RELIGION

OF Wolloston (William)

NATURE

DELINEATED.

Ένιοι Φεύ Γον Τες την Δεισιδαιμονίαν εμπίπθεσιν εἰς 'Αθεότηλα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑσερπεδήσαντες 'ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ κειμένην τω 'Ευσέβειαν. Plutarch.


Χαίζειν εν έασας τας Τιμας τας των πολλων ανθεώπων, των ΑλΗΘΕΙΑΝ σκοπων, σειράσομαι τῷ ὅντι ὡς ἄν δύνωμαι βέλτις ος ων καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐωιδὰν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. Plato.

The SIXTH EDITION.

To which is added a PREFACE, containing a General Account of the Life, Character, and Writings of the AUTHOR.

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A

PREFACE

CONTAINING

A General Account of the Life, Character, and Writings of the Author.



ERHAPS the Perusal of the following Sheets may excite the Curiosity of the Reader to wish for some General Account concerning the AUTHOR of them: And it is not improbable that He may desire to know, in particular, Whether the Person who composed them was a mere Speculative Admirer of VIRTUE; or whether

He was Himself an Example of that Morality which He has so strongly recommended to the Practice of Others. If such a Curiosity shall happen to be raised in any One who was quite a Stranger to this Gentleman's Life and Character, This slight Sketch of Both may chance in some Measure to gratify it.

Mr. WILLIAM WOLLASTON, the Author of the Religion of Nature delineated, was descended from a Family which appears to have been ancient and considerable in the County of Stafford. It was, long since, divided into Two Branches: The former of which continued seated in Staffordshire; But the latter was in process of Time transplanted into other Counties. The Head of the Second Branch slourished formerly at Oncot in the County of Stafford; but, of late Years, at Shenton in the County of Leicester: and was possessed branch was our Author descended: And from a younger Brother of the same Branch sprung Sir John Wollaston, Lord Mayor of London, well known in that City at the Time of the late Civil War.

Mr. Wollaston was born upon the 26th of March 1659. at Coton-Clanford in Staffordshire. When He was in the 10th Year of his Age, a Latin School was opened at Shenston in Staffordshire, where his Father, a private Gentleman, of a small Fortune, then resided: And Mr. Wollaston was immediately sent to the Master of it for such Instruction as He was capable to give Him; and continued near two Years under his Care. Afterwards He was fent to Litchfield School: in which a great Confusion soon after happened, and the Magistrates of the City turned the Master out of the School-House. Many Scholars followed the Ejected Master: And Mr. Wollaston amongst the Rest. He remained with Him till He quitted his School, which was about three Years: And then, the Schism being ended, He returned into the Free-School, and continued there about a Year. This was All the Schooling Mr. WOLLASTON ever had: And this Time was passed, not without Uneafiness. For, though He was always a great Lover of his Book, and defirous of Improvement, Yet the Rudeness of a Great School was particularly disagreeable to his Nature; and, what was still worse, He began to be much infested with the Head-Ach, which seems to have been constitutional in Him.

Upon the 18th of June 1674. He was admitted a Pensioner in Sidney College in Cambridge; being then so much upwards of 15 Years of Age as from the 26th of the preceding March. But here He laboured under various Disadvantages: to which a Person so circumstanced as He then

was, could not but be subject. He had no Acquaintance in the College, nor even in the University (to which He was come a Country Lad from a Country School;) few Books or Materials to work with; no Assistance or Direction from any Body; nor fufficient Confidence to supply that Defect by inquiring from Others. Add to this, That his State of Health was not quite firm: And that his Allowance was by no Means more than fufficient for bare Necessaries; his then Situation being that of a Second Son of a Third Son of a Second Son of a Second Son. (Tho' indeed, notwithstanding this Series of younger Brothers, his Grandfather, who stands in the middle of it, had had a confiderable Estate both Real and Personal, together with an Office of 700 l. per Annum.) However, under All these Disadvantages, Mr. Wollaston acquired a great Degree of RE-PUTATION in the University: perhaps too much; For had it been less, it might have escaped the Tax of Envy, which probably was the Cause of His missing a Preferment in the College, which a Young Man of his Character had Reason to expect.

Upon the 29th of September 1681 He left the University: being then Twenty two Years and an Half Old. He had commenced Master of Arts the Summer before: And it seems to have been about this Time, that He took Deacon's Orders.

From Cambridge He went to pay his Duty to his Father and Mother, who now lived at Great Bloxwyche: having first made a Three Weeks Visit to the then Head of this Branch of the Family, his Cousin Wollaston of Shenton. And He remained at Bloxwyche, with his Father and Mother (whom He had not seen for many Years before) till May or June 1682. About which Time, seeing no Prospect of Preferment, He so far conformed Himself to the Circumstances of his Fortune as to become Assistant to the Head-Master of Birmingham School: Who readily embraced the Opportunity of such a Co-Adjutor, and consider'd Mr. Wollaston as one that prudentially stooped to an Employment below what He might have reasonably pretended to. And his Cousin of Shenton was far from being displeased at this Instance of his Relation's humble Industry.

In a short Time He got a small Lectorship at a Chappel about two Miles distant. But He did the Duty of the Whole Sunday: Which, to-gether

gether with the Business of a Great Free-School, for about four Years began to break his Constitution; and, if continued, had probably overcome it quite, though the Stamina of it were naturally very strong.

During this Space He likewise suffered many Anxieties and underwent a Deal of Trouble and Uneasiness, in order to extricate Two of his Brothers from some Inconveniencies to which their own Imprudencies had subjected them. And in the good Offices which He did them at this Time, He seems to have rather over-acted his Part: For He indulged his Affection for them more than was consistent with a due Regard to

his own Welfare, as He was then circumstanced.

When He had been about four Years at Birmingham, He was chosen Second Master of the School: In which there were three Masters, two Assistants, and a Writing-Master. It was pretended that He was too Young to be Head-Master of so great a School: But in Reality, the Old Master was turned out in order to make way for a particular Person to succeed Him. In this Matter some of the Governors themselves owned that Mr. Wollaston had Wrong done Him. He kept this new Station about two Years. It was worth to Him about 70 l. per Annum. Upon this Occasion He took Priest's Orders: For the Words of the Charter were interpreted to require that the Masters should be in Those Orders, and yet must take no Ecclesiastical Preferment.

The late Chief Master, a valuable and good Old Man, and for whom Mr. Wollaston of Shenton had an Esteem, retired after his Expulsion to his Brother's House in the Neighbourhood of Shenton. He once or twice waited upon Mr. Wollaston of Shenton: And undoubtedly informed Him of the Character, Learning, Conversation and Conduct of our Author; which He was very capable of doing, because they had lived together till the Time of the Old Gentleman's leaving Birmingham.

Mr. Wollaston of Shenton having now lately lost his only Son, and never intending (as appears from his whole Conduct) to give his Estate to his Daughters, pursued his Father's Design of continuing it in the Male Line, and resolved to settle it upon our Author's Uncle and Father (his own first Cousins and his nearest Male Relations) in the same Proportions and Manner exactly in which it had been intailed formerly upon them by

his

his Father. And accordingly He made such a Settlement: subject however to a Revocation.

Mr. Wollaston all this While applied Himself to his Business: and never so much as waited upon his Cousin, or employed any one to speak or act any thing in his Behalf; (tho' many then blamed Him for not doing so.) Only One Visit He made Him, in the November before his Death: lest a Total Absence should be taken for Ingratitude. He went upon a Saturday in the Asternoon; gave Him a Sermon the next Day; received his Hearty Thanks; and the next Morning told Him that He came only to pay those Respects which were due from Him, and to thank Him for all his Favors; and having done that, desired Leave to return to the Duties of his Station: But not one Syllable did He speak, or even insinuate, in relation to his Estate. His Cousin dismissed Him with great Kindness: And by his Looks and Manner seemed to have a Particular Regard for him, but discovered nothing of his Intention by Words.

Mr. Wollaston of Shenton was used to employ Persons privately, to observe our Author's Behaviour: (who little suspected any such Matter.) And his Behaviour was found to be such, that the stricter the Observations were upon it, the more they turned to his Advantage. In Fine, Mr. Wollaston of Shenton became so thoroughly satisfied of our Author's Merit, that He revoked the before mentioned Settlement, and made a Will in his Favor.

In August following Mr. Wollaston of Shenton fell sick: and sent secretly to our Author to come over to Him as of his own Accord without any Notice of his Illness. He complied with the Message: and staid some Days at Shenton. But whilst He was gone Home again, under a Promise of returning, his Cousin died.

It was the 19th of August 1688. when this Gentleman died. His WILL gave a new and a great Turn to Mr. Wollaston's Affairs: who found Himself intitled by it to a very ample Estate.

The Circumstances relating to the Means whereby Mr. Wollaston came to the Possession of his Estate, and the Steps which led to it, have

been

been the more minutely particularized here; Because Common Fame has somehow caught up and sorwarded a groundless Imagination, That our Author was an absolute Stranger to the sormer Possessor and his Family, and happened to fall into his Company by Mere Accident at an Inn. Which is so far from being true or even bearing any Resemblance to Truth, That they were very near Relations, and this very Estate had been twice entailed upon Mr. Wollaston's Uncle and Father.

Such a Sudden and Advantageous Alteration of Affairs would have intoxicated Many a One. But the same FIRMNESS OF MIND which supported this Gentleman under the Pressures of his more Adverse Fortune enabled Him to bear his Prosperity with Moderation: And his Religion and Philosophy taught Him to maintain a due Equanimity under either Extreme.

In November 1688 He came to London: And about a Twelve-month after, upon the 26th of November 1689, He married Mrs. CATHARINE CHARLTON, Daughter of Mr. NICHOLAS CHARLTON, an eminent Citizen of London, a fine Woman, with a good Fortune and a most excellent Character. They lived extremely happy in each other, till her Death left Him a mournful Widower upon the 21st of July 1720. By Her He had eleven Children: Of whom four died in his Life-time; the rest survived Him.

He may most truly be said to have settled in London: For He very seldom went out of it. He took no Delight in unnecessary Journies: And for above Thirty Years before his Death had not been absent from his Habitation in Charter-House Square, so much as ONE whole Night.

In this his Settlement in London He chose a Private and Retired Life. His Carriage was nevertheless Free and Open. He acted like one that aimed at folid and real Content, rather than Shew and Grander: and manifested his Dislike of Power and Dignity, by refusing one of the highest Preferents in the Church when it was offered to Him. He endeavoured to excell in Sincerity and Usefull Sense, more than in Formalities and Trifles.

He had now Books and Leisure: And it was no small Use He made of them. He was perfectly acquainted with the Elementary Parts of Learning:

Learning: And with the learned Languages; Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, &c. He thought it necessary to add to These such a Degree of Philology and Criticism as seemed likely to be Useful to Him; Mathematical Sciences, or at least the Fundamentals of them; The General Philosophy of Nature; The History and Antiquities of the more known and noted States and Kingdoms; and fuch like ERUDITION. And in order to attain the Knowledge of TRUE RELIGION and the DISCOVERY OF TRUTH, (the Points which He always had particularly in View, and to which He chiefly directed all his Studies,) He diligently inquired into the Idolatries of the HEATHENS: And made Himself MASTER of the Sentiments, Rites, and Learning of the JEWS; the HISTORY of the first Settlement of CHRISTIANITY, and the Opinions and Practices introduced into it fince. In the mean time He exercised and improved his MIND by throwing off PREJUDICES; using Himself to clear IMAGES; observing the Influence and Extent of Axioms, the Nature and Force of Con-SEQUENCES, and the Method of investigating TRUTH. In General, He accustomed Himself to THINK MUCH.

By this Method indeed He was rather qualified for private Instruction, than accomplished for public Conversation and Shew. But the latter was not his Point. He looked upon that Specious Sort of Knowledge which often gains a Man the Reputation of a Scholar at a very cheap Rate, to be a False Learning and of no kind of Service to Him who was in Quest of Real Knowledge.

He was of Opinion too That a man might easily read too much: And he considered the Helluo Librorum and the True Scholar as two very different Characters.

The Love of Truth and Reason made Him love Free Thinking: and, as far as the World would bear it, Free Speaking too. This tended, He thought, to the Discovery of Error. Tho' He was not insensible that This might render Him less acceptable to many Persons: To those who perhaps have only just sense enough to perceive their own Weakness; or judge of Things by the Vogue they bear, or the Respect they have to their own Interest or Party; or can neither bear the Trouble of an honest Inquiry themselves,

nor yet that another should know what they do not know; and, in short, to every Prejudiced Person whatsoever. But He took all Opportunities to assert seriously and inculcate strenuously the Being and Perfections of God; his Providence, both General and Particular; the Obligations we are under to adore Him; the Reasonableness of all Virtue; the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul; future Rewards and Punishments; and other High and essential Points of Natural Religion and the Christian Revelation. In Fine, To reason impartially, and to know where to stop, was the Mark He always aimed at.

And He loved TRUTH, not in Speculation only, but also in Practice: For he loved PUNCTUAL HONESTY.

He likewise delighted in Method and Regularity: And chose to have his Labours and Refreshments Periodical; and that his Family and Friends should observe the proper Seasons of their Revolutions. The Reverse of this being the prevailing Temper, or at least Practice of Mankind, oftentimes either deprived Him of Conversation or rendered it dis-

agreeable to Him.

The General Character of his Nature was, That it was Tender and Sensible. This Tenderness disposed Him to feel and Compassionate the Miseries of others: Insomuch that He many times suffered more perhaps in another man's Case than the man did in his own. This Tenderness induced Him always to endeavour to satisfie and convince in Cases where He might have commanded most despotically and absolutely. Tho' it is not improbable that in this He was frequently misunderstood as if He meant to chide, when He only intended to explain and convince. To this Tenderness may also be ascribed that excessive Modesty and Distince of Himself, which made Him delight in Privacy and Retirement; and incapacitated Him in a great Measure from appearing in Public at all like what He really was; and even occasioned Him sometimes to seem inserior to those who exceeded Him in nothing but Forwardness and Conceit. Something of this might indeed be owing to the Depression of his Spirits

in his younger Days. From the fame Causes might arise his strong Apprehension of the Unreasonableness and Injustice of those who were designedly the Beginners of Quarrels or Abuses, or invaded without Provocation Another's Good Name. The same Tenderness rendered Him in a high Manner sensible of the Desertion, Unkindness or Indifference of Friends.

He never indulged his Passions to the Hurt of any One. If in any respect He shewed that He was not so compleat a Stoic as to have eradicated his Passions, or so perfect a Philosopher as never to be surprized by them, it was in the Escape of an hasty Word or Expression now and then, when He was put off of his Guard by Hurries, Indispositions, or such like Occasions. Yet He was not always angry, when the Urgency of Business, the Straitness of Time, the Importunity of impertinent People, or the like, caused Him to talk louder or quicker than ordinary; nor often, (if at all) without sufficient Reason; nor ever so angry with any One else, as He would be with Himself for having been so. In short, If every One would restrain their Anger within the same Bounds as He did, there might be a hasty Word or Expression dropped sometimes upon Provocation or Indisposition: But there would never be Resentment, Wrath or Quarrel more in the World.

He was most remarkably Chearful and Lively in Private Conversation, and by his Inclination ready, as well as by his Treasures of Learning abundantly qualified to be serviceable to all forts of Persons. This rendered his Company agreeable: and Himself worthy to be courted by the Learned and Virtuous. But a General Acquaintance was what He never cultivated: and it grew more and more his Aversion. So that He passed his Days mostly at Home, with a few Friends: with whom He could enjoy an agreeable Relaxation of Mind, and receive All the Advantages of a sincere and open Friendship. This Excessive Retirement was however attended with some Inconveniencies. His Intimates were dropping off, and their Places remained unsupplied; His own Instrmities were increasing; The Frequent Remission of Study growing more and more necessary; and his Solitudes at the same Time becoming less and less pleasant and agreeable.

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What Decays foever there might be in his BODILY STRENGTH, He nevertheless retained to the last the Clearness and Perspicuity of his THOUGHTS. But perceiving his Designs frustrated by the daily Attacks of NATURE, and that it would be impossible to finish and compleat them in the Manner He wished, it seems as if He had intended to destroy with his own Hand the greatest Part of his Works: And that those few Manuscripts which were found after his Death were indebted to the Treachery of his Memory for their Preservation. For He had within the last two or three Years of his Life actually burnt several Treatises, in the Composition whereof He had bestowed no small Quantity of Time and Pains. The following indeed happened to be spared: But from the Place in which they were deposited, and from some other Circumstances, 'tis probable that they owed their Escape to mere Forgetfulness. They were in Number thirteen, (besides about Fourscore Sermons) viz. 1. An Hebrew Grammar. 2. Tyrocinia Arabica & Syriaca. 3. Specimen Vocabularii Biblico-Hebraici, literis nostratibus quantum fert Linguarum Dissonantia descripti. 4. Formulæ quædam Gemarinæ. 5. De variis generibus pedum, metrorum, carminum, &c. Apud Judæos, Græcos & Latinos. 6. De Vocum Tonis Monitio ad Tyrones. 7. Rudimenta ad Mathesin & Philosophiam spectantia. 8. Miscellanea Philologica. 9. Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers. 10. Ioudaina: sive Religionis & Literatura Judaica Synopsis. 11. A Collection of some Antiquities and Particulars in the History of Mankind: tending to shew that Men have not been here upon this Earth from ETER-NITY, &c. 12. Some Passages relating to the History of Christ; collected out of the Primitive Fathers. 13. A Treatise relating to the Jews: of their Antiquities, Language, &c. And what renders it the more probable, or indeed almost beyond Doubt, That He would have destroyed these likewise if He had remembered them, is That several of these which remain undestroyed are only Rudiments or rougher Sketches of what He afterwards reconfidered and carried on much farther: and which even after such Revisal He nevertheless committed to the Flames, as being still (in his Opinion) short of that PERFECTION to which He defired and had intended to bring them.

It must be owned indeed that He had formerly published a PARA-PHRASE on part of the Book of Ecclesiastes, which He had not corrected. But for that very Reason He was afterwards earnestly desirous to suppress it. And He likewise composed and printed a little LATIN GRAM-MAR. But this was only for the Use of his Family. The former was

printed in the Year 1690: The latter in 1703.

Not long before his Death, He published the ENSUING TREATISE, intitled "THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED;" in which the Picture of his LIFE is most fully drawn. There you may behold Him in his REAL CHARACTER: in the humble SUBMISSION AND RESIGNATION of Himself to the unerring Will of the DIVINE BEING; in his TRUE CONJUGAL AND PATERNAL AFFECTION to his Family; in his KIND REGARD AND BENEVOLENCE towards his Fellow-Creatures, according to their respective Stations in Life. For HE HIMSELF steadily practifed those Duties and Obligations which He so earnestly recommended to OTHERS. The Public Honors paid to his MEMORY, and the Great Demand for THIS BOOK (of which more than Ten Thousand were fold in a very few Years) are fufficient Testimonies of its Value. He had, in the Year 1722, printed off a few Copies of it for private Use. And as foon as he had done fo, He began to turn his Thoughts to the THIRD QUESTION: as appears by a Manuscript intitled Heads and Materials for an Answer to Question 3. set down rudely and any bow, in order to be considered, &c. after they are got into some Order. July 4, 1723. Underneath which He has added. They are written at Length (not in my Short-hand) that so if this Answer should never be finished, they may however not be totally lost. However, in this Design He had Opportunity to make but a very small Progress. For it was just about this Time that, at the Instances and Persuasion of his Friends, He set about revising and publishing the following Work: wherein he had answered the two first of the proposed Questions: Refolving, as foon as that should be done, to return to and finish his Answer to the THIRD QUESTION.

But in that He was disappointed. For immediately after he had compleated the Revifal and Publication of the following Treatife, an accident of breaking his Arm increased his Distempers, and accelerated his Death; which happened upon the 29th of October 1724, and has absolutely put an End to the Expectation of seeing any more of his Works in Print. For it would be equally injurious to the AUTHOR and difrespectful to the Public, if his Family should expose his more IMPERFECT SKETCHES in Print after his Death: when HE HIM-SELF had destroyed several more finished PIECES, because He judged them not sufficiently accurate.

His Body was carried down to Great Finborough in Suffolk, One of his Estates, and the Principal Residence of his now Eldest Son and Succeffor in his Estate: who represents the neighbouring Burrough of Ipswych

in Parliament.

From all that has been faid concerning Mr. Wollaston, it appears that notwithstanding his Declining to accept of any Public Employment, yet his STUDIES were designed to be of Public Use: And his SOLITUDE was far from being employed in vain and trifling Amusements terminating in Himself alone.

His latest Moments were calm and easy, Such as might be expected to close a Life spent like his: And He left the World, as He sojourned in it, quietly and resignedly. Both the Manner of his LIFE and that of his

DEATH were well worthy of Imitation.

It is fcarce worth while to take any Notice of an idle or malicious Reflection which has been cast, by some over-zealous Persons, upon this Gentleman's Memory, as if He had put a Slight upon CHRISTIANITY by laying so much Stress upon the Obligations of TRUTH, REASON, and VIRTUE: Or as if He could not have believed aright, because He did not think it necessary to digress from his Subject in Order to INSERT HIS CREED. Surely, a Suspicion thus founded can deserve no Regard. However, it may not be amiss to observe that it has probably been increased by a vulgar mistake that Mr. Wollaston, the Author of the Religion of Nature delineated, was the fame Person with Mr. Woolston who wrote several Pieces which grossly attacked the Literal Truth of the Miracles of Jesus Christ. And this Mistake, which arose originally from the Similitude of Names, might happen to be further confirmed by Mr. Woolston's intitling Himself "Late Fellow of Sidney College in Cambridge:" At which College Mr. Wollaston Himself and Four of his Sons were educated.



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Recion to Marting oftending eds Epstants, views and the description of the second property and assessment and the second of the second recensor coast incredesign on a confirt which en de la companya de Companya de la compa . La comita de estada de la comita del comita de la comita del la comita del la comita del la comita de la comita de la comita de la comita del la comita del la comita del la comita de la comita del la comita



The Religion of Nature delineated.

To A. F. Esq;



WAS much surprised, SIR, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired my thoughts upon these questions,

I. Is there really any fuch thing as natural religion, properly and truly so called?

II. If there is, what is it?

III. How may a man qualify himself, so as to be able to judge, for himself, of the other religions profest in the world; to settle

his own opinions in disputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kind-

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ness to amuse me at a time, when I wanted something to divert melancholy reflexions, I shall not venture to guess. I shall only say, that could I have foreseen in due time, that such a task was to be imposed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was suitable to my purpose in those books, which I have red, but shall scarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leisure nor patience to peruse: I might have noted what the various occurrences and cases, that happen in life, suggested: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on such parts of learning, as would have been directly serviceable to me on the present occasion.

However, as I have not spent my days without thinking and reflecting seriously within my self upon the articles and duties of natural religion, and they are my thoughts which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and consulting a few scatterd papers, in which I had formerly for my own use set down some of them (briefly, and almost solecistically), to give an answer to the two first of your questions, together: the I must own, not without trouble in adjusting and compacting loose sentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the

chaos into the shape of something like a system.

Notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise of natural religion, a subject so beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and fo many things require to be proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find much that is new. Yet something perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature of moral good and evil, and is the prevailing thought that runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to those matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they used to appear to me in my walks and folitudes. So that they are indeed my thoughts, fuch as have been long mine, which I fend you; without any regard to what others have, or have not faid: as I persuade my self you will easily perceive. It is not hard to discern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an author from the false wares and patch-work of a plagiary. Tho after all, it would be madness in a man to go out of his right way, only because it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Sensible how unfinished this performance is, I call it only a Delineation, or rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuse a friend,

who has now passed the threshold of old age; and is, upon that and other accounts, not able to bear much study or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows: which, for the sake of order and perspicuity, I have divided into sections, and propositions.

SECT. I. Of Moral Good and Evil.

which distinguishes them into good, evil, indifferent. For if there is such a difference, there must be religion; & contra. Upon this account it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general idea a, or some rule b, by comparing the foresaid acts with which it might appear, to which kind they respectively belong c. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there must be d. That, which I am going to propose, has always seemed to me not only evidently true, but withal so obvious and plain, that perhaps for this very reason it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the use and application of it is so easy, that if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themselves to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; that is, whether they are disagreeable to it, or not. I shall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.

I. That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself : or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent. Because in proper speaking no act at all can be ascribed to that, which is not indued with these capacities. For that, which cannot di-

^{*} So, in Plato, Socrates requires of Euthyphro not έν τι η δύο διδάξαι τ΄ πολων όσίων ἀλλ' καινο αὐτὸ εἶδω, ῷ πάντα τὰ ὁσια όσια ἐςι, κτλ. And again, ταύτω τοίνων με αὐτὶν δίδαξον την Ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐςινἴνα ἐις καινίω ἀποδλέτων, Ͼ χεωρμω αὐτῆ παραδεί[ματι, ὁ μὰ ἀν τοιῦτον ἦ, ων ἀν η σὐ η ἀλός τις πράτη, Φω
εσιον εἶναι ὁ δὶ ἀν μη τοιῦτον, μη Φω. Posce exemplar honesti. Luc. ο Οἶδε τό γ' αἰχρὸν, κανόνι Ε' καλῶ
μαθών. Eurip. Adsit Regula, peccatis qua pænas irroget aquas, says Horace. Now by the same rule,
by which punishments are justly proportiond, crimes must be distinguished among themselves; and therefore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a rule
which can do this, that is required. ε Formula quadam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus. Cic. ο Πῶς οἷον τε ἀτεκμαρτα εἶναι κὰ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκαιόταλα εν ἀνθεώποις; ἔςιν ἐν [κανών τις] Arrian. ε Ubi virtus, si nihil situm est in issis nobis? Cic.
παιος καιος καιος

stinguish, cannot choose: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choosing for itself, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a necessity incumbent ab extra. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only an instrument in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said to act, but to be acted. The act must be the act of an agent: therefore not of his instrument.

A being under the above-mentiond inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a machine: to which no

language or philosophy ever ascribed non or mores.

II. Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs, by which things are exprest, to the things themselves. Defin.

III. A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition. It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and gestures. Every body understands weeping a, laughing, shrugs, frowns, &c. these are a fort of universal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by casts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muscles b. And we read of feet, that speak c; of a philosopher, who answerd an argument by only getting up and walking d; and of one, who pretended to express the same sentence as many ways by gesticulation, as even Cicero himself could by all his copia of words and eloquence e. But these instances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of other kinds, such as constitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have in nature, and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a signification, and to imply some proposition, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what such acts declare to be, is not, they must contradict truth, as much as any salse proposition or affertion can.

If a body of foldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were not enemies, would not this military language declare what was false? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happend to the Athenians

Lacryma pondera vocis habent. Ov. b Oculi, supercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui sermo quidam tacitus mentis est, &c. Cic. Nutu signisque loquuntur. Ov. Est actio quasi sermo corporis-Cic. & sim. pass. ρασι ετικότως λόγον σιωπῶν, τησε. Sext. Emp. So Menedemus reproved luxury by eating only olives. Diog. L. And others are mentiond by Plutarch, who did ἀνου φωνῆς à δει φράζζη. ε Macrob.

in the attack of Epipolæ, or to the Carthaginians in their last incampment against Agathocles in Africa. Suppose then, instead of this string, some officer to have said they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? The truth or falshood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a certain sense affix to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The thing is the very same still, if into the place of words be substituted actions. The salute here was in nature the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any spectator would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either true or salse: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence.

When Popilius Lænas folicited to have Cicero proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner, would not his carriage have sufficiently signified to any one, who was ignorant of the case, that Tully either was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured this man; or at least had not saved his life, nor had as much reason to expect his service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect Tully's? And all these things being false, were not his behaviour and actions expressive of that which was false, or contradictions to truth? It is certain he acted as if those things had been true, which were not true, and as if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had said they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were so therwise, contradict truth as much as to say they were so, when they were not so?

A pertinacious objector may perhaps still say, it is the business of soldiers to defend themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to prosecute such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that

Where we find φίλες τε φίλοις, ης πολίτας πολίταις εις χεῖςας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντας. Thucyd. Τὰς δικείες ὡς πολεμίες ἡμύνοντο. Diod.S. Val. Max. ἀ Ανθεώποισιν σου ἐχρῆν ποτὰ τ πρασμάτων την γλῶσων ἰχύειν πλέον. Eurip. Quasi intersit, audiam, an videam. Cic.

those acts of defending and prosecuting speak or signify so much: but conjectures are raised upon the common sense, which mankind has of such proceedings. Ans. If it be natural to conclude any thing from them, do they not naturally convey the notice of something to be concluded? And what is conveying the notice of any thing but notifying or signifying that thing? And then again, if this signification is natural and sounded in the common principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which results only from the use of some

particular place or country, as that of language doth?

If A should enter into a compact with B, by which he promises and ingages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this case it must be granted, that his act interferes with his promise, and is contrary to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that proposition, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a compact subsisting. If this proposition be true, A made such a certain agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B. Why? Because the truth of this latter is inconsistent with the agreement afferted The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a dein the former. nial, is this inconsistence. If then the behaviour of A be inconsistent with the agreement mentiond in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by A's behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other proposition. If one proposition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is containd in another, it is faid to contradict this other, and denies the existence of what is containd in it. Just so if one act imports that which is contrary to the import of another, it contradicts this other, and denies its existence. In a word, if A by his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath subjected himself, his actions deny them; just as we say, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it a.

When the question was asked, Whose sheep are these? the answer was, Ægon's: for he committed them to my care b (he uses and disposes of them as his). By this act Damætas understood them to be his; and if they had not been his, but Alphondas's or Melibæus's, Ægon, by an act very intelligible to Damætas, had expressed what was not true. What is said here is the stronger, because he, who has the use and disposal of any thing, has all that he can have of it; and v. v. he who has the all (or property) of any thing, must have all the use and disposal of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be his, than by using

it, &c. But of this fomething more hereafter.

^{*} Ημιείς τ ἀνέμθρον βιελία Πλάτων Ο ἀνεῖοζ φαρδο Πλάτωνα κλ. Plut. b Virg. & Theocr.

In the Jewish history we read, that when Abimelek saw Isaac sporting a with Rebekah, and taking conjugal liberties b, he presently knew her to be Isaac's wise; and if she had not been his wise, the case had been as in the preceding instance. If it be objected, that she might have been his mistress or a harlot; I answer, that so she might have been, tho Isaac had told him by words that she was his wife. And it is sufficient for my purpose, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allowed to express things as plainly and determinately as words can. Certainly Abimelek gave greater credit to that information which passed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear c; and to what Isaac did, than to what he said. For Isaac had told him, that she was not his wife, but his sister d.

A certain author e writes to this purpose, "If a soldier, who had taken the cath to Cæsar, should run over to the enemy, and serve him against Cæsar, and after that be taken; would he not be punished as a deserter, and a perjured villain? And if he should plead for himself, that he never denied Cæsar; would it not be answerd, That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions (or by facts) he did?" And in another place, "Let us, says he, suppose some tyrant command a Christian to burn incense to Jupiter, without adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Christ: if the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, that by that very act he denied him;" (and I may add, consequently denied those propositions which affirm him to be the Christ, a teacher of true religion, and the like f)?

When a man lives, as if he had the estate which he has not, or was in other regards (all fairly cast up) what he is not, what judgment is to be passed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breath untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he lives a lye?

In common speech we say some actions are insignificant, which would not be sense, if there were not some that are significant, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either significant or insignificant h.

1 Πυη ΨηΨη. Rashi. b Only ΠΙΤΙ ΠΙΝΙ (II) according to Alshok. c ητα η τυς άνα ἀνθεωποισιν ἐόνθα ἀπισότερα ὀφθαλμῶν. Herod. d That instance of Menelaus and his guest Alexander, in Arrian, might be subjoind to this. Εἰ τὶς αὐτὰς εἶδε φιλοφεονεμθύες ἀκάλες, ἀπίσησεν ἀν τῷ λέροντι
σῶν εἶναι φίλες αὐτάς. c De Dupl. Mart. f Something like this is that in one of Greg. Naz.'s
orations. When some Christians, who had been instanted by Julian, asked, πῶς Χρισὸν ἐρνήμεθα; they
were answerd ὅτι κατὰ Ε΄ πυρὸς ἐθυμιάσατε. E Τὰ ψευδη πράσματα διώκων. Chrys. Καὶ σολισμὸς
ἀνδρὸς. κὸ γέλως, κὸ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγέκλη σῶν αὐτᾶ, as Basil speaks: and therefore greater things must
do it more. h As that Βλίτρι ap. Diog. L. in v. Zen.

It

12 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.

It may not be improperly observed by the way, that the fignificancy here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people a, as that of words and founds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary fignifications. The generality of Christians, when they pray, take off their hats: the Jews, when they pray b or fay any of their Berakoth, put them on. The same thing which among Christians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the Jews. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itself an indifferent thing, and people by usage or consent may make it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the former kind, fuch as I chiefly here intend, have an unalterable fignification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. Ægon's treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to fignify, that it was not his. From whence it appears, that facts express more strongly, even than words themselves c; or to contradict any proposition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words only d. Words are but arbitrary signs e of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes poverty f, in another denotes riches 8): but facts may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the thoughts themselves produced into act; as the very conceptions of the mind brought

[·] Αἰγύπ ιοι — τὰ πολλά πάντα ἐμιπαλιν τοῖσι ἀλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐς ήσανο ήθεά τε καὶ νόμους, κτλ. המתפלל לא יעמור בתפלה---בראש מגולה. א המתפלל לא יעמור בתפלה---בראש מגולה. א Maim. & al. paff. Herod. όμολογεσιν ειδεναι, τοις ή έργοις άρνεναι. Ερίβ. ad Tit. And το έργοις άρνειος Θεον τω έρ το ειπείν εν σόματι. d Any @ Legy & oxin. Plut. Res loquitur ipfa : qua semper valet plurimum. Cic. Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? Id. Αὐτὰ βοᾶ τὰ πρά ματα, κὰν τῆ Φανή σιωπᾶς. Βαί. know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them, as we please, oc. Durg & iroquater, Bo Er Es w, and oran yenalas oumboder. Arift. And the Plate feems to be of another mind, yet when Cratylus fays 'Oνομα ! Θ ορθοτη α είναι έκας ω τ έντων φύση πεφυκυίαν, it is much to be questiond whether any thing. more be meant than this, that some names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he says that this rectitude of names is the same of Exnoun Bagoagous; that it is [only] such as is sufficient Inder είου έκα τον έτι τ όντων; fuch as may render them κατά το δύναθον όμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, &c. That lepidum of festivum argumentum, which P. Nigidius. ap. A. Gell. makes use of to shew, cur videri possint verba effe naturalia magis quam arbitraria, deserves only to be laughd at. f ביש Hebr. צריש Hebr. Arab. So Ab. Ezra observes that TIN in Heb. is to will, in Arab. to nill (tho in Arab. the word is written (and in another place, that the same word even in the same language sometimes signifies , a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words have different senses and uses. 113y in Arabic, according to Giggeius and Golius, has 70 or 80, and Some (two at least) contrary the one to the other. forth

forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and express representations of them. And, beside this, they bear certain respects to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any ratio's are in mathematics. For the sacts and the things they respect are just what they are, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects interceding between those must be as fixt, as the ratio is which one of these bears to the other: that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things cease to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict those propositions, which affert them to be as they are a.

IV. No act (whether word b or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. For,

1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong c, that act which implies such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice.

2. Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the relation between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determind and fixt by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves too), and consequently be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in opposition to truth, or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth d.

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3. If there is a supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either causes, or permits to be; then to own things to be as they are is to own what He causes, or at least permits, to be thus caused or permitted: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, reveald in the books of nature. To do this therefore must be agreeable to His will. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and, since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly wrong.

I defire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is ill done by them, should be so done; i. e. that they should use their liberty ill: but I say, when they have done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we should allow it to have been committed: or, it would be disagreeable

to His will, that we should deny it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, to be as they are, is direct obedience b: so the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been that are or have been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion against Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to say, "God indeed causes such a "thing to be, or at least permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies be tween this and that, is of such a nature, that one may be affirmed of the o- ther, &c. this is true: but yet to me it shall not be so: I will not indure it, or act as if it were so: the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I mind them, or what follows from them: even existence shall be non-existence, when my pleasures require". Such an impious declaration as this attends every voluntary infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any instance or manner whatsoever, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: every
thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone; and the like. And then if
those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which
they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do
this is to act not only in opposition to His government or soveraignty, but to His

^{*} Εδωκεν [ὁ Θεὸς] ἀντὶ δέλτε τὰ κόσμον. Chryf.

b What Hierocles says of his ἐγκόσμοιοι Θεοὶ, is true in respect of every thing. Τῷ Θέιω νόμω κατακολεθέντων ἐςὶ—τῶτο ἀντὰς εἶναι τίθεως, τὸ γεγάνασι. There is a passage somewhere in S. Iqqar. much like this: where it is said (as I remember) that he, who worships an Angel Τι ΠΙΧ απο απο (as being what he is, the messenger of God) is not guilty of idolatry.

nature 2 also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most wrong.

Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better represented thus. If there are such things as axioms, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always known to God to be so, the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the Divine know-ledge must be denied too.

5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for streight, &c. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and stally to deny the existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, if things are not what they are.

To talk to a post, or otherwise treat it as if it was a man, would surely be reckond an absurdity, if not distraction c. Why? because this is to treat it as being what it is not. And why should not the converse be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a post d; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do.

Lastly, to deny things to be as they are is a transgression of the great law of our nature, the law of reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature e, and great force f of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my felf, the least truth cannot be

^{*} Μοτας καπ (Ποιμνας Τος ανδρεια το δντως δν.

Τοιμνας Τος ανδρεια το δντως δν.

Θεξ. Ph. Jud.

Ποιμνας Τος ανδρεια το δντως δν.

Θεξ. Ph. Jud.

Ποιμνας Τος ανδρεια το δντως δν.

Θεξ. Ph. Jud.

Ποιμνας Τος ανδρεια το δντως δν.

Θεξ. Ph. Jud.

Ποιμνας Τος ανδρεις Τέχων is in Soph. the character of Ajax, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monstrous and mad extravagances of C. Caligula one is, that he treated his horse Incitatus as a man. Suet.

Δ Horace argues after the same manner. Si quis lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam; Huic vestem, ut natæ, paret, &c. Interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prator, &c. Quid, siquis natam pro mutâ devovet agnâ. Integer est animi? ne dixeris. If it be against truth and nature to use a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much against truth to use a daughter as a lamb.

Καθ΄ ἀντο ᾶ ψεῦδο φαῦλοι κὰ ψεκτόν τὸ δάληθεις καλὸν κὰ ἐπαινετόν. Arist. Est quiddam, quod sua vi nos alliciat ad ses, non emolumento captans aliquo; sed trahens sua dignitate: quod genus, virtus, scientia, veritas est. Cic. Γλυκὸ ἡ ἀλήθεια a sestival saying in Plut.

1 O magna vis veritatis, &c. Cic. A good man πρωτι πυνιν πρω Μαίπ.

contradicted without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more than displease; it is shocking.

V. What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the

same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition.

Nothing can be afferted or denied by any act with regard to those things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts do bear such relations to other things, as to be declaratory of something concerning them, this commonly is visible; and it is not difficult to determin, whether truth suffers by them, or not. Some things cannot possibly be done, but truth must be directly and positively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the cases arising from omissions are not always so well determind, and plain: it is not always easy to know when or how far truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude must be allowed, and much must be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be faid in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting, the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth. And there may be omissions in other cases, that are silent as to truth. But yet there are some neglects or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with

it (or, with some true propositions).

We before b supposed A to have engaged not to do some certain thing, &c. if now, on the other side, he should by some solemn promise, oath, or other act undertake to do some certain thing before such a time, and he voluntarily c omits to do it, he would behave himself as if there had been no such promise or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former instance.

Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied. If a man does not defire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his own nature and the nature and definition of happiness to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglect the means, leading to any such end, is the same as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and

b p. 10.

c Oblivione volun-

^{*} Plura vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Cic.

that may be considered as an act, many omissions of this kind may be turned over to the other side a, and brought under the foregoing proposition.

It must be confest there is a difficulty as to the means, by which we are to consult our own preservation and happiness; to know what those are, and what they are with respect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: some labor under disadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in such an irregular distemperd world, and of those many incidents, that may happen either to surther or break our measures, deprive us of certainty in these matters. But still we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can b; and the neglect to do this will be an omission within the reach of the proposition.

There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be annumerated to these by being either total, or notorious, or upon the score of some other circumstance. It is certain I should not deny the Phanissa of Euripides to be an excellent drama by not reading it: nor do I deny Chihil-menâr to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to see it. But should I, having leisure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my mind, and attain such knowledge as may be useful to me, I should then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precisely, into what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after knowledge, and where the discontinuance begins to be no offence against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himself as well as he canc. This is one of those cases which I said before were not so well determind.

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be poor, any more than I should deny a man to have a squalid beard by not shaving him, to be nasty by not washing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

Many things are here to be taken into confideration (according to the next proposition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by doing this; and then I cannot by not doing it d. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then something in charity to the poor, should yet never give them any thing at all,

a In the Civil Law he is said to act, who does omit. Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea qua non facit. Dig. b Est quodam prodire tenus. Hor. c Disces quamdin voles: tamdin antem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non panitebit, says Cicero to his fon. d Nulla virtus virtuti contraria est. Sen.

I should then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is: and thus truth would be injured. So, again,

If I should not say my prayers at such a certain hour, or in such a certain place and manner, this would not imply a denial of the existence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him: nay, there may be reasons perhaps against that particular time, place, manner. But if I should never pray to Him, or worship Him at all, such a total omission would be equivalent to this affertion, There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored: which, if there is such a being, must be contrary to truth. Also generally and notoriously to neglect this duty (permit me to call it so), tho not quite always, will favor, if not directly proclaim the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner is only to worship him accidentally, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is possible to a total neglect. Beside, such a sparing and infrequent worshiper of the Deity betrays such an habitual disregard of Him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null.

Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, faln down, alone, and without present help like to perish; or see his house on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my affishance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this refusing to do it according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is; human nature to be what it is; and even those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to my self I should have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what it is in it self or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in.

If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding him to use him as a horse, but not as the horse of another man, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the respect he bears to his true owner. But it is not necessary perhaps to consider what he is in respect to his color, shape or age: because the thief's riding away with him may neither assirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, &c. I say therefore, that those, and all those properties, respects, and circumstances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into consideration. For otherwise the thing to be considered is but

imperfectly surveyd; and the whole compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in part only, and in other re-

spects perhaps as being what it is not.

If a rich man being upon a journey, should be robbed and stript, it would be a second robbery and injustice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to consider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a rich man robbed and abused, and indeed at that time a poor man a and distrest, tho able to repay afterwards the assistance lent him.

Moreover a man in giving affishance of any kind to another should consider what his own circumstances are, as well as what the others are b. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he should give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumstances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And since (as I have observed already) all truths are consistent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a right light, and the case properly stated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly said to want assistance, but not the affishance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be said to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what the latter is with respect to the former.

The case becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under some promise or compact to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his samily, &c. and he cannot do these, if he does that, effectually. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite truths, but there are truths on opposite sides. I answer: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot be both A's duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call mixt, may arise out of those differing considerations. A should affist B; but so, as not to neglect himself and samily, &c. and so to take care of himself and samily, as not to forget the other ingagement, as well and honestly as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some exception or limitation understood. It is not in man's power to promise

י אני באוחה שעני: according to that determination in a case something like this, which occurs in Talm. Mass. Phe. b Utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti; sed ut ipse non egeam, &c. Sen. Ita te aliorum miserescat, ne tui alios miseresat. Plaut.

absolutely. He can only promise as one, who may be disabled by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing.

I could here infert many inflances of partial thinking, which occur in au-

thors: but I shall choose only to set down one in the margin a.

In short, when things are truly estimated, persons concerned, times, places b, ends intended c, and effects that naturally follow, must be added to them.

VII. When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right: likewise when the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not omitting it) must be right. Because contrariorum contraria est ratio.

VIII. Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.

IX. Every act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions which interfere with truth (i.e. deny any proposition to be true, which is true; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard d) are morally evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.

I would have it to be minded well, that when I speak of acts inconsistent with truth, I mean any truth; any true proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of speculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken

to be what in fact and truth it is e.

a Sextus Emp. seems to be fond of that filthy faying of Zeno, in relation to what is storied of Focasta and Oedipus: μη άτοπον είναι το μορίον της μητρος τρίψαι, κλ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only reits is confiderd; as if all was nothing more, but barely reivis; but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For reivis & more than τείψις by it felf: and τείψις & μορίε τ μολεός is still more: and certainly τείδειν την χείρα τη χειεί is a different thing from Teledo To μορίον Τω μορίω, &c. He might as well have faid, that to ruba red hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the same as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but reitis. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, shew themselves to be but half-thinkers, or less: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be confiderd. b Sunt res quadam ex tempore, & ex consilio, non ex sua natura consideranda. — Quid tempora pe_ ο Οὐ λέγεις Φιλόπονον τ 2/4 παιtant, aut quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est, &c. Cic. δισκάριον άγχυπνέντα. Arr. Amico agro aliquis assidet: probamus. at hoc si hareditatis causa facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat. Sen. d Ού β είς ἀξνήσεως ές ι τζόπ . Chrys. Ε Τὸ κράτις ον τ άγαθῶν ἡ ἀλήθα, κὸ ὁ ἔχατΟν ός Φ τ πονηςίας τὸ ψεῦδΟ. Baf. It

are

It may be of use also to remember, that I have added those words in some degree or other. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal a. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different importance b; or more truths may be violated one way than another c: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be cqually (one as well as the other) faid to be crimes, but not equal crimes d. If A steals a book from B which was pleasing and useful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whose happiness partly depends upon it: but still if A should deprive B of a good estate, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we suppose the book to be worth to him one pound, and the estate 10000 l. that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his estate. It is the same as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 must be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 1000oth part of it, fure. Then, tho the convenience and innocent pleasure, that B found in the use of the book, was a degree of happiness: yet the happiness accruing to him from the estate, by which he was fupplied not only with necessaries, but also with many other comforts and harmless injoyments, vastly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former case was, B had a property in that, which gave him such a degree of bappiness: that violated in the latter, B had a property in that, which gave him a happiness vastly superior to the other. The violation therefore in the latter case is upon this account a vastly greater violation than in the former. Lastly, the truths violated in the former case might end in B, those in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who fubfift also by the estate, and

a Notwithstanding that paradox of the Stoics, "Οτι ισα τὰ ἀμαςτήματα, ης τὰ κατοςθώματα, Αρ. Cic. Plut. Diog. L. & al. which might easily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if sinning be like passing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, to sin being equal to going beyond that line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line must be to sin more. Who sees not the falsity of that, nec bono viro meliorem, — nec forti fortiorem, nec sapiente sapientiorem posse sier? And so on. Nullum inter scelus & erratum discrimen facere (as S. Hier. expresses their opinion: if that epistle to Celantia be his) is to alter or destroy the natures of things. b Sure that Wiseman was but a bad accountant, who reckond, την μεγίτω ἐσίαν λωδαλων, δραχμήν μίαν ἐπδεδληκέναι. Αρ. Plut. c This is confest in Cic. Illud interest, quod in servo necando, si adsit injuria, semel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, &c. Multitudine peccatorum prastat, &c. d This may serve for an answer to Chrysippus, and them who say, ει ἀληθες ἀληθες μᾶχλον σον εξειν, εδε ψεῦδω ψεύδως ἐτως εδε ἀπάτη ἀπάτης εδε ἀμαρτήματω, κλ. Αρ. Diog. L.

are to be provided for out of it. And these truths are very many in respect of every one of them, and all their descendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated a. I shall only add, on the other side, that the value of good actions will rise at least in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omission of them: and that therefore they cannot be equal, any more than the opposite evil omissions.

But let us return to that, which is our main subject, the distinction between moral good and evil. Some have been so wild as to deny there is any such thing: but from what has been said here, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral good and evil as there is true and false; and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between those as between these, the difference at the bottom being indeed the same b. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they want some criterion, or mark, by the help of which they might know them assunder. And others there are, who pretend to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared, and may be discriminated; or that ultimate end, to which they ought all to be referred c: but what they have advanced is either salse, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm d, or (so far as it is just) reducible to my rule. For

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call honestume, may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the cause for ends of them: but then what is honestumh? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the honesta from the inhonesta.

They who place all in following nature; if they mean by that phrase acting according to the natures of things (that is, treating things as being what they

Dueis paria esse ferè placuit peccata, laborant Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugb Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil (φύσξ nant, Atque ipsa utilitas. Hor. ayason's κακον), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to fay there was nothing in nature either true or false. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L. ^c Quod [extremum, s. ultimum bonorum] omnium philosophorum sententiatale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat : ipsum autem nusquam. Cic. d There was among the old philosophers such an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the fines bonorum & malorum, that if Varro computes rightly, the number might be raised to 288. S. Aug. · Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est. Cato ap. Cic. f Qui [omnes] permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt — quia honestum est. Cic. ⁸ It is commonly placed among ends: and is confiderd as fuch in those ways of speaking; honestum esse propter se expetendum, Cic. Finem bonorum esse honeste vivere, ib. and the like. h To say, Quod laudabile est, omne honestum est, or any thing like that, is to fay nothing. For how shall one know what is truly laudabile? είπε [Ζήναν] τὸ όμιολογεμθρως (al. ἀκολέθως) τῆ Φύσε ζῆν, ὁπες ἐςὶ κατ' ἀςετην ζῆν. ''Αγε 🔊 πρὸς ταύτω ipas i poris. Diog. L. in

They,

in nature are, or according to truth) fay what is right. But this does not feem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature a, since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will missead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose.

They who make right reason to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them lawful or unlawful, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reason is meant that which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have delivered themselves, is not yet explicit enough. It leaves room for so many disputes and opposite right-reasons, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that his reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends farther: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such matters of satt, as are fairly discoverd to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them.

They, who contenting themselves with superficial and transient views, deduce the difference between good and evil from the common sense of mankind d, and certain principles e that are born with us f, put the matter upon a very insirm foot. For it is much to be suspected there are no such innate maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions of education are mistaken for them: and beside that, the sentiments of mankind are not so uniform and constant, as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them s.

^{*} Vivere ex hominis natura. Cic. It is true he adds, undique perfecta & nihil requirente: but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is natura undique perfecta & nihil requirens? Beside, moral religion doth not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures.

• Celebrated every where.

• To μ εν ετω διορίσω τας τας άγαθας πράξης, τας κατά τ δρθον γινομθρας λόγον, κο τας πονηράς τένωντίον, άληθες μ, σου ες ι είναι ατα πράξης σημώναι. Andr. Rh.

• Nec solum jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Cic. Κριτήριά φησιν [ὁ Χρόσιππ.] είναι αιοθησιν κο πρόληψιν. Diog. L.

• They are usually called principia natura, lex (or leges) natura, προλήψης, κοιναί, οr φυσικαί έννοιαι, νόμ. φυσικός, &c.

• The set of these practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is, what, I think, goes by the name of Synteresis.

• Unaquaque gens hoc legem natura putat, quod didicit. Hieron.

24 The Religion of Nature. Sect. I.

They, who own nothing to be good but pleasure, or what they call jucundum, nothing evil but pain a, and diffinguish things by their tendencies to this or that b, do not agree in what this pleasure is to be placed c, or by what methods and actings the most of it may be obtaind. These are left to be questions still. As men have different tasts, different degrees of sense and philosophy, the same thing cannot be pleasant to all: and if particular actions are to be proved by this test, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the same act may be of one nature to one man, and of another to another. Beside, unless there be fome strong limitation added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to fink into gross voluptuousness, as in fact the generality of Epicurus's herd have done d (notwithstanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, &c.); and the bridle will be usurped by those appetites which it is a principal part of all religion, natural as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these men fay what is intelligible indeed: but what they fay is false. For not all pleasures, but only such pleasure as is true, or happiness (of which afterwards), may be reckond among the fines, or ultima bonorum.

He^c, who, having confiderd the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *middle*, and feems to raife an idea of it from its fituation at an equal diffance from the opposite extremes f,

² Under which word these delicate men comprehend labor. When Epicurus, in Lucian, is asked, Kaκον ηγη τ πόνον; he answers, Ναί. And Mindyrides (Σμινδυρίδης, ap. Herod. ος έπι πλείς ον δε χλιδής είς àνης ἀπίκετο) proceeded so far in his aversion to labor, that ejus latus alieno labore condoluit -: qui cum vidisset fodientem, & altius rastrum allevantem, lassum se sieri (ρίηγμα λαδείν, in Athen.) questus vetuit b Ad hac [voluptatem, & dolorem] & qua sequamur, illum opus in conspectu suo facere. Sen. in qua fugiamus, refert omnia [Aristippus]. Cic. · Velim definias, quid sit voluptas: de quo omnis hac quastio est. Cic. The disputes about pleasure between the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hieronymus. &c. are well known: whether the end was pleasure of body or mind: whether it was voluptas in mozu, or in statu (stabilitate); que suavitate alique naturam ipsem movet, or que percipitur, omni dolore detracto; n en ninod, or n natas nuation, &c. Cic. Diog. L. & al. d Negat Epicurus jusunde vivi posse, nis cum virtute vivatur. Cic. But for all that their pleasures have not continued to be always like those in the little gardens of Gargettus. Nor indeed do they seem to be very virtuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Leontium (or, as he amorously called her, Λεοντάgior,) a famous harlot; but the πῶσίτε τοῖς Επικερείοις σιωνην ον τοῖς κήποις. Athen. And in his book τως τέλες he is faid to have written thus, Οὐ ρ ἔγωςε ἔχω τι νοήσω τὰγαθὸν, ἀφαιρῶν με τὰς Δρά χυλῶν (χειλων, Athen.) ήδονως, άφαιεων ή κρ τας δι άφεοδισίων, κλ. See this and more in Diog. L. Ferom uses the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. Philosophorum sententia eft, μεσήτη ας άξετας, τωτεβολάς κακίας είναι. f 'H κ τωες δολή άμαρτάνε), κ ή έλλοψις ψέγε), τὸ ή μέσον έπαινεί].— Ές ιν άρα ή άρετη έξις προαιρετική, ον μεσότηλι έσα, κτλ. Μεσότης ή, δύο κακιών τ μίψ καθ' τω ερδολήν. τ j κατ' έλληψω. Arist. Perhaps Pythagoras (and after him Plato, and others), when he said (ap. Dieg. L.) The aperine approvious sivas, might have some such thought as this. could

could only defign to be understood of such virtues, as have extremes. It must be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward either extreme, must be so far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the distance, and declines neither way, must be right: also, that this notion supplies us with a good direction for common use in many cases. But then there are several obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: scarce more than such, as respect the virtues couched under the word moderation. And even as to these, it is many times difficult to discern, which is the middle point. This the author himself was sensible of b.

And when his master *Plato* makes virtue to consist in such a likeness to God c, as we are capable of (and God to be the great exemplar), he says what I shall not dispute. But since he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeness, we are little the wiser in point of practice: unless by it we understand the practice of truth, God being truth, and doing nothing contrary to it d.

Whether any of those other foundations, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than these mentiond, I much question. But if the formal ratio of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the truth of the case or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the distinction seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a true proposition and matter of sact is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be easy for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not only words, but also actions with them. A very little skill and attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they speak truth, or not e.

X. If there be moral good and evil, distinguished as before, there is religion; and such as may most properly be styled natural. By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I say, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be

done. So that there must be religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral good and evil: because that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms to be done; and so that, which being done would be evil, and implies such absurdaties and rebellion against the supreme being, as are mentioned under proposition the IV th. ought most undoubtedly not to be done. And then since there is religion, which follows from the distinction between moral good and evil; since this distinction is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth; and since no proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature: since things are so, there must be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the religion of nature or natural religion; the great law of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we shall afterwards find reason to call it) of the Author of nature is,

XI. That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is a.

Objections I am sensible may be made to almost any thing b; but I believe none to what has been here advanced but such as may be answerd. For to consider a thing as being fomething else than what it is, or (which is the same) not to consider it as being what it is, is an absurdity indefensible. However, for a specimen, I will fet down a few. Let us suppose some gentleman, who has not sufficiently considerd these matters, amidst his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after some fuch manner as this. " If every thing must be treated as being what it is, what " rare work will follow? For, 1. to treat my enemy as fuch is to kill him, or re-" venge my self soundly upon him. 2. To use a creditor, who is a spend-thrist, or " one that knows not the use of money, or has no occasion for it, as such, is not to " pay him. Nay further, 3. If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I " take it from some body else to supply my own wants? And more, do not I act " contrary to truth, if I do not? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a design " of killing another, or doing him some great mischief, if he can find him, should " ask me where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to fave life, fay I do "not know, tho that be false? 5. At this rate I may not, in a frolick, break a 66 glass, or burn a book: because for sooth to use these things as being what they

What it is in nature. Μόμω , to use Maim.'s words. And thus that in Arrianus is true, Νόμω βιωτικός ἐξιν ἔτω, τὸ ἀκόλεθον τῷ φύσψ πράτθψ. Omni in re quid sit veri, videre & tueri decet. Cic. This is indeed the way of truth.
 b Because there is scarce any thing, which one or other will not say. Quid enim potest dici de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem, &c. Lact.

are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not

66 burn it. Lastly, how shall a man know what is true: and if he can find out

" truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?" To the first objection it is easy to reply from what has been already said. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was nothing more than his enemy, there might be some force in the objection; but since he may be confiderd as something else beside that, he must be used according to what he is in other respects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the first place is a man; and as such may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very sensible part. And then if O and E are fellow-citizens, living under the same government, and subject to laws, which are so many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, estate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unless he treats him also as one, who by common consent is under such a protection. If he does otherwise, he denies the existence of the foresaid laws and public compacts: contrary to truth. And beside, O should act with respect to himself as being what he is; a man himself, in such or such circumstances, and one who has given up all right to private revenge (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be observed, the result will be this. O must treat E as something compounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: that is, he must only profecute him in fuch a way, as is agreeable to the statutes and methods, which the fociety have obliged themselves to observe. And even as to legal prosecutions, there may be many things still to be considerd. For E may shew himself an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are such things, as really affect the safety or bappiness of O or his family, then he will find himfelf obliged, in duty and fubmission to truth, to take refuge in the laws; and to punish E, or obtain satisfaction, and at least security for the future, by the means there prescribed. Because if he does not, he denies the nature and sense of happiness to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we shall shew hereafter he is under to his family a, to be what they are; a dangerous and wicked enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the end of laws, and society itself, to be the safety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, punishing offenders, &c.

^{*} Conveniet cùm in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum: — à litibus verò quantum liceat, & nescio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem. — Habenda est autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi sinere flagitiosum est. Cic.

Which

which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity of E rifes not beyond trifting, or more tolerable inflances, then O might act against truth, if he should be at more charge or hazard in prosecuting E than he can afford, or the thing lost or in danger is worth; should treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a little enemy, as a great one; or should deny to make some allowances, and forgive such peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. Lastly, in cases, of which the laws of the place take no notice, truth and nature would be sufficiently observed, if O should keep a vigilant eye upon the steps of his adversary, and take the most prudent measures, that are compatible with the character of a private person, either to asswape the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he should only not use him as a friend a. For this if he should do, notwithstanding the rants of some men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and consound truth with untruth.

The debtor in the fecond objection, if he acts as he fays there, does, in the first place, make himself the judge of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy fentence, an incapacity in effect of having any estate, or any more estate. In the next place, he arrogates to himself more than can be true: that he perfectly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumstances are, but also what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwise. And, which is to be confiderd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is supposed to be owing or due to him (otherwise he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, of right it is his (or, it is his). But the debtor by detaining it uses it, as if it was his own, and therefore not the other's; contrary to truth. a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no such fignification. It only fignifies, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his: and this it naturally doth fignify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not without this.

Ans. to objection the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that no truth may be denied by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which (by the supposition)

are

is his. The former is only as it were filence, which denies nothing: the latter a direct and loud affertion of a falsity; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no pretence for making another man to pay for his wickedness or folly. We will suppose therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for necessaries, and to have incurred this want through some misfortune, which he could not prevent. In this case, which is put as strong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without trespassing upon truth. The man may by honest labor and industry seek to supply his wants; or he may apply as a supplicant a, not as an enemy or robber, to fuch as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very preffing, to the first persons he meets, whom truth will oblige to affish him according to their abilities: or he may do any thing but violate truth b; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as this is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate c. Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved feet. vi. to have a right to defend himself and his, and not suffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.

Ans. to obj. the 4th. It is certain, in the first place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes murder: whoever is accessary to that, offends against many truths of great weight. 2. You are not obliged to answer the furioso's question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may truly deny, that you know where the man is. Lastly, if by not discovering him you should indanger your life (and this is the hardest circumstance, that can be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, "If you do not murder such a one, I will murder you." And then be sure you must not commit murder; but must defend your self against this, as against other dangers, against Banditi, &c. as well as you can. Tho' merely to deny truth by words (I mean, when they

^{*} Τὸ πένει ζζ σόκ ὁμολογεῖν τοὶ αἰχεὸν, ἀπὰ μὰ Δεφεύγψ ἔεγφ αἴχιεν. Thucyd.

b For ἔεγον γ' ἐδεν ἐνψδΦ. Hef.

c Suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Cic. According to Plato, a man should choose to die πεὸ Ε ἀδικεῖν.

are not productive of facts to follow; as in judicial transactions, bearing witness, or passing sentence) is not equal to a denial by facts; tho an abuse of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any; tho all sins against truth are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties a, as little a one as any; and tho one might look on a man in such a sit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a man but a mad man: yet truth is sacred b, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or taking the advantage of some seasonable incident c.

The 5th objection feems to respect inanimate things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is infinuated we shall become obnoxious to many trifling obligations; such as are there mentiond. To this I answer thus. If the glass be nothing else but an useful drinking-glass, and these words fully express what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to break it designedly is to do what is wrong d. For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any reason for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it As, if the glass be poisond: for then it becomes a poisond drinking-glass, and to break or destroy it is to use it according to this true description of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the loss of it, it becomes a glass with that circumstance: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to use it according to what it is. And if it should become by some circumstance useless only, tho there should be no reason for breaking it, yet if there be none against it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This answer, mutatis mutandis, may be adapted to other things of this kind; books, or any thing else. As the usefulness or excellence of some books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to secure them to posterity e; fo some may be used more like what they are, by tearing or burning them,

שנו מל נמוף און אינור אינור און אינור אינור און אינור אינו

than by preserving or reading them: the number of which, large enough already, I wish you may not think to be increased by this, which I here send you.

Here two things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or t'other may be so little as to render the crime evanescent or almost nothing a. And, z. that inanimate beings cannot be considered as capable of wrong treatment, if the respect they bear to living beings is separated from them. The drinking-glass before mentioned could not be considered as such, or be what it now is, if there was no drinking animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it self, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are in reference to things that have life.

The last and most material objection, or question rather, shall be answerd by and by. In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear what, or how things are, then this will be true, that the case or thing under consideration is doubtful: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be on the safer side. Such behaviour shews the case to be as it is. And as to the want of power to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himself the satisfaction, which he will find in sect. IV.

SECT. II. Of Happiness.

HAT, which demands to be next confiderd, is happiness; as being in it self most considerable; as abetting the cause of truth; and as being indeed so nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the respects due to one, unless we regard the other. Happiness must not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at that happiness, which is true.

In the few following propositions I shall not only give you my idea of it, but also subjoin some observations, which tho perhaps not necessary here, we may sometime hereafter think no loss of time or labor to have made en passant: such as

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The Stoics must certainly therefore be much too scrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earnest), that is τ δάκτυλον ως τυχε σαλεύψη τῷ σοΦῷ ὁ λόγ Φ ἐπιτρέπψ. Clem. Alex. Especially since this is, at least ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by pr. ix.

men of science would call, some of them perismata, or corollaries, and some scholia, I shall take them as they fall in my way promiscuously.

- I. Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, pain of the contrary: &v.v. the consciousness of any thing agreeable is pleasure, of the contrary pain. For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the same time, and as such; nor any thing disagreeable pleasant, by the terms; so neither can any thing agreeable be for that reason (because it is agreeable) not pleasant, nor any thing disagreeable not painful, in some measure or other.
- Obs. 1. Pleasures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and sense of their subjects, or the persons affected with them. For consciousness and perception cannot be separated: because as I do not perceive what I am not conscious to my self I do perceive, so neither can I be conscious of what I do not perceive, or of more or less than what I do perceive. And therefore, since the degrees of pleasure or pain must be answerable to the consciousness, which the party affected has of them, they must likewise be as the degrees of perception are.
- Obs. 2. Whatever increases the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more susreptive of pleasure or pain. This is an immediate consequence; and to add more is needless: unless, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward tense of things may in many cases be heightend and increased, the principal are reflexion, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be conscious of what I do not perceive: so I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every instance therefore of consciousness and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions; so v. v. the more frequent or intense the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more consciousness there is, and the stronger is the perception. Further, all perceptions are produced in time: time passes by moments: there can be but one moment prefent at once: and therefore all present perception considerd without any relation to what is past, or future, may be looked upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is past, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a connexion of past and future, which by this are brought into the sum, and superadded to the present or momentaneous perceptions. Again, by reflecting we practife our capacity of apprehending: and this practifing will inerease, and as it were extend that capacity, to a certain degree. Lastly, reflexion doth

doth not only accumulate moments past and suture to those that are present, but even in their passage it seems to multiply them. For time, as well as space, is capable of indeterminate division: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reslexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilst the mind considers those parts as so many several moments, is in effect renderd by this so much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obs. 3. The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in that subject. When the cause is of the same kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one person be equal to that of another, what they perceive must needs be equal. And so it will be likewise, when the forces in the producing causes and the degrees of perception in the sentients are reciprocal. For (which doth not seem to be considered by the world, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cause of pleasure or pain should act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the sum of their pleasures or pains will be equal. In other cases they will be unequal. As, if the causa dolorifica should act with the same impetus on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain sustained by D would be half as much more as that of C: because he would perceive or feel the acts and impressions of the cause more by so much. If it should act with twice the force. upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: i. e. as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception. to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And so on.

Obs. 4. Mens respective happinesses or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the thoughts and sense, which they have of them: not according to the estimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor can know what they are; may compute by different rules; have less sense; be in different circumstances; or such as guilt has renderd partial to themselves. If that prince, who having plenty and slocks many, yet ravished the poor man's single ewelamb out of his bosom, reckond the poor man's loss to be not greater, than the loss of one of his lambs would have been to him, he must be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little understood the doctrine of proportion. Every

[.] Tu si bic fis, aliter fentias. Ter.

man's happiness is his happiness, what it is to him; and the loss of it is answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumstances a.

Obs. 5. How judicious and wary ought princes, lawgivers, judges, juries, and even mafters to be! They ought not to confider fo much what a ftout, resolute, obstinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker fort, or at least (if that can be known) the persons immediately concernd can bear: that is, what any punishment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore should not be used as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public justice, they scarce know how themselves: some fall into them through necessity, strength of temptation, despair, elasticity of spirits and a sudden eruption of passion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or some natural infirmity or propension, and some who are really innocent, are opprest by the iniquity or mistakes of judges, witnesses, juries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their sense or their honesty has not permitted them to join. What a difference must there be between the fufferings of a poor wretch sensible of his crime or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy veteran in roguery: between the apprehensions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in short, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obs. 6. In general, all persons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concernd. Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no man can

tell, by himself, or any other way, how another may be affected.

Obs. 7. There cannot be an equal distribution of rewards and punishments by any stated human laws b. Because (among other reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same gratification, or the same punishment to different persons.

Obs. 8. The sufferings of brutes are not like the sufferings of men. They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon past or future, upon causes, circumstances, &c.

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to nothing, to no-time and no-life. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remain-

Felicitas cui pracipua fuerit homini, non est humani judicii: cùm prosperitatem ipsam alius alio modo, & suopte ingenio quisque terminet. Pliny.

b It is not possible (in Albo's words)

c Inter hominem & belluam hoc maximè interest, quod hac—ad id solum quod adest, quodque prasens est, se accommodat, paululum admodum sentiens prateritum aut futurum, &c. Cic. Nos & venturo torquemur & praterito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum prasentibus miser est. Sen.

d Prasens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur, &c. Sen. Όταν β αυτοί μηθίν μεταδάχωμβν την Αμίνοιαν, η λάθωμβν μεξαδάχοντες, ε δοχεῖ ήμῶν γεsονέναι ὁ χεόν. Arist.

der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to some animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be 2; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the way here.

II. Pain considerd in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good. I take this as a postulatum, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleasure] is in it self desirable, the other [pain] to be avoided. What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all circumstances, consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their nature, that unless these be taken in, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what happiness is, I must proceed to some other propositions relating to this subject.

IV. Pleasure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also pleasures may be compared with other pleasures b, and pains with pains. Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear some respect or be in some ratio to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intensenses be multiplied by the moments of duration, there must still be some ratio of the one product to the other.

That this proposition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this hurry of business, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain such advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abstinences and self denials for, if they do not think some pleasures less than the pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various methods of life shew, that men prefer one sort of pleasure to another, and submit to one fort of pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the

s. His. b The rants of those men, who affert, μη Δρ. φέρψ πουνης, μηθε ήθειον τι είναι: nay, φύσψ ἐθὰν ἡθλ, ἢ ἀηθες, αρ. Diog. L. can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Northat of the Stoics in Plut. ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόν σὰν κύξψ προσγινόμης, κτλ. As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happiness more than a moment's.

pain with the pleasure obtaind by it, or miss the pleasure, being excused from the pain.

V. When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain. For nine degrees of pleasure, less by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former net and true.

VI. As therefore there may be true pleasure and pain: so there may be some pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckond as pains a; and v. v. some pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures. For the true quantity of pleasure differs not from that quantity of true pleasure; or it is so much of that kind of pleasure, which is true (clear of all discounts and future payments): nor can the true quantity of pain not be the same with that quantity of true or mere pain. Then, the man who enjoys three degrees of fuch pleafure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are fet off to balance and fink the three of pleasure, can have remaining to him only fix degrees of pain: and into these therefore is his pleasure finally resolved. And so the three degrees of pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing some pleasures will be found to be the loss of pleasure, compared with greater: and some pains the alleviation of pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded b. Thus the natures of pleasures and pains are varied, and fometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this neither. As in the sense of most men, I believe, a little pain will weigh against a great deal of pleasure c: so perhaps there may be some pains, which exceed all pleasures; that is, such pains as no man would choose to suffer for any pleasure whatever, or at least any that we know of in this world. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the pleasure to be set against that pain will be but a point, or cypher; a quantity of no value.

VII. Happiness differs not from the true quantity of pleasure, unhappiness of pain. Or, any being may be said to be so far happy, as his pleasures are true, &c. That cannot

^{*} Nocet (fit noxa) empta dolore voluptas. Hor. And—multo corrupta dolore voluptas. Id. b As when that Pompey mentiond by Val. Max. by burning his finger escaped the torture. c Bona malis paria non sunt, etiam pari numero: nec latitia ulla minimo mœrore pensanda. Plin.

be the happiness of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happiness be disagreeable. It must be something therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the possession. Now present pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who injoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his happiness. Nor, again, can that pleasure be reckond happiness, for which one pays the full price in pain: because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other. But yet since happiness is something, which, by the general idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of pleasure: and this, from what has been said, can only be such pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happiness will be as his true quantity of pleasure.

One, that loves to make objections, may demand here, whether there may not be happiness without pleasure: whether a man may not be said to be happy in refpect to those evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be such a thing as negative happiness. I answer, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger use of the word may be styled a happiness. Also, the absence of pain or unhappiness may perhaps be called negative happiness, since the meaning of that phrase is known. But in proper speaking happiness always includes something positive. For mere indolence resulting from insensibility, or joind with it, if it be happiness, is a happiness infinitely diminishd: that is, it is no more a happiness, than it is an unhappiness; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best it is but the happiness of stocks and stones b: and to these I think happiness can hardly be in strictness allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a stock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable being: this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own sense of it, we call it happiness; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the stock it self. A sense indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happiness: but then the happiness flows from the sense of the case, and is a positive happiness. Whilst a man reflects upon his negative happiness, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it positive: and perhaps a sense of immunity from the afflictions and miseries every where so obvious to our observation is one of the greatest pleasures in this world.

² Οιόρετα δεῖν ἡδονὴν παςαμεμίχθαι τῆ ἐυδαιμονία. Arift. Arift. ap. Diog. L.

b Or οιονεί καθεύδοντος κατάξασις.

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VIII. That being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum total of whose pleasures exceeds the sum of all his pains: or, ultimate happiness is the sum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account. And so on the other side, that being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the sum of all whose pains exceeds that of all his pleasures.

IX. To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in general. For happiness is some quantity of true pleasure: and that pleasure, which I call true, may be considered by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappiness is certainly to be avoided: because being a quantity of mere pain, it may be considered by it self, as a real, mere evil, &c. and because if I am obliged to pursue happiness, I am at the same time obliged to recede, as far as I can from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,

X. We cannot all with respect to either our selves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptive of happiness and unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other. Other animals may be considered after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of apprehension.

But that the nature of happiness, and the road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be better understood; and true pleasures more certainly distinguished from false; the following propositions must still be added.

XI. As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: so neither can the practice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature and truth, opposes the will of the Author of nature (whose existence, &c. I shall prove asterwards); and to suppose, that an inferior being may in opposition to His will break through the constitution of things, and by so doing make himself happy, is to suppose that being more potent than the Author of nature, and consequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very being himself, which is absurd. And as to the other part of the proposition, it is also absurd to think, that, by the constitution of nature and will of its author,

This is truly Bonum summum, quò tendimus omnes. Lucr. "Απαντα β ώς ἐιπεῖι, ἐτέςυ χάριν αἰεμεθα, πλην τ ἐυδαιμονίας τέλ. β αὐτη. Ατίβ.

any being should be finally miserable only for conforming himself to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the same as to say, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to nature and reality. If such a blunder (excuse the boldness of the word) could be, it must come either through a defect of power in Him to cause a better and more equitable scheme, or from some delight, which he finds in the misery of his dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the First cause, who is the sountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives so many proofs of his goodness and beneficence. Many beings may be said to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many injoyments a: whereas did he delight in the inselicity of those beings, which depend upon Him, it must be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwise in any respect. The world in that case instead of being such a beautiful, admirable system, in which there is only a mixture of evils, could have been only a scene of mere misery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (wicked men) should be ultimately happy, or the religious observers of it (good men) ultimately unhappy, is such injustice, and an evil so great, that sure no Manichean will allow such a superiority of his evil principle over the good, as is requisite to produce and maintain it.

XII. The genuine happiness of every being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its nature, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt. For instance, nothing can be the true happiness of a rational being, that is inconfistent with reason. For all pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear pleasure and true happiness must be something agreeable (pr. I.): and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning nature, or (which is the same) to the reason of that nature, which is repugnant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reason, it is plain his reason is lost, his nature deprest, and that he now lists himself among irrationals, at least as to that particular. If a'being finds pleasure in any thing unreasonable, he has an unreasonable pleasure; but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itself. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with rea fon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been faid under the former proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been faid in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

^{*} Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo qua possides? qua ———— Sen. auxa na nanodasporia esí. Arr.

ο Παντί το παςα φύσιν

XIII. Those pleasures are true, and to be reckond into our happpiness, against which there lies no reason. For when there is no reason against any pleasure, there is always one for it a, included in the term. So when there is no reason for un-

dergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

Obs. There is therefore no necessity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to justify themselves in the pursuits after worldly advantages and injoyments, provided that neither these injoyments, nor the means by which they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like b. For in this case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; viz. because they are injoyments.

XIV. To conclude this fection, The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other c. For no being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his pains exceed all his pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that excess. Now by prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happiness of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, must be something which is consistent and coincident with this.

Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our conduct, are truth (of which in the preceding sect.) and bappiness (that is, such pleasures, as accompany, or follow the practice of truth, or are not inconsistent with it: of which I have been treating in this). And as that religion, which arises from the distinction between moral good and evil, was called natural, because grounded upon truth and the natures of things: so perhaps may that too, which proposes happiness for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleasure and pain, which are physical (or natural) good and evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is one religion which may be called natural upon two accounts.

Tww ider no nature despers of nature despersed per adaptérophe. Simpl. Recte facit, animo quando obsequitur suo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo stat bono. Plaut.

b Habebit philosophus amplias opes; sed nulli detractas, &c. Sen. Here he seems to confess the folly of the Stoics, who denied themselves many pleasures, that were honest and almost necessary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a sordid garment, with a rough beard, staff and satchel, &c. Quid rectum sit, apparet: quid expediat, obscurum est: ita tamen, ut—dubitare non possimus, quin ea maxime conducant, qua sunt rectissima. Cic.

SECT. III. Of Reason, and the ways of discovering truth.

Y manner of thinking, and an objection formerly a made, oblige me in the next place to fay something concerning the means of knowing, what is true: whether there are any, that are sure, and which one may safely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amusement to no purpose. Besides, as this will lead me to speak of reason, &c. some truths may here (as some did in the former section) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occasions; and what has been already afferted, will also be further confirmed.

I. An intelligent being, such as is mentioned before b, must have some immediate objects of his understanding; or at least a capacity of having such. For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: because every object must be such san object) either in itself immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate: or of several, one of which must at least be immediate.

II. An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have some, that are abstract and general. I shall not at present inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not how), since this must be true, if there is any such thing as a rational being. For that reason is something different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence; because it is not confined to particular things or cases. What is reason in one instance, is so in another. What is reasonable with respect to Quinctius, is so in respect of Navius. Reason is performed in species. A rational being therefore must have some of these species (I mean specific and abstract ideas) to work with; or some superior method, such as perhaps some higher order of reasoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular idea is only the particular knowledge of that idea or thing: there it ends. But reason is something universal, a kind of general instrument, applicable to particular things and cases as they occur. We reason about particulars, or from them; but not by them.

The last objection, p. 27.
Sect. I. prop. I.
Quinctium, id iniquum esse in Navium? Cic.

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In fact we find within our felves many logical, metaphysical, mathematical ideas, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they comprehend whole classes and kinds. And it is by the help of these that we reason, and demonstrate. So that we know from within our selves, that intelligent beings not only may have such abstract ideas, as are mentiond in the proposition, but that some actually have them: which is enough for my purpose.

III. Those ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whose ideas they are. For ideas can be no further the ideas of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that mind must perceive the whole of them; which is to know them adequately.

Again, these ideas being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increase, diminish, or any way alter them. And to say the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction: because it is the same as to say, that they are misrepresented; that is, that there are intervening and misrepresenting ideas.

And lastly, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwise, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and misperceptions of things: but then these things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and media, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are desective at best and incapable of transmitting things as they are in themselves, and therefore occasion impersect and salse images. But then, even in this case, those images and ideas that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reason, why the originals, which they should exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as they are. In short, I only say the mind must know its own immediate ideas.

IV. What has been said of these ideas, which are immediate, may be said also of those relations or respects, which any of those ideas bear immediately each to other: they must be known immediately and truly. For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot subsist without it; it is of their nature: and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this must be known too. They are in this respect like the ideas of whole and part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them not discover that relation, by which the one must be always bigger and the other less.

To say no more, we may satisfy our selves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propositions, from the experiences of our own minds: where we find ma-

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ny relations, that are immediately seen, and of which it is not in our power to doubt. We are conscious of a knowledge, that consists in the intuition of these relations. Such is the evidence of those truths, which are usually called axioms, and perhaps of some short demonstrations.

V. Those relations or respects, which are not immediate, or apparent at the first view, may many times be discovered by intermediate relations; and with equal certainty. If the ratio of B to D does not instantly shew itself; yet if the ratio of B to C b does, and that of C to D c, from hence the ratio of B to D d is known also. And if the mean quantities were ever so many, the same thing would follow; provided the reason of every quantity to that, which follows next in the series, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the mathematicians e: as I might all, that know any science, for the truth of the proposition in general. For thus theorems and derivative truths are obtaind.

VI. If a proposition be true, it is always so in all the instances and uses, to which it is applicable. For otherwise it must be both true and false. Therefore

VII. By the help of truths already known more may be discoverd. For

1. Those inferences, which arise presently from the application of general truths to the particular things and cases contained under them, must be just. Ex. gr. The whole is bigger than a part: therefore A (some particular thing) is more than half A. For it is plain that A is contained in the idea of whole, as half A is in that of part. So that if the antecedent proposition be true, the consequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and must also be true. The former cannot be true, unless the other be so too. What agrees to the genus, species, definition, whole, must agree to the species, individuals, thing defined, the part. The existence of an effect infers directly that of a cause; of one correlate that of the other; and so on. And what is said here holds true (by the preceding proposition) not only in respect of axioms and first truths, but also and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. These may be capable of the like applications: and the truth of such consequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of those theorems themselves.

That question in Plato, Τί ἀν τις ἔχοι τεχμήριον ἀποδίξαι, εἶ τις ἔροιο νῶν ἐτως cù τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομθω, κὰ πάντα ὰ λομούμεθα ὀνέρωτομθω, κτλ. may have place among the velitations of philosophers: but a man can scarce propose it seriously to himself. If he doth, the answer will attend it.

b = a. c = e. d = ae. e V. Tacq. El. Geom. l. 5. p. 3. n. XII. But the thing appears from the bare inspection of these quantities: b, ab, aeb, aeib, aeiob, &c.

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2. All those conclusions, which are derived through mean propositions, that are true, and by just inferences, will be as true as those, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every just consequence is founded in some known truth, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of steps in an algebraic operation: and if inferences are so founded, and just, the

things inferred must be true, if they are made from true premisses.

Let this be the form of an argument. M = P : S = M : ergo S = P. Here if S = M be false, nothing is concluded at all: because the middle proposition is in truth not S = M, but perhaps S = Ma, which is foreign to the purpose. If S = Mbe true, but M = P falle, then the conclusion will indeed be a right conclusion from those premisses: but they cannot shew, that S = P, because the first proposition if it was exprest according to truth would be Me = P, which is another thing, and has no place in the argument. But if these two propositions are both true, M = P, S = M, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but also true, that S = P. For the second or middle proposition does so connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to speak with the logicians, by separately comparing the predicate or major term of the conclusion with the medium in the first proposition, and the subject or minor term with it in the fecond), that if the first and second are true, the third must be so likewise: all being indeed no more than this, P = M = S. For here the inference is just by what goes before, being founded in some such truth as this, and resulting immediately from the application of it, Quæ eidem æqualia sunt, & inter se sunt æqualia; or Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter se conveniunt; or the like a. Now if an inference thus made is justifiable, another made after the same manner, when the truth discoverd by it is made one of the premisses, must be so too; and so must another after that; and so on. And if the last, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the first is supposed to be, it is no matter to what length the process is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the last result is derived through such a succession of mean propositions, as render its title to our affent not worse by being long.

Since all the forms of true fyllogisms may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the fyllogistic method toward the discovery or confirmation of truth, are so many instances and proofs of what is here afferted. So also are the performances of the mathematicians. From some self-evident truths, and a few easie

If men in their illations, or in comparing their ideas, do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims express, the mind sees without taking notice of the words.

theorems, which they fet out with at first, to what immense lengths, and through what a train of propositions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their theorems and discoveries now, so far once out of human ken!

I do not enter so far into the province of the logicians as to take notice of the difference there is between the analytic and synthetic methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the disquisition from the subject, or from the attribute. If by the use of proper media any thing can be shewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonstration or argument takes its rise. Either way propositions may beget their like, and more truth be brought into the world.

VIII. That power, which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as he can be sure of a; and of making such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determin what is fit to be done upon occasion, &c. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of reason, or what intitles him to the epithet rational, Or in short, Reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are mentiond under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given.

The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at least we may safely say, that He is not obliged to make use of our operose methods by ideas and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to superior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumstances. Reason must be understood, when it is ascribed to God, to be the Divine reason; when to other beings above us, to be their reason; and in all of them to transcend ours, as much as their natures respectively do our nature b.

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a Under the word reason I comprehend the intuition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition necessarily true, is an act of reason, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once.

b If many believed, according to Socrates ap. Luc. that bony the proposition with the proposition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discount the proposition necessarily true, is an act of reason, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once.

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It cannot be amiss to note further, that tho a man, who truly uses his rational powers, has abstract and universal ideas, obtaind by reflexion; out of these frames to himself general truths, or apprehends the strength of such, and admits them, when they occur to him; by these, as by so many standards, meafures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes use of in reasoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet by a babit of reasoning he may come to serve himself of them, and apply them fo quick, that he himself shall scarce observe it. Nay, most men seem to reason by virtue of a habit acquired by conversation, practice in business, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the folidity even to their own just reasonings: just as men usually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the use of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the demonstration of any one of them. But still tho this be so, and men reason without adverting upon general ideas and abstract truths, or even being aware that there are any fuch, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet fuch there are, and upon them rests the weight of reason as its foundation.

This, by the way, helps us to detect the cause, why the generality of people are so little under the dominion of reason: why they sacrifice it to their interests and passions so easily; are so obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party; so apt to change, tho the case remains the very same; so unable to judge of things, that are ever so little out of the way; and so conceited and positive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to discerning persons manifestly salfe. Their reasoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one step, but all is to them Terra incognita; being ignorant of the scientific part, and those universal, unalterable principles, upon which true reasoning depends, and to find which and the true use of them are required cool hours and an honest application, beside many preparatives.

In the next place it must be noted, that one may reason truly from that, which is only probable, or even sale. Because just inferences may be made from propositions of these kinds: that is, such inferences may be made as are sounded in certain truths, tho those propositions themselves are not certainly true. But then what sollows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or salse, according to

κράτες η χαιρεφώντο είδο, τηλικέτον η την δύναμιν ἀυτέ, η την φόνησιν, η Δράνοιαν ἀνάλογον Δαφέρες το είν το δελ ήμως Δράσεως, what may we think of the God of the world? Therefore Tully seems to express himself too boldly where he writes, Est—homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est.

^{*} Upon this account it is, that I add the word given at the end of my description of reason.

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the quality of that proposition, or those propositions, from which the inference is made.

Again; it should be observed, that what I have said of reasoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an internal operation. When we are to present our reasonings to others, we must transfer our thoughts to them by such ways as we can. The case is to be stated in a manner suitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of sact, and their circumstances, to be made; many times persons and things to be described by proper diatyposes, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in discourses and books, and are performed by different authors, upon different subjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a necessity of some condescensions, ascititious advantages, and even applications to the passions. But notwithstanding this, in strict reasoning nothing is required, but to lay steps in a due order, firmly connected, and express properly, without flourish and to arrive at truth by the shortest and clearest gradation we are able.

Once more; perhaps disputacious men may say I ascribe the investigation of truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint business of several. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make use of subordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw diagrams, and put cases in our own imagination; to correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abstract from them; to turn over our memory, and see what has been enterd and remains in that register; even to consult books, and use pen and ink. In short, we affemble all such axioms, theorems, experiments and observations, as are already known, and appear capable of serving us, or present themselves upon the opening and analysis of the question, or case before us. And when the mind has thus made its tour, fetched in materials from every quarter, and set them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the second to that, and to on; and when trials do not succeed rightly, rejects some, adopts others, shifts their order, &c. till at last the series is so disposed, that the thing required comes up refolved, proved, or disproved by a just conclusion from proper premisses. Now in this process there seem to be many faculties concerned; in these acts of circumspection, recollection, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be so? I do not exclude the use of such subservient powers, or other helps, as are necessary to the exerting this faculty of reason; nor deny the mind

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² Simplex & nuda veritas est luculentior; quia satis ornata per se est: adeoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis sucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò specie placet aliena, &c. Lactant.

matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reason to be what I have described it to be.

IX. There is such a thing as right reason: or, Truth may be discovered by reasoning 2. The word reason has several acceptations. Sometimes it is used for that power mentiond in the last proposition; as when we say, Man is a being indued with reason. And then the sense of this proposition must be this; that there is such a use to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifest truth. Sometimes it feems to be taken for those general truths, of which the mind possesses it self from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and conclusions; as when we say, Such a thing is agreeable to reason: for that is as much as to fay, it is agreeable to the faid general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the sense of this proposition is, that there are such general truths, and such a right way of inferring. Again; sometimes it seems to stand only for some particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the causes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: that is, it differs not from truth except in this one respect, that it is considerd not barely in itself, but as the effect and result of a process of reasoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our affent, and its evidences about it; as when it is said, that such or such an affertion is reason. And then the sense of the proposition is, that there are truths so to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at last; truth (or there are truths, which) may be discoverd, or found to be fuch, by reasoning.

If it were not so, our rational faculties, the noblest we have, would be vain.

Beside, that it is so, appears from the foregoing propositions and what we know within our selves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abstract ideas: the relations of these are adequately known to the mind, whose ideas they are: the propositions expressing these relations are evidently known to be true: and these truths must have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uses, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our senses, or present themselves by any other way or means, to

That way, which some Sceptics take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If any thing, say they, is demonstrated to be true, how shall it be known, that that demonstration is true? Ei ἐζ ἀποδείζεως, ζητηθήσε) πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι κὰ τῶτο ἀληθές ἐςι; κὰ τως ἐις ἀπόρεν. Sext. Emp. Nor do I well comprehend St. Chrysostom's meaning, when he says, Τὸ λογισμοῖς ἀποδείχθεν, κὰν ἀληθές ἢ, ἐδέπω πληερφορίων τῆ ψυχῆ παρέχο, κὰ πίσιν ἰκανήν. For as no man truly believes any thing, unless he has a reason for believing it: so no reason can be stronger than demonstration.

which these truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the forementiond manner, new truths may be thus collected. And since these new truths, and the numerous descendents, that may spring from their loins, may be used still in the same manner, and be as it were the seed of more truth, who can tell at what undescried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At least no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is most useful to us in our conduct here, is discoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reason, and treat right reason as a Chimæra, must argue against reason either with reason, or without reason. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cause, and establish that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no such thing as right reason by any good argument, is indeed impossible: because that would be to shew there is such a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And further, if this proposition be not true, there is no right reasoning in Euclid; nor can we be sure, that what is there demonstrated, is true. But to say this I am sure is absurd. Nor do I desire, that this proposition, which I here maintain, should be esteemed more certain than those demonstrated by him: and so certain it must be; because there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great objection against all this is taken from the many instances of false reafoning and ignorance, with which the practices, discourses, writings of mankind are too justly taxed. But, in answer to it, I would have it minded, that I do not fay, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a sufficient survey of things; that they may not be prepossessed with inveterate errors, biassed by interest, or carried violently down with the stream of a sect or fashion, or dazled by some darling notion or bright name a; that they may not be unprovided of a competent stock of pracognita and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reasoning, and what it is that gives sinews to an inference, and makes it just; that they may not want philosophy, history, or other learning requisite to the understanding and stating of the question truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and misrepresent their own thoughts, by expressing themselves ill, even when within themselves they reason well; that many understandings may not be naturally gross, good heads often indisposed, and the ablest judges sometimes overseen, through inadvertence or haste: I say none of these

² Haud alio fidei proniore lapsu, quam ubi falsa rei gravis autor existit. Pliny.

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things. The contrary I confess is manifest: and it is in opposition to those errors, which appear in these cases under the name of reason, that we are forced to add the epithet right, and to say right reason instead of reason only; to distinguish it from that, which wrongfully assumes that appellation. Nor, moreover, do I say, that by reasoning the truth is to be discoverd in every case: that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only say, that there is such a thing as right reason, and truth discoverable by it.

I might add, that he, whose faculties are intire and sound, and who by a proper exercise of his mind in scientific studies first opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furnish himself with such leading truths, as may be useful to him, and of which he is affured in his own brest; and in treating any subject keeps them still in his eye, so that his discourse may be agreeable to them: I say, such a one is not in much danger of concluding salsely. He must either determin rightly, or soon find, that the subject lies out of his reach. However he will be sensible, that there are many things within his sphere, concerning which he may reason; and that there are truths to be found by this use of his faculties, in which he may securely acquiesce.

Thus that question supposed to be asked p. 27. How shall a man know, what is true? is in part answerd. More shall be added by and by: only a proposition or two, which ought not to be omitted, must be first inserted.

X. To all according to right reason, and to all according to truth are in effect the same thing. For in which sense soever the word reason is taken, it will stand either for truth itself, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be such: and then, with respect to this latter sense, whoever is guided by that saculty, whose office consists in distinguishing and pointing out truth, must be a follower of truth, and all agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to all according to the genuin decisions and distates of it.

That reason, which is right (by the meaning of the words) must conclude rightly: but this it cannot do, if the conclusion is not true, or truth.

That is (for fo I would be understood), if the principles and premisses from whence it results are true, and certainly known to be so, the conclusion may be taken as certain and absolute truth: but otherwise the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that such a thing is so, if such another, or such others are so or so.

That manner of demonstration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is false, is only a way of shewing, that an affertion is true, because its contradictory is false; founded in that known rule, Contradictoria nec simul vera, nec simul falsa esse possunt, &c.

XI. To be governed by reason is the general law imposed by the Author of nature apon them, whose uppermost faculty is reason: as the dictates of it in particular cases are the particular laws, to which they are subject. As there are beings, which have not so much as sense, and others that have no faculty above it; so there may be some, who are indued with reason, but have nothing higher than that. It is sufficient at present to suppose there may be such. And then if reason be the uppermost faculty, it has a right to controll the rest by being such. As in sensitive animals sense commands gravitation and mechanical motions in those instances, for which their senses are given, and carries them out into spontaneous acts: so in rational animals the gradation requires, that reason should command sense.

It is plain, that reason is of a commanding nature b: it injoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things, and will be paramount (in an old word rò iyi
provinco) if it is at all. Now a being, who has such a determining and governing power so placed in his nature, as to be essential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It seems to be as much designed by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals should use their reason, and steer by it; as it is by the shipwright, that the pilot should direct the vessel by the use of the rudder he has sitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be used: nor would reason be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be used, but it must command: such is its nature.

It is not in one's power deliberately to resolve not to be governed by reason. For (here the same way of arguing may be used, that was lately) if he could do this, he must either have some reason for making that resolution, or none. If he has none, it is a resolution, that stands upon no soundation, and therefore in course falls: and if he has some reason for it, he is governed by reason. This demonstrates that reason must govern.

XII. If a rational being, as such, is under an obligation to obey reason, and this obedience, or practice of reason, coincides with the observation of truth, these things plainly follow.

^{*} Cujus [summi rectoris & domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & summa lex à philosophis dicitur. Cic. Νόμω ἀψουδης ὁ ὀξθὸς λόγω, ἐχ ὑπὸ Ε δεῖνω ἢ Ε δεῖνω Δυντε Φθαρτὸς, ἐν χαρτιδίοις ἢ εκλαις ἄψυχος, ἀψύχοις, ἀλὶ ὑπ ἀθανάτε Φύσεως ἄφθαρτω ἐν ἀθανάτε Δρενοία τυπωθείς. Philo Judo More to this purpose might be easily collected. Το Λόγω ἐςὶν ἐικὰν Θεε. Ph. Jud. Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κὰ κυριεῦον τ ψυχῆς μέρω. Μ. Anton. Or as it is in Plutarch, τ ψυχῆς ἀνώταθον μερω. Pringe cipatus in Tully, Summus in anima gradus. Tert.

Permit me here again to infert an observation obiter.

Obs. The regiration of right reason and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is private: that is, every one must judge for himself. For fince all reasoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private ideas, by virtue of which he becomes conscious of some first truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his steps in his pursuits after more truths. &c. the criterion, or that by which he tries his own reasonings, and knows them to be right, must be the internal evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableness of his inferences to them. One man can no more discern the objects of his own understanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can fee with another man's eyes, or one ship can be guided by the helm of another. They must be his own faculties and conscience, that Therefore to demand another man's affent to any thing must determin him. without conveying into his mind such reasons, as may produce a fense of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his understanding, and to demand a tribute which it is not possible for him to pay. It is true indeed, tho I cannot see with another man's eyes, yet I may be affifted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumstances of it; and so men may be affisted in making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among those that are to be

Religio cogi non potest, verbis potius quam verberibus res agenda est, ut sit voluntas. Lact.

confiderd: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to flate the question; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general how to reason: especially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little conversant in close reflexions, and doth not teach them to reason, or (as the case too often is) teaches them not to reason. But still this is all in order to produce such a light in them, that by it they may see and judge for themselves. An opinion, tho ever so true and certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his understanding, and affisting him so to order his conceptions, that he may find the reasonableness of it within himself.

To prevent mistakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I say men must judge for themselves, I do not say they must in all cases ast according to their private and single judgments. In respect of such things, as are private, and concern themselves only, or such as are left open and subject to every man's own sense, they may and ought; only preserving a due descrence to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occasions to have more knowledge and literature than themselves: but when a society is concerned, and hath determind any thing, it may be considered as one person, of which he, who dissents from the rest, is only perhaps a small particle; and then his judgment will be in a manner absorbed and drownd in that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intrusted. But I must not digress too far from the main business, the ways of coming at truth.

XIII. The reports of sense are not of equal authority with the clear demonstrations of reason, when they happen to differ. It is true, the ideas caused by the impression of fenfible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themselves; and the mind may use them, and reason truly upon them: that is, the mind may make a right use of the ideas, which it finds in itself. But then whether these are the true ectypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a question; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, must be acknowledged. They are conveyed through media and by instruments susceptive of different dispositions and alterations, and may consequently produce different representations: and these cannot all be right. But suppose those instruments and media to be as intire and pure, as when intirest and purest; yet still there may be in many respects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things just as they are. How mightily are the shape and fize of a visible object varied upon us according to its distance, and the situation of the place, from whence the prospect is taken? Now these things cannot be said of the reports, or rather determinations of reafon. For in pure reasoning we use our own ideas for themselves, and such as the mind knows them to be, not as representatives of things, that may be falfely exhibited.

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exhibited. This internal reasoning may indeed be wrongly applied to external things, if we reason about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reason, but of sense, which reports the case wrong; or perhaps of the person, who has not been sufficiently industrious to inform himself.

That same samiliar instance of vision proves further, that reason may be applied to over-rule and correct sense. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the retina of the eye, and do not give the true figure of those objects (as they not always do, being diversly projected, as the lines proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that concave surface); this, tho it might impose upon a being, that has no faculty superior to sense, doth not impose upon our reason, which knows how the appearance is alterd, and why. To think the sun a is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be b, seems to be the last degree of stupidity. He must be a brute (so far from being a philosopher), who does not know, that the same line (v. g. the diameter of the sun) at different distances subtends different angles at the eye. A small matter of reason may serve to consute sense in this and the like cases.

Obj. How can reason be more certain than sense, since reason is founded in abstractions, which are originally taken from sensible objects? Ans. Perhaps the mind may by being exercised at first about particular objects by degrees find in itself this capacity of considering things by their species, making abstractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of these particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itself, and attaind to the knowledge of abstract and general ideas, I do not see why this capacity of reasoning by the help of them may not be used, upon this proficience, to censure and correct the advices of fense concerning even such particulars, as first gave occasion to the mind to exert this capacity and raise it self. Is it a new thing for a scholar to make such a progress in learning, as to be able afterward to teach the master, from whom he received his first rudiments? May not the modern philosophers correct the ancients, because these first shewd them the way, and led them into the study of nature? If we look impartially into the history of learning, and even of religion, we shall find that truth has generally advanced by degrees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) rifen out of fable and error, which gave occasion to those inquiries, by which themselves were detected. Thus blind ignorance was fucceeded by a twilight of sense: this brightend by degrees: at last the sun as

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^{*} Tantulus ille—fol. Lucr. Poor creature! b Nec nimio solis major rota — Esse potest, nostris qu'am sensibus esse videtur. Lucr. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse qu'am videatur, &c. Cic.

it were rose upon some parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleard up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men think, are yet in their dark and uncultivated state. The understanding, tho it starts from particulars, in time makes a surther progress, taking in generals, and such notions logical, metaphysical, &c. as never could possibly come in by the senses a. Beside, surther, the capacity itself of admitting and considering general ideas was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by senses are only an occasion of using what it had before b. Just as a master may, by the exercises he sets, excite the superior capacity of his scholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his senses, when he has a reason against it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reason is above sense and controlls it. But,

XIV. The reports of sense may be taken for true, when there is no reason against it c. Because when there is no reason not to believe, that alone is a reason for believing them. And therefore,

XV. In this case to all according to them (i. e. as taking the informations of sense to be true) is to all according to reason and the great law of our nature.

Thus it appears that there are two ways, by which we may assure our selves of the truth of many things d; or at least may attain such a degree of certainty, as will be sufficient to determin our practice: by reason, and by sense under the government of reason; that is, when reason supports it, or at least doth not oppose it. By the former we discover speculative truths; by the latter, or both together matters of fact.

XVI. Where certainty is not to be hade, probability must be substituted into the place of it: that is, it must be considerd, which side of the question is the more probable.

Probability, or that, which in this case may incline one to believe any proposition to be true rather than false, or any thing to be rather than not to be, or the

Natura etiam nulle docente profecta ab iis, quorum, ex prima & inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipfa per se rationem, & persicit. Cic.

b Semina nobis scientia dedit [natura] scientiam non dedit. Sen.

c Si sani sunt [sensus], & valentes, & omnia removentur, qua obstant & impediunt. Cic.

d Socrates's saying, ap. Cic. nihil se scire, nisi id ipsum, savours of an affected humility, and must not be understood strictly. But they, who followd, went further (—omnes pane veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt): and particularly Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. And thus the absurdity grew to a size, that was monstrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beside, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing or not; and that is to know for ought he knows.

e Nec scire sa est omnia. Hor.

or fince; that is favourd by no observation; and that cannot be without great

alteration in the mundane system, or those laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the rest, are governd. That this account then may be false is very consistent with the humor and circumstances of mankind: but that it should be true is very inconsistent with those laws, by which the motions of the celestial bodies seem to be regulated, and tend to persevere in their present courses and directions. It is therefore in nature much more probable, that this account is false. The odds are on that side. 2. When any observation hath hitherto constantly held true, or most commonly proved to be so, it has by this acquired an established credit; the cause may be presumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the case before us there doth not appear something particular, some reason for exception. No man can demonstrate, that the sun will rise again, yet every one doth, and must act, as if that was certain 2: because we apprehend no decay in the causes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reason to mistrust the event, or think it will be otherwise a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon immortality here, when he finds so many generations all gone to a man, and the same enemies, that have laid them prostrate, still pursuing their victories. These and such like, tho in strictness perhaps not certainties, are justly current for such. So great is their probability. There are other observations, which, tho not so infallible as those, deserve yet to be thought of, and to have a share in the direction of our judgments. Ex.gr. There have been men in the world and no doubt still are, who, having had opportunities of imposing falsities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedness, have yet in spite of temptation preserved their integrity and virtue: but, fince opportunity has fo feldom faild to corrupt them who have been in possession of her, and men's interests and passions continue in general the same, it is more probable her charms will still have the same power and effect, which they use to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully obnoxious to be abused by frauds pious and impious b. Briefly, when there is no particular reason for the contrary, what has oftnest happend, may from experience most reasonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other observations point out the probable conjecture to us, we must be determind (if it be necessary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and fense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best skill we

שתי יאמין לכל דבר ם. Prov. (which fure one may convert thus, יעולם כמנהגו הולך י (.המאמין לכל דבר פתי הוא

have a, to be most knowing b and honest c. Of all these rules the first is that which deserves the principal regard: the other two are of use, when nature so utterly excludes us from her bosom, that no opportunity is allowed of making a judgment. Lastly, when nature, the frequent repetition of the same event, and the opinion of the best judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest degree.

It appears from what has been faid concerning the nature and foundations of probability, that the force of it refults from observation and reason together. For here the one is not sufficient without the other. Reason without observation wants matter to work upon: and observations are neither to be made justly by our selves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the affiftance of reason. Both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty. For those observations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made our felves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but arise in many cases an internal obligation to give our affent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the observations of others, they may be so cautiously and skilfully selected, as to become almost our own; since our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them. The remarks and advice of old mend, who have gone through variety of scenes, lived long enough to see the consequences of their own and other peoples actings, and can now with freedom e look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily fure to be preferred to those of young and raw actors. The gnomæ, apologues, &c. of wise men, and such as have made it their business to be useful spies upon nature and mankind, national proverbs, and the like f, may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their several professions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercised themselves all their days, must be supposed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can usually

^{*} Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maxime videtur esse sapientis. Cic. b Non numero has judicantur, sed pondere, as Tully speaks upon another occasion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a fort of writers pleasing themselves with having discoverd some uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their observations to the service of atheism. As if ignorance could prove anything, or alter its nature by being general! c Aristotle's known rule is "Ενδοξα, τα δοκώντα πάσιν, η τοῖς πλείτοις, η τοῖς σοφοῖς κ τκτοις, η τοῖς πῶσιν, η τοῖς πλείσοις, η τοῖς μάλισα γνωρίμιοις ης ενδόξοις. But it is not applicable to all cases. μοι χερίναι παρ αυτών [πεεσδυτών] πωθάνεοζ, ώσπες τινα όσον προεληλυθότων, ήν εξ ήμως ίσως δεήση ποesusas . ποία τις έςι. Plato. e When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχζις πρὸς τ'αφροδίσια, he answerd, Εὐφήμει, ὧ άνθρωπε ἀσμίμες αλα μίρ τοι ἀυτο ἀπεφυγεν, ώσπες λυτίωντα τινα κὸ άγειον δεσπότω δποφυγών. - παντάπασι 🕉 τ γε τοιέτων ου το γήςα πολλή ειρήνη γίνε) κὸ έλουf 'Εν βραχεί σφυρήλατον νέν αξιέχοντα. Plut. Aseia. Plato, & al. have:

have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honesty they do not either lose, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in respect of those things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, lastly, bistories written by credible and industrious authors, and red with judgment, may supply us with examples, parallel cases, and general remarks, prositable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cases is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counsels, much of the course of Divine providence is visible in them.

To conclude; that we ought to follow probability, when certainty leaves us, is plain: because then it becomes the only light and guide we have. For unless it is better to wander and fluctuate in absolute uncertainty than to follow such a guide; unless it be reasonable to put out our candle, because we have not the light of the sun, it must be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reasonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above probability, it doth govern: when there is nothing in the opposite scale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the course of nature must turn the beam. Tho a man, to resume the instance before, cannot demonstrate that sice-ace will come up before ambs-ace, he would find himself obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that side: nor could he not choose to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which side it lay.

Here then is another way of discovering, if not truth, yet what in practice may be supposed to be truth. That is, we may by this way discover, whether such propositions as these be true, I ought to do this, rather than that; or, to think so, rather than the contrary.

Obs. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almost from the premisses collect,

First, the principal causes of error, which I take to be such as these. 1. Want of faculties; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As some (straying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no ideas but their own dreams, come to) affert what they have no reason to affert: so others deny what there is the highest reason to believe, only because they cannot comprehend it. 2. Want of due reflexion upon those ideas we have, or may have: by which it comes to pass, that men are destitute of that knowledges which is gaind by the contemplation of them, and their relations; misapply names, confusedly: and sometimes deal in a set of words and phrases, to which

no ideas at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 3. Want of proper qualifications and πεοπαιδεύματα. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of scholars; the half-letterd are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a modest, studious man dares not a, tho he knows more; and scholars, that have confined themselves to one fort of literature, lanch out into another: unsuccessfully all. 4. Not understanding in what the nature and force of a just consequence consists. Nothing more common than to hear people affert, that fuch a thing follows from fuch a thing; when it doth not follow: i.e. when such a consequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of memory and imagination. For men in reasoning make much use of these: memory is upon many occafions confulted, and fometimes draughts made upon the phantafy. If then they depend upon these, and these happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be misrepresented, and men led out of the way by mis-shapen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little distrust of these faculties, and fuch proper helps ought to be used, as perhaps the best judgments want the most. 6. Attributing too much to fense. For as necessary as our senses are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of sensible objects, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but just faluted the mathematics and philosophy, must be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which feem absurd to sense, and yet must be admitted. 7. Want of retirement, and the practice of thinking and reasoning by our selves b. A rambling and irregular life must be attended with a loose and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous conclusions. Truth is the offspring of filence, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often revised and corrected. 8. The strength of appetites, passions, prejudices. For by these the understanding may be corrupted, or overborn: or at least the operations of the mind must be much obstructed by the intrusion of such solicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet strong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you must have observed to be one of the greatest causes of modern irreligion. Whilst some opinions and rites are carried to such an immoderate height, as exposes the absurdity of them to the view of almost every body but them who raise them, not only gentlemen of the belles lettres, but even men of common sense, many

[•] Sicut ἀμαθία με θράσ, λογισμός η ἔκνον Φέρς (è Thucyd.) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia. Plin. jun.

• Θταν τι βελόμεθα ἀκριδες νοῆσαι, ἐις ἐρημίαν λόπολιεράσκομψη, καταμύομψη τὰς ἔψες, τὰ ὧτα ἐπιΦράτθομψη, λόποτατθόμεθα ταῖς αἰθήσεσι. Ph. Jud.

times see through them; and then out of indignation and an excessive renitence, not separating that which is true from that which is false, they come to deny both, and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general a.

9. Ill stating of a question; when men either put it wrong themselves, or accept it so put from others. A small addition or falsity slipped into the case will ferment, and spread itself: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The question ought to be presented before its judge clean, and in its natural state, without disguise or distortion. To this last may be subjoind another cause, nearly allied to it; not fixing the sense of terms, and (which must often sollow) not rightly understanding what it is, that is to be examind and resolved.

Secondly, the reason why the many are commonly in the wrong and so wretchedly misjudge things. The generality of people are not sufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reasoning. And of them, who have liberal education, some are soon immersed and lost in pleasures, or at least in fashionable methods of living, rolling from one visit or company to another b, and flying from nothing so much as from themselves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reasoning: others become involved in business and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingross their time: others fall into a flothful neglect of their studies and disuse of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only defign to deceive life and gratify themselves with the amusements and sensual parts of learning: and others there are, whose misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclusion; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their situation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever confiderd them; and then making the subsequent business of their lives to dispute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If such men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they study, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having set out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, so much worse or less than no knowledge. Of this sort there are many: and very few indeed (with respect to the bulk of mankind), whose determinations and tenents were ever in the form of questions: there could not otherwife be so many sects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon

^{*} Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus. Plin. Sen. The former part of this observation is in truth the effect of the latter.

b Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, &c. Hieron.

the face of the earth. The sum of all in a few words is this: many qualifications are requisite in order to judge of some truths, and particularly those which are of greatest importance: proper learning and penetration, vacancy from business, a detachment from the interest of all parties, much sincerity and a perfect resignation to the government of reason and force of truth; which are things not to be reconciled with the usual ignorance, passions, tumultuary lives, and other circumstances which carry most men transverse.

Sect. IV. Of the Obligations of impersect Beings with respect to their power of acting.

Here remains yet another question, supposed also to be proposed by an objector, which must not be forgot; and upon which I shall bestow this very short section. The question was this, If a man can find out truth, may be not want the power of asting agreeably to it?

I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the same as not to oblige.

II. So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do. For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of any thing, is in refpect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power fuperior to the refistence to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply fuch a power is the same as to require that his power of such a kind and degree be applied. Put if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is nothing: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is just the same, as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the same as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it.

Without more ado, it is a truth confest by every body, that no body is obliged to impossibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of corollaries, the two following propositions.

III. Inami-

himself.

III. Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely fensitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense.

IV. The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.

V. To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but impersect, being hath to act. For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every such being may do, where ever he stands in the scale of impersects, so none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or success, than another; yet still they are but endeavours.

VI. The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may. This follows again from what has been said: and so does this?

VII. and lastly, They who are capable of discerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do these, as far as they are able: or, it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavour to practice reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat every thing as being what it is.

Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentioned in or refulting from the preceding sections, are brought together, and finally fixt under the correction or limitation in this last proposition. This is the sum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself beartily; not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now needless to me seem those disputes about buman liberty, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same, as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own freedom; whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chaind to his seat, and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon

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himself. And I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves, they would find by experience, that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor predestination and sate so rigid, but that much is left to their own conduct. Up and try.

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is also in his power to forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from ill company and vicious places. And so on e.

This suggests a very material thought: that forbearances, at least in all ordinary cases, are within our power f; so that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and so may seem to contradict truth by his omission, which, if his infirmities and disadvantages were taken into the account, and the case was rightly stated, he would be found not to do.

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SECT. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his existence, persection, providence, &c.

Have shewn in what the nature of moral good and evil consists; viz. a conformity or disagreement to truth, and those things that are coincident with it, reason and happines: also, how truth is discoverd; by sense, or reason, or both. I shall now specify some of those truths, which are of greatest importance and influence, and require more reasoning to discover them; leaving the rest (common matters of sact) to the common ways of finding them. They respect principally either the Deity, or our selves, or the rest of mankind. The first sort are the subject of this section.

I. Where there is a subordination of causes and effects, there must necessarily be a cause in nature prior to the rest, uncaused. Or thus, Where there is a series, in which the existence of one thing depends upon another, the existence of this again upon some other, and so upwards, as the case shall be, there must be some independent being, upon whom it doth originally depend.

If Z (some body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are first moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are moveds, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together a, are one moved: that W stands here as the first mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a moved without a mover, which is absurd b: and lastly, that of what length soever the series may be, the case will be ever the same; i.e. if there be no First mover commoved, there must be a moved without a mover.

Further, if W, whom we will suppose to be an intelligent being, and to have a power of beginning motion, hath this power originally in himself and independently of all others, then here not only the first mover in this series, but a First being and original cause is found. Because that, which has a power of beginning motion independent of any other, is a mover independent; and therefore is independent, or has an independent existence, since nothing can be a mover without being. But if W

^b One might with the Στασιῶται (so called by Aristotle; ap. S. Emp.) as well deny, that there is any such thing as motion, as say there is motion without a mover; or, which is the same, a first mover.

Ωρῶτον μελαθάλλον. Plato. 'Αρχη κικήσεως ἀπάσης. Id. Πρῶτον κινῶν. Arist.

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himself. And I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth them-selves a, they would find by experience, that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor predestination and sate so rigid b, but that much is left to their own conduct c. Up and try d.

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has not this power independently in himself, then he must receive it from some other, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of conferring a faculty of producing motion originally and independently in himself, here will be a First, independent cause. And if it can be supposed, that he has it not thus, and that the series should rise too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there is some such cause, upon whom this train of beings and powers must depend, if we reason as in the former paragraph. For,

Universally, if Z be any effect what soever, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the cause of its existence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifest that the existence of all, Z, Y, X does originally come from W, which stands here as the Supreme cause, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and consequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X one effect, without W there would be an effect without a cause. Lastly, let this retrogression from effects to their causes be continued ever so far, the same thing will still recur, and without such a cause as is before mentioned the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; i. e. dependent, and not dependent.

Obj. The series may ascend infinitely a, and for that reason have no first mover or cause. Ans. If a series of bodies moved can be supposed to be infinite, then taken together it will be equal to an infinite body moved: and this moved will not less require a mover than a finite body, but infinitely more. If I may not be permitted to place a first mover at the top of the series, because it is supposed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet still there must of necessity be some cause or author

The greatest men among the ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. Ours of roof on τεδε διωατον ίεναι εις απίζον. Arift. If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be μέσα: and then είπες μηθεν ές, το πρώτον, όλως αίτιον έδεν ές, κλ. Το suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so in and so is to suppose oneg isiv advaror ide frag ซัระ xเทริง ซัร at ซัระ xเทร์ เป็นอง, เน่ท ซัธาเร ฉ่องกัด รั xเทร์ธาเร. Simpl. Not only those Arabian philosophers ealled Hebr. מרברים, Arab. אלמחכלמון, but many of the elder Jews have agreed with the Greeks in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see Mor. nebok. & al. particularly S. Kozri: where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fourth in S. Emu-אכם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף ער העת הזארת אין noth). הפועל. For tho, as Muscatus observes, these reafonings of the Medabberim לא לרצון היו לפניו [המורה] yet most certainly let the feries of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inexbauftible one way, they must be so the other too: and then what Saad. Ga. says, takes place No תגיע ההויה אלינו לא נהיה וכז. There is another argument of this kind in Justin M. which deferves notice, what stress soever may be laid upon it. Είτο μέχον μές Ε χεόνε, says he, επω ές ώ Αν 5 κς το γεισνός μές Εχεόνε πεό Ε γενέλζ μέλλον. Αν άρα ότε σολ Αν το γεγονός μές Εχεόνε.

of the motion a, different from all these bodies, because their being (by the supposition) no one body in the series, that moves the next, but only in consequence of its being moved first itself, there is no one of them that is not moved, and the whole can be considered together but as an infinite body moved, and which must therefore be moved by something.

The same kind of answer holds good in respect of all effects and their causes in general. An infinite succession of effects will require an infinite efficient, or a cause infinitely effective. So far is it from requiring none.

Suppose a chain b hung down out of the heavens from an unknown height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation; and upon this a question should arise, What supported or kept up this chain: would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the first (or lowest) link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the second or rather the sirst and second together upon the third, and so on ad infinitum? For what holds up the whole? A chain of ten links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hinderd: one of twenty, if not staid by something of a yet greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight: and therefore one of infinite links certainly, if not sustained by something insinitely strong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a chain of causes and effects c tending, or as it were gravitating, towards some end. The last (or lowest) depends, or (as one may say) is suspended upon the cause above it: this again, if it be not the first cause, is suspended as an effect upon something above it, &c. d. And if they should be infinite, unless (agreeably

[·] Aristotle himself, who afferts the eternity of motion, afferts also the necessity of a first and eternal mover. י אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלד: ועלול אל בלתי תכלירת S. Iggar. too by Lucr. Where more may be feen of this השתלשלור out of Ibn Sinai, Maim. פיכ. chain must be fastend Sei pior Oudouxoio. Invenietur, says Macrobius, pressus intuenti à summo Dec usque ad ultimam rerum facem-connexio: & hac est Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de cœlo in terras Deum jussisse commemorat. This matter might be illustrated by other similitudes (even שלשלרת הקבלר might ferve for one): but I shall fet down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the same taken either way. It occurs in Hhob. halleb. and afterward in Resh. hhokm. Suppose a row of blind men, of which the last laid his hand upon the shoulder of the man next before him, he on the shoulder of the next before him, and so on till the foremost grew to be quite out of fight; and some body asking, what guide this string of blind men had at the head of them, it should be answerd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and so went on, ad infin. would any rational creature accept this for a just answer? Is it not to fay, that infinite blindness (or blindness, if it be infinite) supplies the place of fight, or of a guide?

to what has been said) there is some cause upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to affert there is any such thing, would be as great an absurdity, as to say, that a finite or little weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the greatest does not.

- II. A Cause or Being, that has in nature no superior cause, and therefore (by the terms) is also unproduced, and independent, must be self-existent: i. e. existence must be essential to him; or, such is his nature, that he cannot but be a. For every being must either exist of itself, or not of itself: that which exists not of itself must derive its existence from some other, and so be dependent: but the Being mentiond in the proposition is supposed to be independent, and uncaused. Therefore He must exist, not this way, but the other. The root of His existence can be sought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where else is to make a cause superior to the Supreme.
- III. There must be such a Being. For (beside what has been said already) if there was not at least one such Being, nothing could be at all b. For the universe could not produce itself c; nor could any part of it produce itself, and then produce the rest: because this is supposing a thing to ast before it is.
- 3 So Aristotle says of the First mover, Our chose ran and se sextor it avalues is, nh. And after him the Arabic philosophers, Maimonides, Albo, & al. pass. teach all that God exists necessarily. מן השקר העררו: to suppose him not to be implies a falsity; or, He cannot be supposed not to be. This feems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himfelf in Moses's history; אהיה אשר אהיה; or in one word, אהיה; which in the mouth of one who speaks of Him in the third person is יהוה or יהוה. So Philo explains it; Eirau πέφυκα. So Abarbanel; אני אהיה בעבור שאהיה כי אין מציאותי תלוי בזולתי אלא בעצמי; adding moreover, that it thewd God to be not, like other beings, מחוייב המציאות מצר עצמו but מחוייב המציאות, a Neceffary being. And fo R. L. b. Gersh. יורה זה השם שהוא הנמצא אשר ימצא מעצמותו. I omit others, who write after the fame manner. There have been even Heathens, who feemd to think, that some such name as this belongd to the Deity, and for the fame reason. For as אהוה and thence יהוה are used above, so Plutarch fays, that in addressing to Him the second person Εί (ΠΠΠ, or ΠΠΠ) is ἀυτοτελης Ε΄ Θεε προσαγόgovors κος προσφώνησις: and that by this compellation we give Him ἀληθη κος ἀψουδη κος μόνω μόνω περοτήχεσαν την Ε είναι περοσαγός δυτιν. Ἡμῖν μου β όντως Ε είναι μέτες ιν έδεν· it is το ἀίδιον κς ἀγενητον לא יהיד. otherwife, מחוייב המציאות otherwife, n apsagrov that is ovras ov. רבר נמצא כלל: every thing cannot be אפשר מציאורן, פינ. Mor. neb. פי al. needs no demonstration. But there is a very old one in S. Emun. and after in Hhob. halleb. עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחר משני רברים שעשה את עצמו קורם הויתו או אחר הויתו ושניהם אי אפשר וכנ"

IV. Such a Being, as is before described, must not only be eternal, but infinite. Eternal He must be, because there is no way, by which such a Being can either begin or cease to be, existence being of His essence. And infinite He must be, because He can be limited by no other as to his existence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He must be inferior to that being. He must also in that case be dependent: because he must be beholden to that being for his being what He is, and that He is not confined within narrower limits. Beside, if His presence (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be there: and if not there, He might be supposed to be not elsewhere: and thus he might be supposed not to be at all. But such a Being, as is described in the II. prop. cannot so much as be supposed not to be.

V. Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and therefore his manner of existence is above all our conceptions. For He is a necessary existent: but nothing within our comprehension is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can imagine not to be without any contradiction or repugnance to nature: nor do we know of any beside this Supreme being himself. For with respect to Him indeed we know, by reasoning, that there must be One being who cannot be supposed not to be; just as certainly as we know there is any thing at all: tho we cannot know Him, and how he exists. Adequate ideas of eternity and infinity are above us, us finites b.

What relation or analogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and eternal (unchangeable) existence; how any being should be not older now, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are speculations attended with insuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of Timeus ap. Plat. ερε ποτ' ἀίδιον παράδειγμα τ' ίδανικον κόσμον όδε ἀρανὸς έγεννάθη, Έτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τ' αίῶνα ὁδε χεόν Φ σύν κόσμω εδαμικεγήθη; or that in Philo, 'Αιών ἀναγράφεται 🕏 νοητές βίΦ κόσμε, ώς αίδητές xpon . Many philosophers therefore have thought themselves obliged to deny, that God exists in time. Τό, τ' κν, τό, τ' έται, χρόνε γεγονότ 🕒 είδη, Φέροντες λανθάνομθυ έπι την ἀίδιον εσίαν, σου όρθως, κλ. Plato, "Ες ιν ο Θεός, χεη φάναι, Ε ές ι κατ έδενα χρόνον άλλα κατα τ άιῶνα τ άκίνητον, Ε άχρονον Ε άνίρελ. τον, Ε έ πρότερον, έδεν ές ιν, έδι ύς ερον έδε νεωτερον άλλ' είς ων ενί το νον το άει πεπλήρωκε, κλ. Plut. וכו ובין הזמן וכו בינו ובין החם בינו ובין הזמן וכו . Id. Albo has a whole Chapter to shew שה"י אינו נופל תחרת הזמן. But then he owns, that their Rabbi's do not mean בלתי נספר ומשוער והוא המשך שהיד. קורם מציאור or that הזמן בשלוח הזמן המשוער בתנועת הגלגל נקרא סרר זמנים לא זמן בשלוח וכו' but; הגלגל וכו'. In fhort, they reckon (to use R. Gedal's words) שומן האמתי הוא נברא והמשך אינו קרוי זמן And fo what they fay, doth not include all the present difficulty, time in their use of the word being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet see b. 2. c. 19. א"א א"יש חופל to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. שיאמר עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי רויר וממה שהיה לו כשברא העולם ο Οίδα με πολιά στι έπις άμθο ή αὐτῶν τ τρόπον. — ότι ἀναρχός ἐς ιν [ὁ Θεὸς], κὰ ἀγέννητΦ, κὸ àid. , oida. to j xãs son oida. So Chrysoftom. In

In inquiring after the causes of things, when we find (or suppose) this to be the cause of that, another thing to be the cause of this again, and so on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with respect to the last cause that we can comprehend, What is the cause of that? So that it is not possible for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in something, which is to us incomprebensible. And therefore the Supreme cause must certainly be such. But tho it is impossible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of existence, yet we may be sure that,

VI. He exists in a manner, which is perfect. For He, who exists of himself, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cause) is the fountain of existence to other beings, must exist in the uppermost and best manner of existing. And not only so, but (since He is infinite and illimited) He must exist in the best manner illimitedly and infinitely. Now to exist thus is infinite goodness of existence; and to exist in a manner infinitely good is to be perfect.

VII. There can be but One such Being b. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there must be at least one independent Being, such as is mentioned in prop. I. so now, that in reality there is but One c. Because his manner of existence being perfect and illimited, that manner of being (if I may speak so) is exhausted by Him, or belongs solely to Him d. If any other could partake with Him in it, He must want what that other had; be deficient and limited. Infinite and illimited inclose all c.

If there could be two Beings each by himself absolutely perfect, they must be either of the same, or of different natures. Of the same they cannot be; because thus, both being infinite, their existences would be coincident: that is, they would be but the same or one. Nor can they be of different natures: because if their natures were opposite or contrary the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would just destroy or be

a Simonides had good reason still to double upon Hiero the number of days allowd for answering that question, Quid, aut quale sit Deus? Ap. Cic.

b Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum. Hor.

c In Mor. neb. Maimonides having proved, that there must be some Being, who exists necessarily, or whose existence is necessary ברחינת עצמו, proceeds from this necessity of existence to derive incorporeity, absolute simplicity, perfection, and particularly unity, חומה ולא הפך וכת המחוייב המציאות לא הפך וכל לא רומה ולא הפך וכל לא רומה ולא הפך וכל ישני, she One.

d Therefore by Plato He is called of the One.

e Deus, si perfectus est, — ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia. If there could be more Gods than one, tantum singulis deerit, quantum in cateris sucrit. Lact.

to

the negation of the other 2: and if they are supposed to be only different, not opposite, then if they differ as disparates, there must be some genus above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be said at most to be beings perfect in their respective kinds. But this is not to be absolutely perfect; it is only to be perfect in this or that respect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in other respects.

What has been here faid is methinks sufficient to ruin the Manichean cause and exclude the independent principle of evil. For if we cannot account for the existence of that evil, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one instance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reasons for it, tho we do not know them. And certainly no fuch experience must make us deny axioms or truths equally certain b. There are, befide, fome things relating to this subject, which deserve our attention. For as to moral good and evil, they seem to depend upon our selves. If we do but endeavour, the most we can, to do what we ought, we shall not be guilty of not doing it (sect. IV.): and therefore it is our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being d, if guilt and evil be introduced by our neglect, or abuse of our own liberty and powers e. Then as to physical evil; without it much physical good would be lost, the one necessarily inferring the other f. Some things feem to be evil, which would not appear to be such, if we could fee through the whole contexture of things 8. There are not more evil than good things in the world, but surely more of the latter h. Many evils of this kind, as well as of the former, come by our own fault; some perhaps by way of punishment; some of physic i; and some as the means to happiness, not otherwise to be obtaind. And if there is a future state, that which seems to be wrong now may be rectified hereafter. To all which more may yet be added. As, that matter is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concernd, there must be imperfections, and consequently evils k. So that to ask, why God permits evil, is

^{*} As light and darkness are. Δύο 🔊 έξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' εναντίωσιν φθαρτικά ές αι πάντως τῆς àλληλων συτάσεως. Baf. There can be no fuch law between them, as is faid to be among the Heathen deities. Θεοίσι δί ωσί έχο νομ. Οὐδείς ἀπαντῶν βέλείαι προθυμία Τῆ Ε θέλοντ. κλ. Eurip. b 'Απόλωλεν ή άλήθει', έπεί συ δυτυχείς: Id. 💃 Ψυχήν έχζς άυτεξέσιον —— έ γ κατά γένεσιν αραςτάνεις, έτε κατα τύχλω ποςνεύεις, κλ. Cyr. Hier. d 'Ων αυτός εί χύριΦ, τετων τας αρχας pun Gnthons étépader. S. Bas. e Mul God extinguish sun, moon, and stars, because some people worship them? Mishn. Αὐτε τε έλομθρε αἰτία, Θεός ἀναίτι . Max. T. f 'H dita in owματι παρασκουάζει ήδονην ποτέ, κλ. Max. T. This observation might be extended a great way. If there was, v. g. no fuch thing as poverty, there could be no riches, or no great benefit by them. there would be scarce any arts or sciences, &c. "Av S areay, The nerice, & Bis the outework, ἀνείλες ἀπασαν, κλ. Chrys. Ε Τὰ μέρη προς ἀυτό τὸ όλον δεί σκοπείν, ἐι σύμφωνα ε ἀρμότθοντα h V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12. cusiva (with more to this purpose). Plot. 🕏 Θεέ ιατρική. Simpl. k Kania Brasnua & Unns. Plut.

to ask, why he permits a material world, or fuch a being as man is a; indowd indeed with some noble faculties, but incumberd at the same time with bodily pasfions and propensions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the answer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be defignd for a palæstra, where men b are to exercise their faculties and their virtues, and by that prepare themselves for a superior state (and who can say it is not?) there must be difficulties and temptations, occasions and opportunities for this exercise. Lastly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true origin; yet if they would but seriously reflect upon the many marks of reason, wisdom and goodness every where to be observed in instances, which they do or may underftand, they could scarce doubt but the same things prevaild in those, which they do not understand. If I should meet with a book, the author of which I found had disposed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his subjects with reason and exactness; but at last, as I red on, came to a few leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this case I should close the book with a full persuasion, that the same vein of good sense, which shewd itself in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other also: especially having arguments à priori, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the fame person. This I should certainly do, rather than deny the force of those arguments, in order to affert two authors of the same book. But the evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.

VIII. All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propositions for their existence. For since there can be but one perfect and independent being, the rest must be imperfect and dependent: and since there is nothing else, upon which they can, ultimately, depend beside Him, upon Him they must and do depend.

IX. He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either causes (immediately, or mediately), or permits. All beings (by the last) depend upon Him for their existence: upon whom depends their existence, upon him also must depend the intrinsic manner of their existence, or the natures of these

To that question. Why are we not so made, ώς ε μηθε βελομβοις ήμιν ἐπάρχειν τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν; S. Basil answers, Because ἀς ετη ολ προαιρέσεως κὸ σου εξ ἀνάσκης γίνεται. And he who blames the Deity because we are not impeccable, ἐθεν ἔτερον ἢ την άλογον φύσιν το λογικής προτιμά, κὸ την ἀκίνητον κὸ ἀνόρμητον το προαιρετικής ε ἐμπράκτε. Το Αθληταί ἀρετής, as Philo. In Chrysostom's style, ἀρετής ἐπιμελείος, ε καθάπερ εν παλαίτρα ἐπὶ Επαρόντο βίε ἀγωνίζεος, ΐνα μξ τὸ λυθήναι τὸ θέατρον λαμπρὸν ἀναθήσαος διωηθώμθη το εφανον.

beings: and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the necessary effects and consequences of their being, and being such as they are in themselves. Then, as to the acts of such of them as may be free agents, and the effects of them, He is indeed not the Author of those; because by the terms and supposition they proceed from agents, who have no necessity imposed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however these free agents must depend upon Him as such: from Him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to use their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they use it amiss. And, lastly, as to the nature of those relations, which lie between ideas or things really existing, or which arise from facts already done and past, these result from the natures of the things themselves: all which the Supreme being either causes, or permits (as before). For since things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, disagreements, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with respect to each other, the natures of these relations will be determined by the natures of the things.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expresses the existences or non-existences of things, and their mutual relations as they are, is true by the constitution of nature: and if so, it must also be agreeable to His perfect comprehension of all truth, and to His will, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (some free agent) is the effect of his liberty, and can only be said to be permitted by the Supreme being; yet when it is once done, the relation between the doer and the deed, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed such a fact, is a fixt relation. From thenceforward it will always be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one should deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whose existence is now proved. And thus those arguments in sect. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon a supposition that there was such a Being, are here consistence and made absolute.

X. The one supreme and perfect Being, upon whom the existence of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD.

There are other truths still remaining in relation to the Deity, which we may know, and which are necessary to be known by us, if we would endeavour to demean our selves toward Him according to truth and what He is. And they are such, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but also may serve at the same time as further proofs of His existence, and an amplification of some things touched perhaps too lightly. As,

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XI. GOD cannot be corporeal: or, there can be no corporeity in God. There are many things in matter utterly inconfistent with the nature of such a Being, as it has been demonstrated God must be.

Matter exists in parts, every one of which, by the term, is imperfect: but in a Being absolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.

These parts, tho they are many times kept closely united by some occult influence, are in truth so many distinct bodies, which may, at least in our imagination, be disjoind or placed otherwise: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural discerpibility and susceptivity of various shapes and modifications: i. e. mutability seems to be essential to it. But God, existing in a manner that is perfect, exists in a manner that must be uniform, always one and the same, and in nature unchangeable.

Matter is incapable of acting, passive only, and stupid: which are defects, that can never be ascribed to him who is the First cause or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is corporeal, where ever there is a vacuum, He must be excluded, and so becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chasms.

Lastly, there is no matter or body, which may not be supposed not to be; whereas the idea of God or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it existence.

XII. Neither infinite space, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together, can be God. For,

Space taken separately from the things, which possess and fill it, is but an empty scene or vacuum: and to say, that infinite space is God, or that God is infinite space, is to say that He is an infinite vacuum: than which nothing can be more absurd, or blasphemous. How can space, which is but a vast void, rather the negation of all things, than positively any thing, a kind of diffused no-

εἰ σῶμά ἐςι, Φύσις ἡ σώματ۞ μεριζομβή ἐις πλείω, ἔκας ον τ μερῶν μὰ τὸ ἀυτὸ εἶναι (f. ἔςαι) τῷ ὅλω, ſays Plotinus even of the Soul. Δέδεικται ἡ κὸ ὅτι μέγεθ۞ ἐδὲν ἀνδέχε) ἔχζν ταύτων ἐσίαν ἀκλὰ ἀμερὰς κὴ ἀδιαίρετός ἐςιν. Ατίβι.

minds

thing; how can this, I say, be the First cause, &c. or indeed any cause? What attributes beside penetrability and extension, what excellencies, what persections is it capable of a?

As infinite space cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or space; so tho He is eternal, yet eternity or infinite duration itself is not God b. For duration, abstracted from all durables, is nothing actually existing by itself: it is the duration of a being, not a being.

Infinite space and duration, taken together, cannot be God: because an interminable space of infinite duration is still nothing but eternal space; and that is at most but an eternal vacuum.

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconsistent with Divine perfection, tho matter should be infinitely extended, or there should be an infinite quantity of it, yet still, where ever it is, it carries this inconsistence along with it.

If to matter be added infinite duration, neither does this alter the nature of it. This only supposes it to be eternally what it is, i. e. eternally incapable of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of both infinite extension (or space) and duration too; yet still, so long as matter is matter, it must always and every where be incapable of Divinity.

Lastly, not the universe, or sum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then every thing is divine, every thing God, or of God; and so all things together must make but one being c. But the contrary to this we see, there being evidently many beings distinct, and separable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this distinction and separation of existence, beside what we see without us, we may even feel within our selves. We are severally conscious to our selves of the individuation and distinction of our own.

a They, who call God [πρρ, do it αρια πος αρια πος αρια πος τος αρια τος πος τος πος

minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of which we can be more cer-Were we all the same being, and had one mind, as in that case we must have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one person; but they must be common acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conscience common to us all a. Beside, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of fuch things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable instance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we should not know even our selves, and what we are b? In short, no collection of beings can be one being; and therefore not And the universe itself is but a collection of distinct beings c.

XIII. It is so far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no such thing as either matter or motion, if there was not some Superior being, upon whom they depended. Or, God is such a being, that without Him there could be neither matter nor motion. This must be true of matter: because it has been proved already, that there can be but one independent being; that he is incorporeal; and that the existence of all other beings must depend upon Him. But the same thing may be proved otherwise. If matter (I mean the existence of it) does not depend upon something above it, it must be an independent being; and if an independent being, a necessary being; and then there could be no such thing as a vacuum: but all bodies must be perfectly folid; and, more than that, the whole world could be but one fuch body, five times as firm as brafs, and incapable of all motion. For that being which exists necessarily does necessarily exist: that is, it cannot not exist. But in a vacuum matter does not exist.

Morcover, if matter be an independent, necessary being, and exists of itself, this must be true of every particle of it: and if so, there could not only be no vacuum

[·] Άτοπον ει μία ή εμή [ψυχή] κζ ή ότιξι άκε έχιῆν δ είμε άιδανομβε, κζ άκον ἀιδιάνεωζ,—κζ όλως ομοπαθείν ήμῶς τε προς ἀλλήλες, κὸ προς το πῶν. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at some other b Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus? Cic. fystem of Spinosa is so apparently salse, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be said against it: tho much might be. What Velleius says in Cicero, is not only true, Si mundus est - dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt: but, if there is but one substance, one nature, one being, and this being is God, then all the follies, madnesses, wickednesses that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and sufferd are both done and sufferd by Him; He is both cause and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the same things at the same time, &c. That such gross Atheism as this should ever be fashionable! Atheism: for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourselves and all other things which are visible about us do exist: something different from them must be intended. Therefore to fay, there is no God different from them, is to fay, there is no God at all.

but every particle must be every where. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of such certain dimensions by its own nature; since this consinement of existence within certain bounds implies non-existence in other places beyond those bounds, and is equal to a negation of existence; and when existence is essential to any being, a negation of existence cannot be so. Nor, in the next place, could its existence be limited by any thing else, because it is supposed to have its existence only of itself; i.e. to have a principle of existence in itself, or to have an existence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add still, if matter be self-existent, I do not see, not only how it comes to be restrained to a place of some certain capacity, but also how it comes to be limited in other respects; or why it should not exist in a manner that is in all respects perfect. So that thus it appears, matter must derive its existence from some other being, who causes it to be just what it is. And the being, who can

do this, must be God.

It is to no purpose to object here, that one cannot conceive, how the existence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being above our conceptions, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, must also be unconceivable. Reason discovers, that this visible world must owe its existence to some invisible Almighty being; i. e. it discovers this to be fact, and we must not deny facts because we know not how they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties should disclose to us the existence of things, and then drop us in our inquiry how they are. Thus much for matter.

As for motion; without a First cause, such as has been described, there could be none: and much less such motions as we see in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if matter itself could not be without such a cause, it is certain motion, which is an affection of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no motion, unless either there be in matter itself a power of beginning it; or it is communicated from body to body in an infinite succession, or in a circle, and so has no beginning; or else is produced by some incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never so repugnant to reason, I can hardly believe any one will affert, that a parcel of mere matter (let it be great or small, of any figure whatsoever, &c.) left altogether to itself, could ever of itself begin to move. If there is any such bold affertor, let him six his eyes upon some lump of matter, ex. gr. a stone, piece of timber, or a clod (cleard of all animals), and peruse it well; and then ask himself seriously, whether it is possible for him in earnest to believe, that that stone, log, or clod, tho nothing corporeal or incorporeal should excite or meddle with it, might some time or other of itself begin to creep. However, to be short, a power of beginning motion

is not in the idea of matter. It is passive, as we see, to the impressions of motion, and susceptive of it; but cannot produce it. On the contrary, it will always persist uniformly in its present state, either of rest or motion, if nothing stirs, diverts, accelerates, or stops it. Nor is there any thing in all physics better settled than that, which is called vis inertiae, or the inertia of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, without any First mover, or

immaterial cause of motion, has been proved impossible, prop. I.

The supposition of a perpetual motion in a circle is begging the question. For if A moves B, B moves C, and so on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the same as to say, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, ---Z: that is, A moves itself, or can begin motion a.

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from some mover incorporeal: which must be either that Supreme and self-existing spirit himself, who is God; or such, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is

fuch a Being. Turn back to p. 65.

If we consider ourselves, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there see the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or some members of them, and by these move other things, as they again do others; and know these motions to spring from the operations of our minds: but then we know also, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be so limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to small quantities and certain circumstances only: we should have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are necessitated to look up and acknowledge some Higher being, who is able not only to produce motion, but to impart a faculty of producing it.

And if the petty motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may those greater motions we see in the world, and the phanomena attending them: I mean the motions of the planets and heavenly bodies. For these must be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by causes and laws of His appointment; or by their respective movers, who, for reasons to which you can by this time be no stranger, must depend upon some Superior, that furnished them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done either of these ways, we can be at no great distance from a demonstration of the existence of a Deity.

What Censorinus charges upon many great men (but upon some of them surely unjustly) is to me unintelligible. He says, they believed semper homines suisse, &c. and then, Itaque & omnium, qua in sempiterno isto mundo semper surrunt, suturaque sunt, aiunt principium suisse nullum; sed orbem esse quemdam generantium, nascentium que, in quo uninscujusque geniti initium simul & sinis esse videatur.

It

It may perhaps be faid, that the matter has not the power of moving itself. yet it hath an attractive force, by which it can move other parts of matter: fo that all matter equally moves and is moved. But, allowing those things which are now usually ascribed to attraction, we shall still be necessitated to own some Superior being, whose influence mixes itself with matter, and operates upon it s or at least who, some way or other, imparts this force. For attraction, according to the true sense of the word, supposes one body to act upon another at a distance, or where it is not; but nothing can be an agent, where it is not at all, Matter can act only by contact, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by fomething elfe, or refifting those which strike against it, when it is at rest. And this it does as matter; i. e. by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called attraction, is so called only because the same things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of some thing, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter feem not only to gravitate towards each other, but many of them to fly each other. Now these two contrary motions and seeming qualities cannot both proceed from matter qua matter; cannot both be of the nature of it; and therefore they must be owing to some external causes or to some other being, which exites in them this, as it were love and discording - wolled mo lin or nove

Beside, as to the revolution of a planet about the sun, mere gravitation is not sufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of projection, to keep the planet from falling directly into the sun, and bring it about and from what hand, I desire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)?

Who impressed it?

What a vast field for contemplation is here opend! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the least particle that does not carry with it an argument of God's existence; not the least stick or straw, or other trisse that falls to the ground, but shews it; not the slightest motion produced, the least whist per of the air, but tells it. To the strain which the strain but tells it.

XIV. The frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phænomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things:

^{*} So what we call attraction and aversion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) seem to have been called by Empedocles: Φιλία η συγμείνειαι [τα σοιχεία], Ενείκο ὁ διαμείνειαι. Diog. L. (v. Emp.) v. Arift. Cic. & al.

fuch marks there are of both a. Or, God is that Being, without whom fuch a frame or constitution of the world, such a magnificence in it, &c. could not be. In order to prove to any one the grandness of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him confider the fun with that insupportable glory and lustre that furrounds it: to demonstrate the vast distance, magnitude, and heat of it: to represent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their several orbits about it; affording a regular variety of aspects; guarded some of them by secondary planets, and as it were emulating the state of the fun; and probably all possess by proper inhabitants: to remind him of those furprifing visits the comets make us; the large trains, or uncommon splendor, which attends them; the far country they come from; and the curiofity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who also may be up to see the entry and progress of these ministers of fate b: to direct his eye and contemplation, through those azure fields and vast regions above him, up to the fixt stars, that radiant numberless host of heaven; and to make him understand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they should be placed there only to adorn and bespangle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much less to supply the places of so many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets: to convince him, that they are rather so many other suns, with their several regions and sets of planets about them: to shew him, by the help of glasses, still more and more of these fixt lights, and to beget in him an apprehention of their unaccountable numbers, and of those immense spaces, that lie retired beyond our utmost reach and even imagination: I fay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him fuch things as are now known almost to every body; and by it to shew that if the world be not infinite, it is infinito similis c; and therefore fure a magnificent structure, and the work of an infinite Architect. But if we could take a view of all the particulars containd within that astonishing compass, which we have thus bastily run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our feat (I mean this

So far is that from being true, Nequaquam—divinitus esse creatam Naturam mundi, qua tanta est pradita culpà. Lucret. Men rashly (impiously) censure what they do not understand. Like that king of Castile, who fancied himself able to have contrived a better system of the world; because he knew not what the true system is, but took it to be as ascribed to him by R. Is. ab. Sid, and other astronomers of those times.

Since they have, or may have great effects upon the several parts of the solar system, one may speak thus without falling into the superstition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, Nunquam calo spectatum impune cometen (in Claud.), or the like.

Figure 1.

earth), what scope is here for admiration? The great variety of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different animals, with which it is stocked! The multifarious inventions and works of one of these; that is, of us men, &c. And yet when all these (heaven and earth) are surveyd as nicely as they can be by the help of our unaffished senses, and even of telescopical glasses, by the affishance of good microscopes in very small parts of matter as many new wonders a may perhaps be discovered, as those already observed; new kingdoms of animals; new architesture and curiosity of work. So that as before our senses and even conception fainted in those vast journeys we were obliged to take in considering the expanse of the universe; so here again they fail us in our researches into the principles and constituent parts of it. Both the beginnings and the ends of things, the least and the greatest, all conspire to bassle us: and which way ever we prosecute our inquiries, we still fall in with fresh subjects of amazement, and fresh reasons to believe that there are indefinitely still more and more behind, that will for ever escape our eagerest pursuits and deepest penetration.

This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances stupendous in it, but the manner in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their causes too profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and some, of which we seem to know the causes: but, alas! how few are these with respect to the whole sum? And the causes which we asfign, what are they? Commonly such, as can only be expressed in general terms, whilst the bottoms of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been collected from experience, but could scarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments à priori, to be capable of rendering such effects: and yet till causes are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly understood. Such, as feem disproportionate and too little, and are so insufficient and unsatisfactory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that something immaterial and invisible must be immediately concerned. In short, we know many times, that such a thing will have such an effect, or perhaps that such an effect is produced by fuch a cause, but the manner how we know not; or but grosly, and if fuch an hypothesis be true. It is impossible for us to come at the true principles of things, or to see into the oeconomy of the finest part of nature and workings of the first springs. The causes that appear to us, are but effects of other causes: the veffels, of which the bodies of plants and animals confift, are made up of other, smaller vessels: the subtilest parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal spirits, or particles of light), have their parts, and may for ought we know be compound bodies: and as to the substances

themselves of all these things, and their internal constitution, they are hid from our eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the surface of nature.

However, in the next place, we ourselves cannot but be witnesses, that there are flated methods, as so many set forms of proceeding, which things punctually and religiously keep to. The same causes, circumstanced in the same manner, have always the same success: all the species of animals, among us, are made according to one general idea; and so are those of plants also, and even minerals: no new ones are brought forth or arisen any where: and the old are

preserved and continued by the old ways.

Laftly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a contrivance and a respect to certain reasons and ends. How the sun is pofited near the middle of our fystem for the more convenient dispensing of his benign influences to the planets moving about him; how the plain of the earth's aguator interfects that of her orbit, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diversify the year, and create a useful variety of seasons, and many other things of this kind, tho a thousand times repeated, will always be pleasing meditations to good men and true scholars. Who can observe the vapors to ascend, especially from the sea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condensation, and not understand this to be a kind of distillation in order to clear the water of its groffer falts, and then by rains and dews to supply the fountains and rivers with fresh and wholsom liquor; to nourish the vegetables below by showers, which descend in drops as from a watering-pot upon a garden, &c. who can view the frueture of a plant or animal; the indefinite number of their fibres and fine vessels, the formation of larger vessels and the several members out of them, and the apt disposition of all these; the way laid out for the reception and distribution of nutriment; the effect this nutriment has in extending the vessels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expansion, continuing the motion of the feveral fluids, repairing the decays of the body, and preferving life: who can take notice of the several faculties of animals, their arts of saving and providing for themselves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the uses of plants to animals, and of some animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken that the several species should be propagated out of their proper feeds (without confusion a), the strong inclinations implanted in animals for that purpose, their love of their young, and the like: I say, who can do this, and not fee a design, in fuch regular pieces, so nicely wrought, and so preserved? If there was but one animal, and in that case it could not be doubt-

a If any one, fitting upon mount Ida, had feen the Greek army coming on in proper order [werz πολί κόσμε & τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιέσαν], he ought most certainly, notwithstanding what Sext. Emper. fays, to have concluded, that there was some commander, under whose conduct they moved.

ed but that his eyes were made that he might see with them, his ears that he might bear with them and so on, through at least the most considerable parts of him; if it can much less be doubted, when the same things are repeted in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like observations may be made with respect to vegetables, and other things: and if all these kinds of things, and therefore much more their particulars, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably numerous (as most evidently they are), one cannot but be convinced from that, which is so very obvious to every understanding, and plainly runs through the nobler parts of the visible world, that not only they, but other things, even those that seem to be less noble, have their ends too, tho not so well understood.

And now fince we cannot suppose the parts of matter to have contrived this won-derful form of a world among themselves, and then by agreement to have taken their respective posts, and pursued constant ends by certain methods and measures concerted (because these are acts, of which they are not capable), there must be some other Being, whose wisdom and power are equal to such a mighty work, as is the structure and preservation of the world. There must be some almighty Mind, who models and adorns it; lays the causes of things so deep; prescribes them such uniform and steady laws; destines and adapts them to certain purpo-

les; and makes one thing to fit and answer to another a.

That fuch a beautiful scheme, such a just and geometrical arrangement of things, composed, of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and uses and wants of the several beings require, through such an immense extent, should be the effect of chance only, is a conceit so prodigiously absurd, that certainly no one can espouse it heartily, who understands the meaning of that word. Chance seems to be only a term, by which we express our ignorance of the cause of any thing. For when we fay any thing comes by chance, we do not mean, that it had no other cause; but only, that we do not know the true cause, which produced it, or interposed in such a manner, as to make that fall out which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has such an idea of chance, as to make it an agent or really existing and acting cause of any thing, and much less sure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they must proceed from some agent or cause, which is either free or not free (that is, necessary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced is produced with design, not by chance. If it acts necessarily, the event must necessarily be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident only, that

Tíς ὁ ἀξμόζων την μάχαιζαν πζὸς τ κολεὸν, Ε τ κολεὸν πζὸς την μάχαιζαν, κτλ; Arr. Even such a thing as this doth not come by accident.

it is. There can be therefore no such cause as chance. And to omit a great deal that might yet be said, matter is indefinitely divisible, and the first particles (or atoms) of which it consists must be small beyond all our apprehension; and the chances, that must all hit to produce one individual of any species of material beings (if only chance was concerned), must consequently be indefinitely many: and if space be also indefinitely extended, and the number of those individuals (not to fay of the species themselves) which lie dispersed in it indefinite, the chances required to the production of them all, or of the universe, will be the rectangle of one indefinite quantity drawn into another. We may well call them infinite. And then to fay, that any thing cannot happen, unless infinite chances coincide, is the same as to say, there are infinite chances against the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the same as to say, it is impossible to happen; fince if there be a possibility that it may happen, the hazard is not infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of chance . He must be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not sensible how delicate and fine they are: and the finer they are, the groffer were those of Epicurus b.

If it should be objected, that many things seem to be useless, many births are monstrous, or the like, such answers as these may be made. The uses of some things are known to some men, and not to others: the uses of some are known now, that were not known to any body formerly: the uses of many may be discoverd hereafter: and those of some other things may for ever remain unknown to all men, and yet be in nature, as much as those discoverd were before their discovery, or are now in respect of them who know them not. Things have not therefore no uses, because they are conceald from us. Nor is nature irregular, or without method, because there are some seeming deviations from the common rule. These are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumstances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external impressions, heterogeneous matter introduced, or disagreeable and unnatural motions excited: and if the case could be truly put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as regularly (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a monster is produced, as when the usual issue in common cases. Under these circumstances the monster is the genuine issue: that is,

Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellige cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius & viginti forma literarum,—aliquò conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Cic. But alas, what b He was πολυγεαφώτατ Φ, πάντος υπερβαλare Ennius's annals to fuch a work as the world is! λόμεν Φ πλήθει βιβλίων. D. L. But that part of his physics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of infinite worlds; which makes his thought the groffer still. For infinite worlds require infinite chances infinitely repeted.

in the fame circumstances there would always be the same kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then mif-shaped, this infers no unsteadiness or mistake in nature. Beside, the magnificence of the world admits of some perturbations; not to fay, requires some variety. The question is, Could all those things, which we do know to have uses and ends, and to the production of which fuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of fo many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preserved fo far as it is. if nothing but blind chance prefided over all? Are not the innumerable instances of things, which are undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of those which are propagated and repeted by the same constant methods, enough to convince us, that there are ends proposed, and rules observed, even where we do not see them. And, lastly, if we should descend to particulars, what are those seemingly useless or monstrous productions in respect of the rest, that plainly declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the usual ways, with the usual perfection of their several kinds? If the comparison could be made, I verily believe these would be found to be almost infinituple of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing.

They, who content themselves with words, may ascribe the formation of the world to fate or nature, as well as to chance, or better. And yet fate, in the first place, is nothing but a feries of events, considered as necessarily following in some certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they would be in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a series of causes: but then they are such causes as are also effects, all of them, if there is no First cause; and may be taken for such. So that in this description is nothing like such a sause, as is capable of giving this form to the world. A series of events is the same with events happening seriatim: which words declare nothing concerning the cause of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, necessity are but circumstances of things that come to pass; not causes of their existence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, some external and superior cause must be supposed to put the series in motion, to project the order, to connect the causes and effects, and to impose the necessity.

^{*} Series implexa causarum. Sen.

b Seneca says himself, that in this series God is prima omnium causa, ex quâ catera pendent. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by fate. Sometimes it seems to follow the motions of the heavenly bodies and their aspects. Of this kind of fate is that passage in Suetonius to be understood, where he says that Tiberius was addictus mathematica, persuasionisque plenus cuneta fato agi. Sometimes it is confounded with fortune. So in Lucian we find την τύχην πράξεσαν τὰ μεμοιραμθρά, κὰ ὰ ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἐκάς ω ἐπεκλώω η. And sometimes it is the same with God: as when the Stoics say, ἔν τε είναι θεὸν κὰ νῶν κὰ τὰ μεμαρθράν κὰ Δία, ap. Diog. L. and the like elsewhere.

Then for nature, 1. If it be used for the intrinsic manner of existing; that constitution, make, or disposition, with which any thing is produced or born, and from which result those properties, powers, inclinations, passions, qualities, and manners, which are called natural (and fometimes nature), in opposition to such as are acquired, adventitious, or forced (which use is common): then to say, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of existence, is to say, that it formed itself, or that the effect is the efficient a. Beside, how can manner (manner of existing) be the cause of existing, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, some substance, not a manner of being. 2. If it be used in that other sense, by which it stands for the ideas of things, what they are in themselves, and what in their circumstances, causes, consequences, respects; or, in short, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we say, the nature of justice b requires this or that; i.e. the idea of justice requires or supposes it: a crime is of such a nature; that is, bears such a respect to the law. and is attended with fuch circumstances, or the like): then none of these senses can do an atheist any service. 3. If it be used for the world c (as, the laws of nature may be understood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the phanomena in it produced; after the same manner of speaking as when we fay, the laws of England, France, &c.) then it stands for that very thing, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect it felf. Under this sense may be comprehended that, when it denotes reality of existence, as when it is said that such a thing is not in nature (not to be found in the world). 4. If it fignifies the forementiond laws themselves; or that course, in which things by virtue of these laws proceed (as when the effects of these laws are styled the works of nature): then, laws suppose some legislator, and are posterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that nation confifts. 5. If it be used after the same manner as the word habit frequently is; to which many things are ascribed (just as they are to nature), though it be nothing existing distinct from the habits, which particular men or beings contract: then nature is a kind of abstract notion, which can do nothing. Perhaps nature may be put for natures, all natures, after the manner of a collective noun; or it may be mentioned as an agent, only as we personify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the shorter and more convenient expressing of

As when Strato Lamps. according to Tully, docet omnia esse effecta natura.

b Vis Enatura justitia. Cic.

c Almost as if it stood for nata, or res nata; all things, that are produced. (So fatura seems to be put sometimes for fatus.) Sunt, qui omnia natura nomine appellent; — corpora, & inane, quaque his accidant. Cic.

things

things. Lastly, if it denotes the Author of nature, or God^a (the effect seeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this case, to be put for the efficient): then, to Him it is that I ascribe the formation of the world, &c. To all which I must subjoin, that there is an unaccountable liberty taken in the use of this word: and that frequently it is used merely as a word, and nothing more, they who use it not knowing themselves, what they mean by it b. However, in no sense can it supersede the being of a Deity.

XV. Life, sense, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds shew the existence of some superior Being, from whom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, without whom neither could these be, any more than the things before mentiond. That they cannot flow from the nature of any matter about us as matter, or from any modification, size, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our souls themselves are not self-existent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, sollows from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we must necessarily be indebted for what we have of this kind to some great Benefactor, who is the fountain of them. For since we are conscious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our selves, we must have them from some other.

A man has little reason, God knows, to fancy the suppositum of his life, sense, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he considers how transitory and uncertain at best his life and all his injoyments are; what he is, whence he came, and whither he is going c. The mind acts not, or in the most imperceptible manner in animalculo, or the seminal state of a man; only as a principle of vegetation in the state of an embryon; and as a sensitive soul in the state of infancy, at least for some time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exercise and proper opportunities, it seems to open itself, find its own talents, and ripen into a rational being. But then it reasons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious steps in the pursuit of truth; finds all its powers subject to great eclip-

[&]quot;Natura, inquit, hac mihi prastat. Non intelligis te, cùm hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est Natura, qu'am Deus, & divina ratio, &c.? Sen. When it is said, Necesse est mundum is sum natura administrari, ap. Cic. what sense are those words capable of, if by nature be not really meant God? For it must be something different from the world, and something able to govern it.

**Balia naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, &c. says Balbus in Cic. What can this vis be: vis by itself, without the mention of any subject, in which it inheres; or of any cause, from whence it proceeds? A soul of the world, plastic nature, bylarchic principle, אסר פוער פוער אונים. אונים או

best reaching but a few objects in respect of all, that are in the immensity of the universe; and, lastly, is obnoxious to many painful sensations and reflexions. Had the soul of man the principle of its own existence and faculties within itself, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all these limitations and defects, to all these alterations and removes from one state to another: it must cer-

tainly be constant to itself, and persist in an uniform manner of being.

There may be perhaps who will fay, that the foul, together with life, fense, &c. are propagated by traduction from parents to children, from them to their children again, and so from eternity a: and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature of them as to the existence of a Deity. Ans. If there could be fuch a traduction, yet to suppose one traduced to come from another traduced, and so ab æterno, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this traductive power, is the same as to suppose an infinite series of moveds without a mover, or of effects without a cause: the absurdity of which is shewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by tradux anima ought to be clearly explaind: for it is not easy to conceive how thought, or thinking fubstances, can be propagated after the manner of branches, or in any manner that can be analogous to it, or even warrant a metaphorical use of that phrase b. It should also be told, whether this traduction be made from one or from both the parents. If from one, from which of them is it? And if from both, then the same tradux or branch must always proceed from two stocks: which is a thing, I presume, that can no where else be found, nor has any parallel in nature. And yet fuch a thing may much better be supposed of vines, or plants, than of thinking beings, who are fimple and uncompounded substances c.

² For I cannot think that any body will now stand by that way of introducing men first inte the world, which is mentiond by Diodorus Sic. but afferted by Lucretius. Ubi quaque loci regio b What by Tertullian in one opportuna dabatur, Crescebant uteri terra radicibus apti, &c. place is called anima ex Adam tradux, in another is velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himself better, when he confesses there to be duas species seminis, corporalem & animalem (al. corporis semen & anima): or more fully femen animale ex anima distillatione, sicut & virus illud, corporale semen, ex carnis defacatione. According to the fore-cited author the foul is derived from the father only, & genitalibus famina foveis commendata: and all souls from that of Adam. Definimus animam, says he, Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem: and in another place, ex uno homine tota has animarum redundantia agitur. But this doth not well confift with his principal argument for traduction, that children take after their parents. For beside what will here be said by and by, if there is a traduction of all men from one man, and traduction causes likeness; then every man must be like the first, and (consequently) every other. This

This opinion of the traduction of fouls seems to me to stand upon an unsound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on these two things: the similitude there is between the seatures, humors, and abilities of children and those of their parents a; and the difficulty men find in forming the notion of a spirit b. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other substance but matter: and that the soul resulting from some disposition of the body, or some part of it, or being some merely material appendix to it, must attend it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the one, so there must be also of the other at the same time.

Now the former of these is not always true; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to see children differ from their parents, in their understandings, inclinations, shapes, complexions, and (I am sure) one from another. And this dissimilitude has as much force to prove there is not a traduction, as similitude, whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Besides, it seems to me not hard to account for some likeness without the help of traduction. It is visible the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objects they see, the sounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create changes in them, fometimes with respect to their intellectuals, sometimes to their passions and humors, and sometimes to their health and other circumstances of their bodies: and yet the original stamina and fundamental parts of the man remain still the fame. If then the semina, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) animalcula already formed; which being diftributed about, especially in some opportune places, are taken in with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being separated in the bodies of the males by strainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in their seminal vessels, do there receive some kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the females, are there nourished more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big to be longer confined d: I say, if this be the case, why may not the

[&]quot;Unde, oro te, says the same author, similitudine anima quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus,— si non ex anima semine educimur? Then to consirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus: in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo astu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire? I am ashamed to transcribe more.

b Therefore the said father makes the soul to be corporeal.

c This might seem to be favord by them who hold, that all souls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in Nahh. ab. & al. often), did not the same authors derive the body אום בו משפה סרוחה בו משפה סרוחה בו משפה סרוחה בו אובריו משים יגרל מעט ער שישחלמו איבריו.

d This account destroys that argument, upon which Censorinus says many of the old philosophers afferted the eternity of the world: quod negent omnino pose reperiri, avesne ante, an ova generatation.

the nutriment received from the parents, being prepared by their vessels, and of the same kind with that with which they themselves are nourishd, be the same in great measure to the animalcula and embrya that it is to them, and consequently very much assimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing else from them? Many impressions may be made upon the fætus, and many tinctures given to the fluids communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the animal itself, may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothesis (which has long been mine) fuggests a reason, why the child is sometimes more like the father, sometimes the mother: viz. because the vessels of the animalculum are disposed to receive a greater proportion of aliment sometimes from the one, fometimes from the other: or the fluids and spirits in one may ferment and operate more strongly than in the other, and so have a greater and more signal effect. (Here it ought to be observed, that tho what the animalculum receives from the father, is in quantity little in respect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former, being the first accretion to the original stamina, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)

Since there cannot be a proper traduction of the child (one mind, and one body) from both the two parents, all the similitude it bears to one of them must proceed from some such cause as I have assigned, or at least not from traduction. For the child being sometimes like the father, and sometimes the mother, and the traduction either always from the father, or always from the mother, there must sometimes be similitude, where there is no traduction: and then if the child may refemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at least, to be true in plants, which raised from the same seed, but in different beds and soil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces some diversity into the seed or original plant, and assimilates it in some measure to the rest raised in the same place.

The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal supports to this doctrine of traduction (a supposition, that the soul is merely material, or but the refult of some disposition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premise this here: tho we can have no image of a spirit (because no being can be portraid or represented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reason to affert the existence of such a substance. Matter is a thing, which we converse with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and pro-

sint; cium & ovum sine ave, & avis sine ovo gigni non possit. This question was once much agitated in the world, as may be feen by Macrobius and Plutarch; who calls it, τὸ ἀπορον κὰ ποκλα πράγμαθα τοίς ζητητικοίς παρέχου - προελημα.

4

³ This is as much as Epicurus had to fay for his atoms: for they were only σώματα λόγφ θεωgnra, xh. fuft. M. perties;

perties; and fince we cannot find among them any that are cogitative, or fuch a thing as life, but several things inconsistent with them, we are under a necessity of confessing that there is some other species of substance beside that which is corporeal, and that our souls are of that kind (or rather of one of those kinds, which are not merely corporeal: for there must be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all surprising, that we should not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itself a? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conscious of its own acts, and reslect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own substance it can have no adequate notion, unless it could be as it were object and spectator both. Only that perfect Being, whose knowledge is infinite, can thus intimately know himself.

They, who found the traduction of the foul upon this prefumption, that it is material, and attends the body as some part or affection of it, seem further to be most wofully mistaken upon this account: because the body itself is not propagated by traduction. It passes indeed through the bodies of the parents, who afford a transitory habitation and subsistence to it: but it cannot be formed by the parents, or grow out of any part of them. For all the vital and effential parts of it must be one coeval system, and formed at once in the first article of the nascent animalculum; fince no one of these could be nourishd, or ever come to any thing, without the rest: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the rest, it would soon wither and decay again for lack of nourishment received by proper vessels; as we see the limbs and organs of animals do, when the fupply due from the animal occonomy is any way intercepted or obstructed. And fince an organized body, which requires to be thus simultaneously made (fashiond as it were at one stroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and gradual. process, I cannot but conclude, that there were animalcula of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the feed of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is usually called equivocal or spontaneous generation, and with great reason now generally exploded. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other instances, and microscopical observations do abet what I have said strongly.

Lastly, if there is no race of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man who is not descended from two first parents: and then the souls of those two first parents could be traduced from no other. And that there is no such race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earthly things, and the history of mankind, arts, and sciences. What is objected

² Οὐ ἡ οὐ τῷ Θεωεκμθρώ τὸ Θεωεεῖν. Plot.

b Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrai & cali——
Cur supra bellum Thebanum & funera Troja Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poeta. Lucr.

against this argument from fancied inundations, conflagrations, &c. a has no weight with me. Let us suppose some such great calamity to happen now. It must be either universal, or not. If universal, so that no body at all could be saved, then either there must never be any more men, or they must begin again in some first parents. If it was only topical, affecting some one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there were any natural means left by which men might escape, considerable numbers must certainly survive: and then it cannot be imagined, that they should all be absolutely so ignorant of every thing, that no one should be able to give an account of fuch things as were common; no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect that there were fuch things as letters; none, that understood any trade; none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they used to be clothed, how their meat drest, or even what their food was: not can it be thought, that all books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ships, buildings, and all the product of human skill and industry now extant in the world should be so universally and utterly abolished, that no part, no vestigium of them should remain; not so much, as to give a hint toward the speedy restoration of necessary arts at The people escaping must fure have clothes on, and many necessaries about them, without which they could not escape, nor outlive such a dreadful scene. In short, no conflagration, no flood, no destruction can serve the objectors purpose, to reduce mankind to that state, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable symptoms we find them to have been in not many thousands of years fince; I fay, no destruction can serve his purpose, but such an one as makes thorough work, only sparing two or three couples, stript of every thing, and the most stupid and veriest blocks b to be picked out of the whole number: natural fools, or mere bomines sylvestres would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as foon as they had the opportunity to do it. And suppose they never should have such an opportunity; yet neither would this serve him effectually: since without some supernatural Power interposing such a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preserved, nor the earth reformed out of its ashes and ruins after such a calcination, or dissolution, such a total demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or testimony of any such thing, that has ever been universal c, except per-

I

[•]Πολλαι η κατά πολλά Φθοςαί γεγόνασιν άνθεώπων, η έσονται, πυςί μι η ύδατι μέγιται. P'ate. · For what has been faid only in general, Tes appaulmates is ameres, as Plato speaks. and prefumptively, to serve a cause, signifies nothing: no more than that testimony in Arnobius, where he feems to allow, that there have been universal conflagrations. Quando, says he, mundus incensus in favillas & cineres dissolutus est? Non ante nos? haps

haps of one deluge: and as to that, if the genius of the language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing history in it were well understood, some labord and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And beside that, the same record, which tells the thing was, tells also how immediately God was concernd in it; that some persons actually were saved; and that the people who then perishd, as well as they who survived, all descended from two first parents: and if that authority be a sufficient proof of one part of the relation, it must be so of the rest.

We may conclude then, that the human foul with its faculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a Superior being. And who can this be but the Supreme being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. Though His effence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible, yet we may say with assurance, that He is free from all defects: or One, from whom all defects must be removed.

This proposition hath in effect been proved already a. However I will take the liberty to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are finite, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is infinite. And if they were inlarged to ever so great a capacity, yet so long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the same kind, they would by that be only rendered able to apprehend more and more finite ideas; out of which, howsoever increased or exalted, no positive idea of the perfection of God can ever be formed. For a Perfect being must be infinite, and perfectly One: and in such a nature there can be nothing finite, nor any composition of finites.

How should we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exists, when we comprehend not the nature of the most inferior spirits, nor have any conception even of matter itself divested of its accidents? How should we attain to an adequate knowledge of the Supreme author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the extent of the world itself, and the numberless undescried regions, with their several states and circumstances, containd in it, never to be frequented or visited by our philosophy; nor can turn our selves any way, but we are still accosted with something above our understanding? If we cannot penetrate so far into effects, as to discover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expected, that we should, that we can ever be admitted to see through the mysteries of His nature,

[·] Prop. V, VI.

who is the Cause, so far above them all. The Divine perfection then, and manner of being must be of a kind different from and above all that we can conceive.

However, notwithstanding our own defects, we may positively affirm there can be none in God: fince He is perfect, as we have feen, He cannot be defective or imperfect. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well understood and rememberd: viz. that from Him must be removed want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconfifently with reason and truth, and the like. Because these are defects; defect of knowledge, power, &c. These are defects and blemishes even in us. And the his perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in them, would be much more fuch in Him, and can by no means be ascribed to Him a.

Though we understand not His manner of knowing things; yet ignorance being uniform and the same in every subject, we understand what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly deny that to belong to Him. The like may be faid with respect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we speak of the internal essential attributes of God positively, as that He is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the intent is only to say, that there is no object of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exists without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep still within the limits allowd by the proposition b. That is, we may speak thus without pretending to comprehend His nature. And fo,

XVII. We may consider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw conclusions from His works, as they are called, notwithstanding any thing which has been said c. Because this we can do without com-Nay, the contemplation of His prehending the manner of His existence. works leads us into a necessity of owning, that there must be an incomprehen-

fible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the mode, in which the world depends upon Him and He influences and disposes things, because this enters into His nature, and the one cannot be understood without the other: yet if I see things, which I know cannot be felf-existent, and observe plainly an oeconomy and design in the disposition of them, I may conclude that there is some Being, upon whom their existence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld; may call this

a If that in Terence had been (not a question, as it is there, but) an affirmation, Ego homuncio. hoc non facerem, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity? b Asyony o אין דרך להשיגו אלא ממעשיו . Maim. pon is w o de is w, & heropy. Plotin.

Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, &c. without contradicting my self or truth: as I hope it will appear from what has been said, and is going to be said in the next proposition.

XVIII. God, who gives existence to the world, does also govern it by His providence. Concerning this grand question, Whether there is a Divine providence,

or not, I use to think, for my self, after the following manner.

First, The world may be said to be governed (at least cannot be said to be another.), or left to fluctuate fortuitously), if there are laws, by which natural causes act, the several phanomena in it succeed regularly, and, in general, the constitution of things is preserved: if there are rules observed in the production of herbs, trees, and the like: if the several kinds of animals are, in proportion to their several degrees and stations in the animal kingdom, surnished with faculties proper to direct and determin their actions; and when they act according to them, they may be said to follow the law of their nature: if they are placed and provided for suitably to their respective natures and wants a, or (which amounts to the same thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumstances b: if, lastly, particular cases relating to rational beings are taken care of in such a manner, as will at last agree best with reason.

Secondly, If there are such laws and provisions, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the Author of nature. For those laws, which result from the natures of things, their properties, and the use of their faculties, and may be said to be written upon the things themselves, can be the laws of no other: nor can those things, whose very being depends upon God, exist under any condition repugnant to His will; and therefore can be subject to no laws or dispositions, which He would not have them be subject to; that is, which are not His. Beside, there is no other being capable of imposing laws, or any scheme of government upon the world; because there is no other, who is not himself part of the world, and whose own existence doth not depend upon Him.

Thirdly, By the providence of God I mean His governing the world by fuch laws, and making fuch provisions, as are mentioned above. So that if there

are such, there is a Divine providence.

[&]quot; ער ביצי כנים, as the fews speak. I shall not pretend here to meddle with particular cases relating to inanimate or irrational beings; such as are mentioned in Mo. nebok. (a leaf's falling from a tree, a spider's catching a flie, érc.) and which are there said to be במקרה גמור. Tho it is hard to separate these many times from the cases of rational beings; as also to comprehend what מקרד: גמור, perfect accident, is.

N 2

Lastly,

Lastly, It is not impossible, that there should be such: on the contrary, we have just reasons to believe there are. It would be an absurd assertion to say, that any thing is impossible to a being whose nature is infinitely above our comprehension, if the terms do not imply a contradiction: but we may with confidence assert, that it is impossible for any thing, whose existence flows from such a being, ever to grow so far out of His reach, or be so emancipated from under Him, that the manner of its existence should not be regulated and determind by Him.

As to inanimate substances, we see the case to be really just as it was supposed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their stations, or persevere to go the same circuits over and over by a certain law. Little bodies or particles, of the same kind, observe continually the same rules of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any seeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumstances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient laws. We are so far acquainted with the laws of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and serve our selves of them, supplying upon many occasions the defect of power in our selves by mechanical powers, which never sail to answer according to the establishment. Briefly, we see it so far from being impossible, that the inanimate world should be governed by laws, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to laws by them inviolable.

As to vegetables, we see also how they are determind by certain methods prescribed them. Each fort is produced from its proper seed; hath the same texture of fibres; is nourished by the same kind of juices out of the earth, digested and prepared by the same kind of vessels, &c. Trees receive annually their peculiar liveries, and bear their proper fruits: flowers are drest, each family, in the same colors, or diversify their fashions after a certain manner proper to the kind, and breath the same effences: and both these and all other kinds observe their seasons; and seem to have their several professions and trades appointed them, by which they produce such food and manufactures (pardon the catachresis), as may satisfy the wants of animals. Being so very necessary, they, or at least the most useful, grow easily: being fixt in the earth, insenfible, and not made for fociety, they are generally appearables : being liable to a great consumption both of them and their seeds, they yield great quantities of these, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evidently a regulation, by which the feveral orders are preferved, and the ends of them answerd according to their first establishment too.

Then as to animals, there are laws, which mut. mutand. are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at least such as resemble a their laws. The

[?] Pliny in his chapter De ordine natura in satis, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

individuals of the several kinds of those, as of these, have the same (general) shape and members, to be managed after the same manner: have the same vessels replenished with the same kinds of fluids, and furnished with the same glands for the separation and distribution of such parts of them, as answer the same intentions in them all: are stimulated by the same appetites and uneafinesses to take in their food, continue their breed, &c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner so like to that of vegetables, according to fixt methods, and keeps in the same general track as they do, may be said to observe and be under some like rule or law, which either operates upon and limits it ab extra, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations resulting from the feveral degrees of reason and sense, or sense only, of which we cannot but be conscious in our selves, and observe some faint indications in the kinds belows us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing less than laws, by which animals are to move and manage themselves: that is, otherwise exprest, by which the Author of their natures governs them. 'Tis true thefe laws may not impose an absolute necessity, nor be of the same rigor with those of inanimate and merely passive beings, because the beings which are subject to these (men at least) may be supposed in some measure free, and to act upon some kind of principles or motives: yet still they may have the nature of laws, tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that providence by which God administers the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's providence and government, as if they were given me immediately by Him, without my acting; fince all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon Him, and are as it were instruments of His providence to me in respect of such things as may be procured by them .

To finish this head: it is so far from being impossible, that the several tribes of animals should be so made and placed, as to find proper ways of supporting and defending themselves (I mean, so far as it is consistent with the general oeconomy of the world: for some cannot well subsist without the destruction of some others), that, on the contrary, we see men, beasts, birds, sishes, insects all have organs and faculties adapted to their respective circumstances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey, &c. even to the astonishment of them who attend to the history of nature. If men, who seem to have more wants than any other kind, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is because they themselves, not contented with what is decent and convenient only, have by their luxuries and scandalous neglect of their reason made life expensive.

^{*} Therefore if those Essenes in Josephus, who are said ἐπὶ μω Θιῷ καταλιπεῖν τὰ πάντα, excluded human endeavours, they must be much in the wrong.

The

The wirld then being not left in a state of confusion or as a chaos, but reduced into order and methodized for ages to come; the several species of beings having their offices and provinces assignd them; plants and animals subsistence set out for them, and as they go off, successors appointed to relieve them, and carry on the scheme, &c. that the possibility only of a general providence should be allowed, is certainly too modest a demand. We see, or may see, that in fast there is such a providence.

The great difficulty is, how to account for that providence, which is called particular; or that, which respects (principally) particular men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deferving well, or ill. Some will make a right use of their faculties and opportunities, some will not: the vicious may, or may not repent, or repent and relapse: some fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any defign: and these want to be reclaimd: fome may be supposed to worship God and to crave His protection and bleffing, \mathcal{C}_c and then a proper answer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will arise, which will require from a governor fuitable incouragements, rewards, correptions, punishments; and that some should be protected and fortunate, others not, or less. Now the good or ill state of a man here, his fafety or danger, happiness or unhappiness depend upon many things, which feem to be fcarce all capable of being determind by providence. They depend upon what he does himself, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by others, and may either touch him at the same time, or reach him afterward: upon the course of nature, which must affect him; and, in fine, upon many incidents, of which no account is to be given b. As to what be does himself, it is impossible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happiness, and what not: or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compass of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are free, how can they be determind to be only such, as may be either good or bad (as the case requires) for some other particular man; fince fuch a determination feems inconfiftent with liberty? Beside, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own private freedom, and the feveral degrees of fense and ability which they respectively have, their acts, as they either conspire, or cross and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet

a Ut siquis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa sieri judicare, sed esse aliquem intelligat, qui prasit, & cui pareatur, &c. Cic.

b Little things have many times unforeseen and great essects: & contra. The bare sight of a sig, shewn in the senate-house at Rome, occasiond Carthage to be destroyd: quod non Trebia, aut Trasymenus, non Canna busto insignes Romani nominis persicere potuere; non castra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portaque Collina adequitans ipse Hannibal. Plin.

and oppose each other, and have different effects upon men of different makes, or in different circumstances, must cause a strange embarras, and intangle the plot 3. And as to the course of nature, if a good man be passing by an infirm building, just in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God should suspend the force of gravitation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance; or can we think it would be increased, and the fall hastend, if a bad man was there, only that he might be caught, crushd, and made an example? If a man's safety or prosperity should depend upon winds or rains, must new motions be imprest upon the atmosphere, and new directions given to the floating parts of it, by some extraordinary and new influence from God? Must clouds be so precipitated, or kept in suspence, as the case of a particular man or two requires? To which add, that the differing and many times contrary interests of men are scarce to be reconciled. The wind, which carries one into the port, drives another back to sea; and the rains, that are but just sufficient upon the bills, may drown the inhabitants of the valleys d. In short, may we expect miracles e: or can there be a particular providence, a providence that fuits the feveral cases and prayers of individuals, without a continual repetition of them, and force frequently committed upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,

1. It feems to me not impossible, that God should know what is to come: on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that He does and must know things future. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from Him, must either be the effect of mechanical causes, or of the motions of living beings and free agents. For chance we have seen already is no cause. Now as to the former, it cannot be impossible for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore must intimately know all their powers and what effects they will have, to see through the whole train of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in that

way : nay, it is impossible, that He should not do it. We our selves, if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of which a machine is made, and understand the force and determination of those powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to those things which depend upon the voluntary motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the rest) can only be free with respect to fuch things as are within their sphere; not great, God knows: and their freedom with respect to these can only consist in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent necessity, as their own reason and judgment shall determin them; or to neglett their rational faculties, and not use them at all, but suffer themselves to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itself acts in a manner mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in mens power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the mechanism and propensions of them; knows the nature and extent of their understandings, and what will determin them this or that way; knows all the process of natural (or fecond) causes, and consequently how these may work upon them b: He, I fay, who knows all this, may know what men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, viz. whether they will use their rational faculties or not. And fince even we our felves, mean and defective as we are, can in some measure conceive, how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step to finish the account, can we with any shew of reason deny to a Perfect being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; especially if we call to mind, that this very power of using our own faculties is held of Him :?

Observe what a sagacity there is in some men, not only in respect of physical causes and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind; and how very easie it is many times, if the persons concernd, their characters, and circumstances are given, to foresee what they will do: as also to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate transactions upon which they depend are not known d. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in some men, than in others: consider further, that if there be any minds more persect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent degree, proportionable to the excellence of their natures: in the last place, do but allow

What Seneca says of the Gods (in the heathen style), may be said of the true God. Nota est ill; operis sui series: omniumque illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit, &c.
 Ὁ Ὁ ζωοπλάς ης θεὸς ἐπίς αται τὰ ἐαυτῦ καλῶς δημικεργήματα. Ph. Jud.
 Ipsa nostra voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque prascientia continetur, &c.
 Aust.
 Δ Etsi quem exitum acies habitura sit, divinare nemo potest; tamen belli exitum video, &c. and after, quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, qua oculis cernimus. Cic.

(as you must) this power of discerning to be in God proportionable to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to theirs, and then it becomes infinite; and then again, the future actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things past or present or which come to pass necessarily.

After all, what has been faid is only a feeble attempt to shew, how far even we can go toward a conception of the manner, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His power of knowing, must infinitely pass all our understanding. It must be something different from and infinitely transcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of a.

We know matters of fact by the help of our fenses, the strength of memory, impressions made upon phansy, or the report of others (tho that indeed is comprehended under senses. For that, which we know only by report, in proper speaking we only know the report of, or we have heard it); and all these ways do suppose those matters either to be present, or once to have been: but is it therefore impossible, that there should be any other ways of knowing? This is so far from being true, that, fince God has no organs of sensation, nor such mean faculties as the best of ours are, and consequently cannot know things in the way which we know them in, if He doth not know them by some other way, He cannot know them at all, even tho they were present: and therefore there must be other ways, or at least another way of knowing even matters of fact. And fince the difficulty we find in determining, whether future matters of fact may be known, arises chiefly from this, that we in reality consider, without minding it, whether they may be known in our way of knowing; it vanishes, when we recollect, that they are and must be known to God by some other way: and not only fo, but this must be some way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. Future, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as present is of ours: nor can web tell, what respect past, present, to come, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no fuch thing as found, to blind no fuch thing as light or color: nor, when these things are defined and explaind to them in the best manner, which their circumstances admit, are they can pable of knowing how they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell how future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what founds or colors are, and how they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing those,

י ויועה ממין יריעתנו אין זה יריעה ממין יריעתנו אין זה יריעה ממין יריעתנו . Id. ברב ובמעט לבר אבל במין המציאה . Id. b Ignari, quid queat esse, Quid nequeat: to use Lucretius's words more properly.

as well as there is of perceiving these. As they want a sist sense to perceive sounds or colors, of which they have no notion: so perhaps we may want a sixth sense, or some faculty, of which suture events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reason to deny, that there is in nature such a sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is such a sense as that of hearing or seeing.

We can never conclude, that it is impossible for an infinitely perfect Being to know what a free agent will choose to do, till we can comprehend all the powers of such a Being, and that is till we our selves are infinite and perfect. So far are we from being able to pronounce with any shew of reason, that it is impossible there should be such knowledge in God.

In the last place, this knowledge is not only not impossible, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth necessarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if ignorance be an imperfection, the ignorance of future acts and events must be so: and then if all imperfections are to be denied of Him, this must.

There is indeed a common prejudice against the prescience (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or certainly: and if so, then they are certain; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of freedom. And thus prescience and freedom are inconsistent. But sure the nature of a thing is not changed by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not altered by this. The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the actions of free agents, because they will be; not that they will be, because He foresees them b. If I see an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties supposed, it is certain that object is there: but yet it cannot be said, it is there because I see it there, or that my seeing it there is the cause of its being there: but because it is there, therefore I see it there. It is the object, that determins my sensation: and so in the other case, it is a future choice of the free agent, that determins the prescience, which yet may be infallibly true.

Let us put these two contradictory propositions, B (some particular man) will go to church next Sunday, and B will not go to church next Sunday; and let us sup-

^{*} To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the same as to endeavour שנרה אורה, Maim. אנחנו הוא Maim. אנחנו הוא Maim. Much might be inserted upon this subject (out of Abarb. particularly) which I shall omit. Sicut estim to memoria tha non cogis facta esse qua praterierunt; sic Deus prascientia sua non cogit facienda qua futura sunt. S. Aust.

pose withall, that B is free, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his own will. In this case he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but one of these two things, either go, or not go; and one he must do. One of these propositions therefore is now true; but yet it is not the truth of that proposition, which forces him to do what is containd in it: on the contrary, the truth of the proposition arises from what he shall choose to do. And if that truth doth not . force him, the foreknowledge of that truth will not. We may fure suppose B himself to know certainly before hand, which of the two he will choose to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean fo far as it depends upon his choice only): and if so, then here is B's own foreknowledge consistent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, suppose God to know as much in this respect as B does, there will be God's foreknowledge confistent with B's freedom.

In a word, it involves no contradiction to affert, that God certainly knows what any man will choose; and therefore that he should do this cannot be said to be impossible.

2. It is not impossible, that such laws of nature, and such a series of causes and effects may be originally defignd, that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but even particular cases, at least many of them, may also be provided for without innovations or alterations in the course of nature a. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, estimated, and laid together: but when I consider, what a mass of wonders the universe is in other regards; what a Being God is, incomprehenfibly great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the future wants and deportments of particular men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the First cause, must do this so as to be confiftent one with another, and in fuch a manner, as to make one compact fystem, befitting so great an Author: I say, when I consider this, I cannot deny fuch an adjustment of things to be within His power b. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reafonable success of my endeavours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am c), as with any other thing or phenomenon how great foever.

Perhaps

⁻ Things come to país & κατά φυσικάς ἀκολεθίας & κατά λόγοι· and even τὰ σμωρότεςα δώσωντετάχθαι & σιωυφάνθαι νομίζειν. Plot. That in Seneca looks something like this: Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove, sed sic omnia disposita, ut ea etiam, qua ab illo non siunt, tamen sine ratione non fiant : que illius est .- Nam etsi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut sierent. to be what Eusebius means, when he says, that Divine providence does (among other things) 70% επτός συμβαινεσι την δεεσαν τάξιν λπονέμειν. c Two of Edersian the specute perger speader, in Philo's words.

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Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppose M (some man) certainly to foreknow fome way or other that, when he should come to be upon his death-bed, L would petition for some particular legacy; in a manner so earnest and humble, and with such a good disposition, as would render it proper to grant his request: and upon this M makes his last will, by which he devises to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the will; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilft L had yet no expectation or thought of any fuch thing. When the time comes, the petition is made, and granted; not by making any new will, but by the old one already made, and without alteration: which legacy had, notwithstanding that, never been left had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreseen, that L would not so much as ask, and had therefore been left out of the will; this preterition would have been caused by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowed to foreknow the case a. And thus the prayers, which good men offer to the All-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects already forecasted in the course of nature. Which possibility may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general. &

It is obvious to every one's observation, that in fact particular men are very commonly (at least in some measure) rewarded or punished by the general laws and methods of nature. The natural (tho not constant) attendents and consequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice, loss of philosophical pleasures, a diseased body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be virtuous and happy, C vitious and at last miserable, laboring under a late and fruitless remorse; tho this comes to pass through the natural tendence of things, yet these two cases, being supposed such as require, the one that B should be favord, the other that C should suffer for his wickedness, are as effectually provided for, as if God exerted his power in some peculiar way on this occasion.

3. It is not impossible, that men, whose natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in such times, places, and other circumstances, as that

their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the general plan of things, but also answer many private cases too b. The planets and bigger parts of the world

The case here put may perhaps supply an answer to that, which is said in Mishn. mass. Berak.

'נצועק לשעבר הרי זו תפלתשוא וכוי b If Plato had not been born in the time of Socrates, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with Lactantius's tavor, he might have reason to thank God, quòd Atheniensis [natus esset], of quòd temporibus Socratis. Just as M. Antoninus ascribes, gratefully, to the Gods דֹס מְימֹיִמוּ Aπολλάνιον, 'Ρέξικον, Μάξιμον.

we cannot but see are disposed into such places and order, that they together make a noble system, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion restraind or alterd. On the contrary, being rightly placed, they by the observation of these become subservient to the main design. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind something like a projection of the future bistory of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aspects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why should it not be thought possible for men, as well as for them, by some secret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the presidence and guidance of an unseen governing power, to be brought into their places in such a manner as that by the free use of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppositions of their interests and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their several magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conspire to make out the scheme? And then again, since generals consist of particulars, and in this scheme are comprehended the actions and cases of particular men, they cannot be so situated respectively among the rest of their species as to be serviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the general diagram of affairs, unless they and their several actings and cases do in the main correspond one to another, and fit among themselves, or at least are not inconsistent.

Here is no implication of any contradiction or absurdity in all this: and therefore it may at least be fairly supposed. And if so, it will follow, that a particular providence may be compatible with the natural freedom of mens actions. Such a supposition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty, perfect Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon those words, and take their import, must believe.

The ancients I am persuaded had some such thoughts as these. For they were generally fatalists, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were not masters of their own actions a.

4. It is not impossible (for this is all that I contend for here), that many things, suitable to several cases, may be brought to pass by means of secret and sometimes sudden influences on our minds, or the minds of other men, whose acts may affect us. For instance, if the case should require, that N should be de-

Plato and the Stoics, ap. Plut. make fate to be συμπλοκήν ἀιτιῶν τεταγμθρίω, ἐν ή συμπλοκή κὸ τὰ πας ἡμᾶς ὡς ε τὰ μθρ ἐιμαςθαι, τὰ Ὁ ἀνειμαςθαι.

The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwise Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δ΄ ἀς ἐπὶ Φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Αθήνη ᾿Αλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε Φρένας and the like often. Plutarch explains these passages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιρῶντα ποιεῖ [Όμης] Ἦ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ κινῶντα τὴν προαίρεστιν ἐθ΄ ὁρμὰς ἐργαζόμθρον, ἀλλὰ Φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγές and afterwards the Gods are said to help men, τ ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν κὸ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι κὸ Φαντασίαις κὸ ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ τὰναντίον ἐποτρέφοντες κὸ ἱς ἀνθες.

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liverd from some threatening ruin, or from some misfortune, which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a way at such a time, as he intended: upon this occasion some new reasons may be presented to his mind, why he should not go at all, or not then, or not by that road; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from some dangerous enemy, either some new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the enemy will be, or the enemy may be after the same manner diverted from coming where be shall be, or his [the enemy's] refentment may be qualified, or some proper method of defence may be fuggested, or degree of resolution and vigor excited. After the same manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and successes may be conferred: or on the other side, men may, by way of punishment for crimes committed, incurr mischiefs and calamities. I say, these things and fuch like may be. For fince the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do also depend upon their judgments, as these again do upon the present appearances or non-appearances of things in their minds; if a new prospect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are seen alterd, new forces and directions imprest upon the spirits, passions exalted or abated, the power of judging inlivend or debilitated, or the attention taken off, without any suspension or alteration of the standing laws of nature, then without that new volitions, defigns, measures, or a cessation of thinking may also be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwise would be, and many brought about, that would not. But that this is far from being impossible, seems clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great measure the prefent disposition of the body, some thoughts and designs, or absences of mind, may proceed from corporeal causes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themselves; and so the case may fall in with n. 2. or they may be occasiond by something said or done by other men; and then the case may be brought under n. 3. or they may be caused by the suggestion, and impulse, or other silent communications of some spiritual being; perhaps the Deity himself. For that such imperceptible influences and still whispers may be, none of us all can positively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no fuch things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made observations upon themselves and their affairs, but must, when they reflect on life past and the various adventures and events in it, find many instances, in which their usual judgment and sense of things cannot but seem to themselves to have been overruled, they knew not by what, nor how, nor why (i.e. they have done things,

[•] Σφαλείς [ὁ μειρακίσκω] τον οἶοί ὑπως, ἐμοὶ με τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδώςω ἡ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐπίδωκο, says Callidemidas, who designd the poison for Ptwodorus, in Lucian.

which

which afterwards they wonder how they came to do); and that these actions have had consequences very remarkable in their history. I speak not here of men dementated with wine, or inchanted with some temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their sober and more considering seasons.

That there may be possibly such inspirations of new thoughts and counsels may perhaps further appear from this; that we so frequently find thoughts arising in our heads, into which we are led by no discourse, nothing we read, no clue of reasoning; but they surprise and come upon us from we know not what quarter b. If they proceeded from the mobility of spirits, straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of dreams, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore seems to have experienced some assistance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, and lost to themselves, &c. If any one should object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actings, then they are deprived of their liberty, &c. the answer is, that the man is a free agent, he may not be free as to every thing. His freedom may be restraind, and he only accountable for those acts, in respect of which he is free.

If this then be the case, as it seems to be, that men's minds are susceptive of such instinuations and impressions, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pass by these means without fixing and refixing the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpose, in his way? I say, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of our selves, but other people, who may be concerned in our actions, either immediately c, or in time through perhaps many intermediate events? For the prosperity or improsperity of a man, or his sate here, does not intirely depend upon his own prudence or imprudence, but in great measure upon his situation among the rest of mankind, and what they do. The natural effects of his management meeting with such things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the result may be something not intended or foreseen.

5. There possibly may be, and most probably are beings invisible, and superior in nature to us, who may by other means be in many respects ministers of

When Hannibal was in fight of Rome, non ausus est obsidere. S. Hier. — Sed religione quadam abstinuit, quod diceret, capienda urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut testatur & Orosius. Schol.

b Non enim cuiquam in potestate est quid veniat in mentem. S. Aust. e They who call'd Simonides out from Scopas and his company, as if it were to speak with him, saved his life. The story known.

God's

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God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without altering the laws of nature. For it implies no contradiction or abfurdity to say there are such beings: on the contrary we have the greatest reason to think what has been intimated already; that such imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the top of the scale. Tho pictures of spiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reasoning part of the mind the idea of spiritual substance may perhaps be as clear, as that of corporeity. For what penetrability is, must be known just as well as what impenetrability is: and so on.

And fince it has been proved (p. 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from something incorporeal, it must be as certain, that there are incorporeal substances, as that there is motion. Beside, how can we tell but that there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have corporeal vehicles as we have, but siner and invisible? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of these many orders, rising in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the philosophy of these times, which seems to delight in inlarging the capacities of matter, to affert the possibility of this. But however, my own defects sufficiently convince me, that I have no pretension to be one of the sirst rank, or that which is next under the All-perfect.

Now then, as we our felves by the use of our powers do many times interpose and alter the course of things within our sphere from what it would be, if they were lest intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those laws; so may these superior beings likewise in respect of things within their spheres, much larger be sure, the least of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extensive, their intellects purer, their reason better, they may be much properer instruments of Divine providence with respect to us, than we can be with respect one to another, or to the animals below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of these beings is so large, as to alter or suspend the general laws of the world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft set backward or forward by them; or that they can at pleasure change their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and consequently am not apt hastily to credit stories of portents, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the natures of things and their manner of being be

quite renversed : yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be so placed as to become, even by the free exercise of their own powers, instruments of God's particular providence to other men (or animals); so may we well suppose, that these higher beings may be so distributed through the universe, and subject to such an œconomy(tho I pretend not to tell what that is), as may render them also instruments of the same providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, confiftently with the laws of nature, some way or other, tho

not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

Lastly, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be so understood, as if I peremptorily afferted things to be just in this manner, or pretended to impose my thoughts upon any body else: my design is only to shew? how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There must be other ways above my understanding a, by which such a Being as God is may take care of private cases without interrupting the order of the universe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be fure He regards every thing as being what it is; and that therefore His laws must be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of those things, which are affected by them. The purely material part of the world is governd by fuch, as are fuited to the state of a being, which is insensible, passive only, and every where and always the same : and these seem to be simple and few, and to carry natural agents into one constant road. But intelligent active, free beings must be under a government of another form. They must, truth requiring it, be considerd as beings, who may behave themselves as they ought, or not; as beings susceptive of pleafure and pain; as beings, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) sensible of this, and to whom therefore it must be natural upon many occasions to supplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, affistance; lastly, as beings, whose cases admit great variety: and therefore that influence, by which He is present to them, must be different from that, by which gravitation and common phanomena are produced in matter. This seems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, answering private cases, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more especially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, &c. But I forbear, left I should go too far out of my depth : only adding in general, that God cannot put things so far out of His own power, as that He should not for ever govern transactions and events in His own world; nor can perfett knowledge and power ever want proper means to atchieve

^{* &#}x27;Ουχ ομοίως άνθεωπ Φ άμωνεται & Θεός. Ph. Jud.

what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced should stand for nothing, there may still be a particular providence notwithstanding the forementiond difficulty. And then, if there may be one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one: because in the description of providence, p. 95, nothing is supposed with respect to particular cases, but that they should be provided for in such a manner as will at last agree best with reason; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet say, that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror; it is to charge the Perfect being with one of the greatest imperfections, and to make Him not so much as a reasonable being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a particular providence, as that God is a Being of perfect reason. For if men are treated according to reason, they must be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, &c. as such, and the vitious, unjust, cruel, &c. according to what they are: and their several cases must be taken and considered as they are: which cannot be done without such a providence.

Against all this it has been, as one might well expect, objected of old, that things do not seem to be dealt according to reason, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adversity, pains, persecutions, whilst vitious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flourish a. But to this an answer (in which I shall a little further explain my self) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the Manichean objection under prop. VII. But I shall here give one more direct: and let that and this be mutually affisting and supplements each to the other. I. We are not always certain, who are good, who wicked b. If we trust to same and reports, these may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendship, or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured surmises and constructions of things, envy, or malice; and on either, from small matters aggrandized, from mistake, or from the unskilful relation even of truth itself. Opposite parties make a merit of blackening their adversaries c, and brightening their friends,

undeservedly and unmeasurably: and to idle companions and gossips it is diversion, and what makes the principal part of their conversation a, to rehearse the characters of men, drest up out of their own dreams and inventions. And beside all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great measure upon mean people, who carry their stories from family to family, and propagate them very fast: like little insects, which lay apace, and the less the faster. few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to reprefent things truly b. Beside the matters of fact themselves there are many circumstances which, before sentence is passed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet scarce ever can be known, but to the person himself who is concernd. He may have other views, and another sense of things, than his judges have: and what he understands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a fecret confined to his own brest. A man may through bodily indispositions and faults in his constitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be subject to starts and inadvertencies, or obnoxious to snares, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under invincible errors, and act as in the dark: in which cases he may do things, which are in themselves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at least rather to be pitied, than censured with severity. Or perhaps the censurer, notwithstanding this kind of men talk as if they were infallible, may be mistaken himself in his opinion, and judge that to be wrong, which in truth is right c. Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and superstitious wretches measure the actions of letterd and philosophical men by the tattle of their nurses or illiterate parents and companions, or by the fashion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenents; when both of them cannot be in the

right,

a 'Oudis η ετως κου τοις ἀνθρωποις, ὡς τὸ λωλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότεια ε μάλισα εὰν τύχωσιν ὑπ' ἐυνόιας τινὸς η μίσες ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν ε φιλεῖ κλέπτειζ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Greg. Naz. b Therefore, with Socrates in Plato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [ὁι πολλοι] fay of us, ἀλ' ὁ, τι ὁ ἐπαίων τωὶ τ δικάιων, ε ἀδίκων, ὁ εἰς, ε ἀντη ἡ ἀλήθεια. c Or, ν. ν. he may judge that to be right, which is wrong. This feems to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men, who sufferd, ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos & optimos viros, in Hiβania Pænus oppressi? Cur Maximus extulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, & c. For here they are reckond boni, only because they were fortes; that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them, who happend to be so unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to inlarge their own territories. Is this to be good? Doth it deserve such a particular observation, that F. Maximus buried a son, after he had been Consult too? How doth it appear, that Marcellus was a better man than Hannibal? Is it such a wonder, if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that, which follows in the same place, of others, quibus improbis optime evênit.

right, and it is well if either of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of men must chiefly depend upon the unseen part of their lives; fince the truest and best religion is most private, and the greatest wickedness endeavours to be so a. Some are modest, and hide their virtues: others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under shews of fanctity, good nature, or some-So that it is many times hard to discern, to which thing that is specious. of the two forts, the good or the bad, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the good or bad fortune of other people b. That, which is disagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or disagreeable in a less degree. The misery accruing from any infliction or bad circumstance of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33: or according to the refistence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by these different weights they will be equally loaded. And so the same poverty or disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the same pain to all men. The apprehension of but a vein to be opend is worse to some, than the apparatus to an execution is to others: and a word may be more terrible and fensible to tender natures, than a fword is to the fenseless, or intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to injoyments: men have different tasts, and the use of the same things does not beget equal pleasure in all. Beside, we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the inward stings and fecret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose external fplendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders c: nor perhaps sufficiently consider the filent pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate defires, easy reflexions, a consciousness of knowledge and truth; with other pleasures of the mind, much greater many times than those of the body d. Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwise, he should know all the other's

^{*} Vita possenia celant (in Lucr.) may be aptly applied to the wicked. Multi samam, conscientiam pauci verentur. Plin. jun.

b Neq; mala vel bona, qua vulgus putat: multi, qui constitari adversis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miserrimi, &c. Tacit.

ciorem tu Mecanatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & morosa uxoris quotidiana repudia dessenti, somnus per symphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene resonantium, quaritur? Mero se licet sopiat,—; tam vigilabit in pluma, quam ille [Regulus] in cruce.—ut dubium [non] sit, an electione fati data, plures Reguli nasci, quam Mecanates velint. Sen. Isti, quos pro felicibus aspicitis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt. Id.

d Archimedes having found the way of solving a problem (examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset), ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying Evena: but who eve. heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying Bispaxa, or Πεφίληκα? Plut.

injoy-

injoyments and all his sufferings a. Many misfortunes are compensated b by some larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other respects. But suppose the pleasures of some, and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear: still we know not the consequences of them c. The pleasures of those men may lead to miseries greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and, again, the fufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages d. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call bappiness, which the contrary; unless we knew the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their true circumstances, and what will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity. 3. Men ought to be considered as members of families, nations, mankind, the universe, from which they cannot be separated: and then from the very condition of their being it will appear, that there must be great inequalitiese; that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities f; and that the good of the whole fociety or kind is to be regarded preferably to the present pleasure of any individual, if they happen to clash s. Lastly, if the virtuous man has undergone more in this life, than it would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was no other; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if there is another. For they may be made up to him by fuch injoyments, as it would be reasonable for him to prefer, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the loss of them. And moreover, sometimes the only way to the felicities of a better state may lie through dark and difficult passes, discipline to some men being necessary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into fuch methods as may produce in them proper improvements; fuch, as otherwise and of themselves they would never have faln into. On the other fide, if vitious and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereaster may be such, as that the excess of

^{*} Fatis contraria fata rependens. Virg. See what Pliny writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite and minister of Augustus, whom he reckons to be the only instance of felicity among them who were called Agrippa. Is quoq; adversa pedum valetudine, misera juventa, exercito avo inter arma mortesque,—infelici terris stirpe omni,—praterea brevitate avi,—in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, soceriq; pragravi servitio, luisse augurium praposterinatalis existimatur.

b' Οφθάλμων μθρ' άμερσε διδε δ' ήδειαν ἀοιδήν. Hom

c Zeno reckond he made a good voyage, when he was shipwracked. Diog. L.

d If a good man labors under poverty, sickness, or the like, ἐις ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει, ζῶντι ἢ ε λόπθανόντι, for how can he be neglected of God, who studies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? Plato.

e Who blames a drama, because all the persons are not heroes? Plot.

f 1217 ΠΕΙ ΕΓΙΤΙ ΠΕΙ ΕΓΙΝΙ Ε

them above their past injoyments may be equal to the just multi of their villanies and wickedness. And further, their worldly pleasures (which must be supposed to be such as are not philosophical, or moderated and governed by reason and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingross the whole man, and by that means to exclude almost all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the very causes of their ruin; whilst they leave them under such defects at the end of their days, as we shall see afterward tend to unhappiness.

If what is objected be in many instances true, this only infers the necessity of a future state: that is, if good and bad men are not respectively treated according to reason in this life, they may yet be so treated, if this and another to sollow be taken together into the account. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a suture state, that instances of that kind have been so numerous. For he must not only be guilty of blasphemy, but reduced to the greatest absurdity, who, rather than he will own there is such a state, is forced to make God an unreasonable Being b: which I think amounts to a strong demonstration, that there is one. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. If we would behave ourselves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propositions; or, if we would endeavour to behave our selves towards him according to truth, we must observe these following and the like particulars.

1. We must not pretend to represent Him by any picture or image what soever c. Because this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehensible nature, &cd.

2. We ought to be so far from doing this, that even the language we use, when we speak of Him, and especially of His positive nature and essential properties, ought not only to be chosen with the utmost care, but also to be understood in the sublimest sense: and the same is true with respect to our thoughts, mut. mutand e. Or thus:

Divine providence and immortality of the foul must stand and fall together. Θάτερον ἐκ ἔςτν λπελιπεῖν ἀναιρεντα θάτερον. Plut. Τεν ταυτόν ἐςι τὸ μιν ὁιεσθαι ἔιναι Θεόν ἢ ἀντα μιν προνοεῖν ἢ προνοεῖντα μιν ἀγαθον ἔιναι & δικαιον. Hierocl. Cure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this. According to Diog. L. the Egyptians set up ἀγάλματα in their temples τῷ μιν ἐιδεναι την Ε΄ Θεε μορφίν: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him. For, as Maimonides observes, no man ever did or ever will worship an idol, made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth.

d Non est dubium, quin religio nulla sit, ubicung; simulachrum est. Lact.

c Ως β ἔξονον σώματω τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἔπιτελέσαι, ἔτω κὸ ψυχῆς ἔρον τὸ τῶς κὐνοίαις τὰς ἀρεσκέσας φαντασίας τελησιερογήσαι ὡς θέλη, διὸ κὸ τὰς εννοία ἀμαρτίας μιν ὡς φαντασίας ἀπλῶς, ἀλὶ ὡς ἔρον κὸ ψυχῆ γινομνα δίκαιον κρίνεοχ. S. Bas.

we must endeavour to think and speak of Him in the most reverent terms and most proper manner we are able? keeping withal this general conclusion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the best we can, He is still something above all our conceptions; and desiring, that our faint expressions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more proportionable meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that H's mode of existence and essential attributes are comprehensible by us, but also (which is more) that our words and phrases, taken from among our selves b and the objects of our faculties, are ad-

equate expressions of them: contrary to truth.

To explain myself by a few instances. When we ascribe mercy to God, or implore His mercy, it must not be understood to be mercy like that, which is called compassion in us. For tho this be a very distinguishing affection in human nature , to which we are made subject for good reasons, the constitution of the world and circumstances of our present state making it necessary for us to compassionate each the sufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with uneasiness, and must therefore not be ascribed strictly to God in that sense, in which it is used when ascribed to our selves. It perhaps may not be amiss to call it Divine mercy, or the like; to distinguish it: and to shew, that we mean something, which, tho in our low way of speaking and by way of analogy we call it by the same name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may confider it in general as the manner, in which God respects poor suppliants and proper objects for their good. For certainly the respect or relation, which lies hetween God, considerd as an unchangeable Being, and one that is humble and supplicates and endeavours to qualify himself for mercy, cannot be the same with that, which lies between the same unchangeable God and one that is obstinate, and will not supplicate, or endeavour to qualify himself d: that is, the same thing, or Being, cannot respect opposite and contradictory characters in the same manner; him who does behave himself as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, the design is not to move His affections, as good speakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to express our own sense of our selves and circumstances in such a manner, as may render us more capable of the emanations of Divine goodness, and fit

^{*} Θεοπρεπῶς ἀπαντα νοῦντες. S. Chrys.

b We use them (and speak, as the Jews every where inculcate, Τα ἀνόματα πας ἡμῶν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες. Plot.

chrymas dedit, hac nostri pars optima sensûs.—separat hoc nos à grege mutorum, &c. Juv.

d The ratio of G to M + q is different from that of G to M-q: and yet G remains unalterd.

to receive such instances of His beneficence, as to us may seem to be the effects of compassion, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reason always and without alteration, that he, who labors under a sense of his own desects, honestly uses his best endeavours to mend what is amiss, and (among other things) slies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, should have many things granted him, which are not given to the careless, obdurate, unasking a part of mankind; tho his expressions and manner of address, with all his care, are still inadequate, and below the Divine nature. In short, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our selves we may alter the relation or respect lying between him and us.

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of mercy, justice, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: because in him they are one. Perhaps they may more properly be called together Divine reason: which, as it exerts itself upon this or that occasion, is by us variously denominated.

Here it must not be forgot, that mercy or mercies are many times taken for advantages or benefits injoyd by us: and then they are properly ascribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.

When we speak of the knowledge of God, we must not mean, that He knows things in the way that we do: that any intention or operation of His mind is requisite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impressions made upon Him: that He reasons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is most intuitive and immediate, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knows things. We must rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be ignorant: which has been said already; and is, I am assaid, as much as we can safely say.

When glory, honor, praise b are given to God; or He is said to do any thing for His own glory, or we to propose the glory of His name in what we do; those words should not be taken as standing for that kind of glory and applause, which is so industriously sought, and capriciously c distributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more largely, in order to give here a specimen of the world, and save that trouble in another place. Among us some are celebrated

for

[•] Πῶς ὰν δοίη το πρὸς τὰς ὁρμὰς ἀυτεξεσίω μὰ ἀιτεντι ὁ διδόναι πεφυκὰς Θεός; Hierocl. • Τῶν ἀρίσων σοκ ἔσιν ἔπαιν. ἐπαιν. Τherefore ὁ Θεὸς κὰ τὰγαθὸν are above praise. Arist. Οἱ τὰς θεὰς ἐπαινεντες γελοῖοί ἐισιν, ἡμῶν ἀυτὰς ἐξισεντες. Andron. Rh. • Cleon, only a songster [ἀδες], had a statue at Thebes, kept as sacred, when Pindar himself had none. See the story in Atheneus.

for small matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendships, the usual deference paid to men in eminent stations, or mere good luck a; and others for atchieving such things, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not imposed upon by false notions, first introduced in barbarous times, and fince polished and brought into fashion by historians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a difgrace to savages than any recommendation of rational and civilized natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followd with encomiums and honors, which, the they may be the felicities and privileges of the possessions, cannot be their merit, who received them gratis, and contributed nothing b themselves toward the acquisition of them: whilst real virtue and industry (which, even when unsuccessful, or opprest by ill health or unkind fortune, give the truest title to praise) lie disregarded. Thirst after glory, when that is defired merely for its own sake, is founded in ambition and vanity c: the thing itself is but a dream, and imagination; since, according to the differing humors and sentiments of nations and ages, the same thing may be either glorious or inglorious: the effect of it, confiderd still by itself, is neither more health, nor estate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if that be any thing, it is but what must cease when the man dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the breath of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguishes it e, or perhaps it goes quite out of itself f. Men please themselves with notions of immortality, and fancy a perpetuity of fame secured to themselves by books and testimonies of historians: but, alas! it is a stupid delusion, when they imagin themselves present, and injoying that same at the reading of their story after their death. And, beside, in reality the man is not known ever the more to posterity, because his name is transmitted to them: he doth not live, because his name does. When it is said, J. Casar subdued Gaul, beat Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is the fame thing, as to fay, the conqueror of Pompey, &c. was Cafar: that is, Cafar and the conqueror of Pompey are the fame thing; and Cafar is as much known by the one defignation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the conqueror of Pompey conquerd Pompey; or some body conquerd Pom-

[&]quot;What Seneca fays of Alexander, is true of many an other heroe: pro virtute erat felix temeritas.

b Tumes alto Drusorum sanguine, tanquam Feceris ipse aliquid, &c. Juv. Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est? Juv.

d יו מחר בקבר היום מון ומחר בקבר היום אונים כאן ומחר בקבר היום וואר היום כאן ומחר בינו ומחר בינו ומחר בינו וואר היום וואר היום וואר היום וואר היום וואר בינו וואר בינו

pey; or rather, fince Pompey is as little known now as Cæfar, some body conquerd some body a. Such a poor business is this boasted immortality b: and such, as has been here described, is the thing called glory among us! The notion of it may ferve to excite them, who having abilities to ferve their country in time of real danger, or want, or to do some other good, have yet not philosophy enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to see through the glories of the world (just as we excite children by praising them; and as we see many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to difcerning men this fame is mere air, and the next remove from nothing; what they despise, if not shun. I think there are two considerations, which may justify a desire of some glory or honor: and scarce more. When men have performed any virtuous actions, or such as sit easy upon their memories, it is a reasonable pleasure to have the testimony of the world added to that of their own consciences, that they have done well d: and more than that, if the reputation acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any real comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the insolencies and injustice of mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege must be a great satisfaction, and what a wise and good man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propose to himself. But then he proposes it no farther than it may be useful: and it can be no farther useful than he So that, upon the whole, glory, praise, and the like, are either mere vanity, or only valuable in proportion to our defects and wants. If then those words are understood according to the import and value they have among men, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propose such a mean end to Himself as our praises? He can neither want, nor value them. der, according to his taste of things, it may well be supposed would have been proud to have heard that he should be the subject of some second Homer's, in whose sheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at Athens, the mother of so many wits and captains: but sure even he, with all his vanity, could not propose to himself as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praised by children, or rather by worms and insects, if they were capable of shewing some faint sense of his great-

Τὰ ὀνόματα τ πάλαι πολυυμνήτων νῦν τεόπον τινα γλωστήματά ἐςι. Μ. Απιοπ.

κ μηκίς η ὁς εξοΦημία, κὰ ἀυτὴ ζ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθεωπαείων τάχις α τεθνηζομένων, κὰ ἐκ ἐιδότων ἐδὲ ἐαυτῶς, ἔτι γε τὸν πεόπαλαι τεθνηκότα. Ιd.

κ Έχρεπαθε Hannibalem: quot libras in duce summo Invenies?

Μέχει τῶθε ὁι ἔπαινοι ἀνεκτοί ἐισιν, ἐις ὁσον ὰν ὁ ἐπαινώμεν γνωρίζη ἔκας ον τ λεγομένων πεοσὸν ἐαυτῷ.

τὸ ζ ὑπὲς τῶτο, ἀλλότειον, κλ. Luc.

Μακαείσας ἀυτὸν [᾿Αχιλέα] ὁτι κὰ ζῶν Φίλε πιςῦ, κὰ τελευτώσες μεγάλε κής υκθο ἔτυχε. Plut.

ness. And yet how far short is this comparison! In conclusion therefore, tho men have been accustomd to speak of the Deity in terms taken from princes, and fuch things as they have, in their weakness, admired; tho these are now incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, confidering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and speaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we must remember to exalt the sense of them, or annex some mental qualification to the use of them. As, if God be said to do things for His own glory, the meaning I humbly conceive must be, that the transcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and administration of things in it; where there occurr such marks of inexpressible wisdom and power, that He needed not to have given us greater, had He only intended His own glory: or something to this purpose. Or if the glory of what we do, be ascribed to Him; by this must be signified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we defire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is laudable in us b.

When we thank God for any deliverance or injoyment, this must not be so understood, as if He could value Himself upon our ceremonious acknowledgments, or wanted complements, or any return from us. It is rather a profession of the sense we have of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatness or seasonableness of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who desires to own things, as far as he is able, to be what they are c; and especially to beget in himself such a disposition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty benefactor.

When we are faid to be fervants of God, or to ferve Him, or do Him fervice, these phrases are not to be taken as when one man is said to be servant of another, or to do him service. For here it implies the doing of something, which is useful and beneficial to the man who is served, and what he wants, or fancies he wants: but nothing of want can be supposed in God, nor can we any way be profitable or serviceable to Him. To serve Him therefore must rather be to worship or adore Him (of which something by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our serve is but the translation, is frequently used: as to serve

a graven image a is to worship the image; but cannot fignify the doing of any thing, which may be serviceable or useful to the dead stone. Or to serve God may be understood in a sense something like that: Serve the king of Babylon. For they were said to serve the king of Babylon, who ownd his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly serviceable to him: and so they may be said to serve God, or to be His servants, who live in a continual sense of His soveraign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themselves to the laws which He has imposed upon them. In these senses we pray, that we may live to serve Him: that is, we pray, that we may live to worship Him, and practice those laws of reason and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him subjected.

Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways of speaking, introduced by custom, from rude antiquity, or by necessity following from the narrowness either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love, anger, bands, eyes, &c. when ascribed to God, cannot import such bodily parts or passions as are found in us. Even the pronouns my, thy, his (as His people, His house, &c.) require much temper in the use of them e.

by worshipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be what He is, and ourselves to be what we are, by some more solemn and proper act: that is, by addressing our selves as His dependents to Him as the Supreme cause, and Governor of the world, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us s, and the like. As if, ex. gr. I should in some humble and composed manner s pray to that Almighty being, upon whom depends the existence of the world, and by whose providence I have been preserved to this moment, and injoyd many undeserved advantages, that He would graciously accept my grateful sense and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would deliver me from the evil consequences of all my transgressions and follies: that He would indue me with such dispositions and powers, as may carry me innocently and safely

through all future trials; and may inable me upon all occasions to behave my self conformably to the laws of reason, piously, and wisely: that He would suffer no being to injure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt myself by any error or misconduct of my own: that He would vouch safe me clear and distinct perceptions of things; with so much bealth and prosperity, as may be good for me: that I may at least pass my time in peace, with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully discharged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve myself in virtuous habits and useful knowledge, I may at last make a decent and happy exit, and then find my self in some better state. Not to do this, or something like it, will certainly fall among those criminal omissions mentiond sect. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to deny that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for what we want is to deny, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and so on: all contrary to truth.

It must ever be ownd, that no worship can be proportionable to the Divine nature and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore I added those words in the best manner we can. And it must be acknowledged further, that those words do not oblige us to be always at our devotions neither b. For as in the worship of God we own Him to be what He is, so must we do this as not denying our felves to be what we are: beings not capable of bearing continual intention of mind; beings, that are incompassed with many wants, which by the constitution of our nature require to be supplied, not without care and activity joind to our prayers; beings, that are made for many harmless injoyments; beings, that have many offices to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things confiderd, it would be less respect to be constantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to address our selves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occasions. To be always thus ingaged, if it could be, would be to make God what He is not: fince it feems to suppose. that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at least, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teasing. For these reasons I have also in the explication of my meaning inferted that limitation, by some solemn and proper act.

The every man knows best his own opportunities and circumstances, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself, how he may best perform this duty;

בכל מאמין בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכו'. Albo. התפלה מסתעף מן ההשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכו'. Albo. התפלה מסתעף מן ההשגחה id. b Like those 'Axoumtai at Constantinople particularly, who continued divine service night and day without intermission. Or the Messalians perhaps (מצלין), 'Evxitai), who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, שוֹיא אַסאמׁלְנוּנוּ דֹאָ προσκοινέμωνοι. V. Suie.

yet in general it may be faid, that to the doing of it folemnly and in the best manner we can these things are required: an intent mind a, proper times and places, a proper form of words, and a proper posture. For if the mind be absent, or attends not to what is said, it is not the man that prays: this is only as it were the noise of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any consciousness of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving lips, but alienated thoughts, is not to pray in the best manner we can: because it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to truth. For this is to do it only as speaking, and not as thinking beings.

Upon this account it will be certain, that all times and places cannot be equally proper b. Some times are ingrossed by the business of life, and some places lie exposed to interruptions. Those of retreat and silence ought to be sought, and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reason, because the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we stand of all ostentation: that is, the more we do it upon the score of truth and duty; and

this is again, the more truely and dutifully we do it.

Our next care is a proper form of words. All prayer must either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called mental can scarce be made without words c, or something equivalent d. (I believe, that even the deaf and dumb form to themfelves some kind of language: I mean something, which supplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked state, devested of all words, and taken merely by themselves, are such subtle and sleeting things, as are scarce capable of making any appearance in the mind; at least of being detaind, compared together, and ranged into sentences. If a sentence may be so made up of sensible ideas as to substitute mind by the help of those images which remain in the phantasy, after the manner of a sentence express in pictures, or by hieroglyphics: yet such a sentence must be very impersect, through the want of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions necessary to modify and connect the ideas, of which

De This in general is true: notwithstanding which I do not deny but there may be occasions, when έδεν κωλύει τόπ Φ, έδε εμποδίζει καιρός άλλα κὰν γόνατα μη κλίνης, — διάνοιαν δε μόνον επιδεξίη θερμήν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπήρτισας τῆς ἐυχῆς ἔξεςι Ͼ γυνᾶικα ἀλακάτην καθέχεσαν τὸ ἱς εργέσαν ἀναβλέψαι εἰς τὸν ἐξανὸν τῆ διανοία, Ͼ καλέσαι μετὰ θερμότητ Φ τὸν θεόν ἔξεςι Ͼ ἀνθρωπον εἰς ἀγοςὰν ἐμβάλλοντα Ͼ καθ ἐαυτὸν βα-δίζοντα ἐυχὰς ποιείδζ ἐκτενεῖς, κλ. S. Chrys.

Το μενλόγ Φ ἐξμηνευς διανόιας πρὸς ἀνθρώπες ἡ δὲ διάνοια γίνεται τῷ λόγω τὰ πρὸς τὰν θεόν. Ph. Jud.

Ται, πεὶ ῶν ἀν σκοπῆ. And so Plotinus, Ὁ οὐ φωνῆ λόγ Φ μίμημα εκν ψυχῆ.

(particles, &c.) there can be no images a; and indeed little more than a fet of disjointed conceptions, scarce exhibiting any sense without the affishance of language to fill up the blanks: and beside that, a prayer cannot be made out of such sentences as those. It is by the help of words, at least in great measure, that we even reafon and discourse within our selves, as well as communicate our thoughts and discourse with others: and if any one observes himself well, he will find, that he thinks, as well as speaks in some language, and that in thinking he supposes and runs. over filently and habitually those founds, which in speaking he actually makes. This is the cause, why men can scarce write well in any language but their own: for whilst they think in their own, their style and speech, which is but the portraiture of their thoughts, must have the turn and genius of their own language, to what language soever the particular words belong. In short, words seem to be as it were bodies or vehicles to the sense or meaning, which is the spiritual part b, and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuoufly, whether he can think over but that short prayer in Plato, Tà più i Dai, xTA. c, abstracted quite from those and all other words. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by another, and by taking them in make them bis own; or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them himself; or he may lay before him a prayer in writing, and so carry his eyes and his mind together through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his memory; or he may put words together in his mind ex tempore: but still in all these ways words and language are used. And fince to think over a set of words cannot be a more adequate manner of addressing to God (who neither speaks, nor thinks like us) than to speak it over and think too; and moreover, fince the very sound of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of composing, doth really help attentiond: I say, since this is the case, it must be better, when we have opportunity, to pronounce a prayere, than only to think it over. But then it should be spoken no louder (I mean when we pray privately), than just to make it audible to our selves f. It is not upon God's account that we speak, fince he would know even our thoughts:

[&]quot; Multa funt verba, qua, quasi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, qua formari similitudine nulla possunt. Cic. בור ארם הוא בכונה וכול. ב. א. חבור ארם הוא בכונה וכול בלא כונה באר בלא כונה כגוף בלא נשמה בלונה בלא כונה בלא בור בלא מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה בישוח בלא ביע מלה ומלה כאלו מונה באלו מונה באלו מונה בעולה בלא מונה בעל מלה ומלה באלו מונה ביע מונה ברכות כולן צריך ביע מונה ביע מונה באלו מונה ביע מונה

but it is upon our own account, and to make our adorations, tho imperfect at the best, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an answer to them, who object against prayer the impertinence of talking to God.) This being premised, and it being found that we must make use of words, it cannot be denied that we ought to use the best and properest we can. This cannot be done in extemporaneous effusions: and therefore there must be forms premeditated; the best, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worship God to the best of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of seriousness and being in earnest, it ought to be the plainest, and at the same time is perhaps the hardest of all compositions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have injoyd, what we want, what we have done, &c. and every thing ought to be exprest with method, in phrases that are grave and pointing, and with such a true eloquence, as ingages all our attention, and represents our deepest sense, without affectation or need-These considerations have caused me many times to wonder at less repetitions. those men, who dispute against pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk fo much of the spirit of prayer, seem to know but little of it.

As to the posture, that is best, which best expresses our humility, reverence, and earnestness, and affects us most. The perhaps some regard is to be paid to the customs of the place where we are; or of our own country, to which we have been most used. Several nations may denote the same thing by different gestures: and we may take these, as we do their words; i. e. as having that signification which they put upon them.

The I have not hitherto mentioned it, there ought to be also a public worship of the Deity. For a man may be considered as a member of a society, and as such he ought to worship God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are proper prayers used publicly, which he may resort to; and his health, &c. permit). Or the society may be considered as one body, that has common interests and concerns, and as such is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, how to pray; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken as they are, and consequently some time and place appointed, where they may have suitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And surther, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is necessary there should be some religion prosest, and even established; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is principally preserved (so far as it is preserved) by national some another, and do what else the worsh of savages do.

יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגרו וכו'ם. or hhaiy.

But how does this public worship, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and privacy recommended above? Ans. I spoke there of prayer in general, to which those circumstances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. Excuse a short reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpose, is not altogether foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to all at the same time, that all may unite in one common act, which otherwise they could not do: yet still every particular person, who minds the prayers at all, has a separate perception of the words in his mind, and there he offers them, or the sense containd under them, with more or less application and ardor. And since no man can be said to pray any further than he does this; and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beside himself, how far he doth do it; his prayer is in reality as private, as if he was inclosed within a thousand walls. So that, though there are reasons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all true prayer is private: and the true feat of it being in the mind, toward the interesting of whose powers all the circumstances of worship are mainly designed to contribute, it may be said upon that account to be always made in the most retired and undiscerned of all retreats a: nor can more be said in respect of a worship, which by the terms is in other respects public. A man may be present in a congregation, and either pray the same prayer in which others seem to join, or some other, or none at all b, for ought any body there can tell besides himself.

I am not infensible how much I may expose myself by these things to the laughter of some, who are utter strangers to all this language. What a stir is here, say they, about praying? Who ever observed, that they who pray are more successful or happy, than they are who do not? Ans. All observations of this kind must be very lubricous and uncertain. We neither know what other men are inwardly and really c, nor how they pray d, nor what to call success c. That, which is good for one, may be bad for another: and that, which seems good at present, may at length be evil, or introduce something which is so f. And as to the prosperity of them.

about, that they know not so much as what they say themselves. Ἐιστέρχονται πολλοι εν τῆ ἐκκλησία, —κὰ ἐξέρχονται, κὰ ἐκ ἐιδασι τί ἔιπον τὰ χέιλη κινείται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὶ ἐκ ἀκέι. ε The very Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bias happening to be with some such in the same ship, when a great storm arose and they (being now frighted) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὰ ἀιοθωνται ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντας. D. L. d C. Cestius ap. Tac. says, principes quidem instar deorum esse: sed neque a diis niss justas supplicum preces audiri. Sometimes πλέον ἡμισυ παντός: that is, as Plato paraphrases those words of Hesiod. Τὸ ἡμισυ Επαντός πολλάκις ἐςὶ πλέον, ὁπόταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, κλ. f Quid quod iste calculi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta afflixere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, & ultimis mersere suppliciis? Plin.

who endeavour to worship God in a proper and reasonable manner, whatever it is, perhaps it might be less, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be greater: who can be certain of the contrary? If these gentlemen have any way of discovering it, I wish they would impart their secret. In the mean time sure they cannot expect, that even in the most imperfect sketch of natural religion the worship of the Deity should be omitted: that very thing, which hath been

principally intended by the word religion a.

4. And lastly, to deliver what remains, summarily; Rational beings, or they, to whom reason is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themselves as above, should consider in earnest, what a mighty being He is, who by the constitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and whose laws the distates of right reason may be said to be. They ought to keep it well imprest upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very existence depends: that it is He who superintends and administers the affairs of the the world by His providence: that the effects of His power and influence are visible before their faces, and round about them, in all the phanomena of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His presence: that He is a being of perfect reason: that, if it be reasonable, that the transgressors of reason should be punished, they will most certainly, one time or other, be punished, &c. And then, if they do this, it is easy to see what effect it must have upon all their thoughts, words b, and actions.

By what is faid here, no fuperstition is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of reason and truth, which is required: and any thing, that is not inconsistent with them, may be freely done, though under the inspection of our

great Lawgiver himself.

^{*} Religio deorum cultu pio continetur. Cic. Qui omnia, qua ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retrastarent, & tanquam relegerent, sunt disti religiosi, &c. Id. Particularly with respect to customary swearing; which, beside the ill consequences it has in making oaths cheap, &c. is a great instance of disregard and irreverence. For they, who use themselves to it do, at least, make the tremendous name of God to serve for an expletive only; and commonly to rude, passionate, or debauched discourse (λόγων ἀναπλήρωμα ποιέμενοι τὸ ἀγιώτατον κ θεῖον ὄνομα. Ph. Jud).

SECT. VI. Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human laws.

TN this and the following sections I shall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them capable of distinct properties in things (or distinct subjects of property). That is, B and C are so distinguished, or exist so distinctly, that if there be any thing which B can call his, it will be for that reason not C's: and v.v. what is C's will for that reason not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conscience. Let us see then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. There are some things, to which (at least before the case is altered by voluntary subjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, such a natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.

The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much his, as B is himself? It is impossible for C, or any other to see with the eyes of B: therefore they are eyes only to B: and when they cease to be his eyes, they cease to be eyes at all. He then has the sole property in them, it being impossible in nature, that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C: because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something; and therefore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made use of are his.

Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C: and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's b. Because, what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces

יניע כפיך האכל אוני יבון זרים יגיעו אוני איניע כפיך האכל and therefore the produce of a man's labor is often still called his labor. So יגיע כפיך האכל: and יגיע כפיך האכל, in Pfalm. & al. passim.—Iliadumque labor vestes. Virg.

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by his labor; or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any property in that, which

B only can truly call his, he would act contrary to truth a.

Lastly, there may be many things, which B may truly call his in some such sense, or upon some such account, as no other can; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the property of which will therefore be in B. Because C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one besides B has an equal title, no one besides B can have any title to at all b, their pretences mutually balancing and destroying each other, whilst his only remains. And in this case a small matter, being opposed to nothing, will be strong enough to maintain the claim of B.

III. Whatever is inconfistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable. Those maxims may be esteemd the natural and true laws of any particular society, which are most proper to procure the happiness of it. Because happiness is the end of society and laws: otherwise we might suppose unhappiness to be proposed as the right end of them; that is, unhappiness to be desirable, contrary to nature and truth. And what is faid of a particular society is not less true, when applied to the universal society of mankind. Now those things are most apt to produce happiness, which make the most men happy. And therefore those maxims or principles, which promote the general tranquillity and well being of mankind, if those words express the happiness of mankind, must be the true laws of humanity, or the basis of them: and all such practices, as interfere with these, must also interfere with those. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a general law of human nature, which tends only to favor the pleasures of some particulars to the prejudice of the rest, who partake of the same common nature; and especially if these pleasures are of the lower and brutal kind. As a million of men are more than one; so in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by a million of times: for here we consider men only as men.

It will be easy now to shew, that the transgression of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is wrong and morally evil. For if mankind may be said in general to be a rational animal, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a rational nature: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it,

If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are his.

Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet, as Lactantius says in another case.

must

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must be founded in reason; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is opposite to reason, and consequently to truth.

Let us suppose some rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would be agreeable to the nature and circumstances of mankind. If all men should transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an universal revolt? A general evil, or fomething difagreeable to our nature and the truth of our circumstances: for of contrary practices there must be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the same thing. This then would be wrong by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any one man: because all the individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore all as much as any one. At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that rule, would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal disorder and misery; and would for his part deny human circumstances to be what they are, public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness.

With what face can any particular man put his own humor or unreasonable pleasure into the scale against such a weight of happiness as that of all the world? Does not he, who thus centers in himself, disregards the good of every body else, and intirely separates his injoyments and interests from those of the public; does not he, I fay, strike himself out of the roll of mankind ?? Ought he to be ownd as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an alien and e-

nemy to the common happiness and tranquillity of our species?

IV. Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be just the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted b. Because reason is universal, and respects cases, not persons. (See sect. III. pr. II.)

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to other men, is to confider what we should take things to be were we in their circumstances d.

V. In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominione. I except for the prefent the case of parents and their children, and perhaps of some few other near relati-

b Nec enim aquus judex aliam de sua, aliam de · And posto woe for Ingior. Ph. Fud. " Αεὶ ταυτα το γε τ αυτών γίνωσκε. Ifocr. aliena causa, sententiam fert. Sen. חברך ער שתגיע למקומו. P. Aboth. Eo loco nos constituamus, que ille est, cui irascimur. Sen. . He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, Βασιλεύς μεν έμοι γε δοκείς συ φύσει πεφυκέναι έδεν ήτλον ή ช่ CV รฉี อนท์งย Фบอนยง ซ นะภิเริลิ หัวทุนล์ง. Xen.

ons. Here let me be understood to mean only those, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vanishd).

In a state, where no laws of society make any subordination or distinction, men can only be considered as men, or only as individuals of the same species, and equally sharing in one common definition. And since by virtue of this same definition B is the same to C, that C is to B; B has no more dominion over C than C

reciprocally has over B: that is, they are in this regard equal.

Personal excellencies or defects can make no difference here: because, 1. Who must judge, on which side the advantage lies? To say B (or D, or any body else) has a right to judge to the disadvantage of C, is to suppose what is in question, a dominion over him; not to prove it. 2. Great natural or acquired indowments may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive those, who have less, of their title to what they have; or, which is the same, give any one, who has greater abilities, a right to take it, or the use of it from them. If B has better eyes than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C should not therefore see for himself, and use his eyes, as freely as B may his. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his use, and so are B's to his; and each has the fole property in his own: so their respective properties are equal. The case would be parallel to this, if B should happen to have better intellectual faculties than C. And further, it B should be ftronger than C, he would not yet for that reason have any right to be his lord. For C's less degree of strength is as much his, as B's greater is his: therefore C has as much right to his, and (which is the natural consequence) to use his, as B has to use his: that is, C has as much right to resist, as B has to impose or command, by virtue of his strength: and where the right (tho not the power) of resisting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or dominion is nothing. 3. Since strength and power are most apt to pretend a title to dominion b, it may be added further, that power and right, or a power of doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be separated, nor does one inferr the other. Lastly, if power, quà power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to every thing, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which he has not the power to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in sect. I. but to affert it would be to advance a plain absurdity or contradiction

est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. Cic. b When the Romans, in Livy, asked the Galls, Quadnam id jus esset, agrum à possessoribus petere, aut minari arma, they answerd, se in armis jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum esse. Like barbarians indeed!

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rather. For then to oppose the man who has this power, as far as one can, or (which is the same) as far as one has the power to do it, would not be wrong: and yet so it must be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not opposed. Moreover, that a man should have a right to any thing, merely because he has the power to take it, is a doctrine indeed, which may serve a few tyrants, or some banditi and rogues, but directly opposite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is also what the powerful themselves could not allow, if they would but imagine themselves to be in the state of the weak and more defenceless; and therefore unreasonable, by prop. IV a.

VI. No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another. Because, in the first place, this supposes a dominion over him, and the most absolute too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to disturb the peace and happiness of C is what B would think unreasonable, if he was in C's case. In the last, since it is supposed, that C has never invaded the happiness of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the whole transaction begins originally from B (for all this is couchd in the word begin), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at least as good a title as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to keep as B to claim. These two rights being then at least equal, and counterpoising each other, no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of right in B: and therefore it must of right remain as it is; and what C has must, for any right that B has to oppose this settlement, remain with C in his undisturbed possession. But the argument is still stronger on the side of C: because he seems to have fuch a property in his own happiness, as is mentiond in prop. II. such a one as no other can have b.

VII. Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happiness, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make reprisals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit c. We have seen already, that there are some things, which

Fosephus, when he says, νόμον γε μων ωςίως, ε παρά βυρσίν ιδυςότατον, ε παρά ἀνθρώποις, είκειν, τοῖς διωατωτέςοις, cam only mean, that necessity, or perhaps prudence, obliges to do this; not any law in the stricter sense of that word.

b Societatis [inter homines] arctissimum vinculum est magis, arbitrari esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, sui commodi causa, quàm omnia incommoda subire, &c. Cic.

All this is supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws.

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a man may truly call his; and let us for the present only suppose, that there may be more. This premised, I proceed to make good the proposition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to affert, contrary to truth, either that he has not the faculties and powers, which he has; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not use them? And how may he use them, if not for his own preservation, when he is attacked, and like to be abused, or perhaps destroyd.

All animals have a principle of felf-preservation, which exerts itself many times with an uncontroulable impetuosity. Nature is uniform in this, and every where constant to itself. Even inanimate bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be sure, that no position can have any foundation in nature, or be consistent with it and truth (those inseparable companions), which turns upon nature itself, and tends to its destruction.

Great part of the general happiness of mankind depends upon those means, by which the innocent may be saved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have of defending themselves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the use of these opportunities, and the right of desending themselves against injurious treatment and violence must be inconsistent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to defend himself and what is his, he can have no right to any thing (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved); since that cannot be his right, which he may not maintain to be his right.

If a man has no right to defend himself against insults, &c. it must be because the aggressor has a right to assail the other, and usurp what is his: but this pretension has been prevented in the foregoing proposition. And, more than that, it includes a great absurdity, to commence an injury, or to begin the violence, being in nature more than only to repell it. He, who begins, is the true cause of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, respected back upon himself. It is as when a man spits at heaven, and the spittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happiness of another, does what is wrong, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, does in that respect what is right, by the terms.

Lastly, since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness, there can be no doubt but that he not only may, but even ought to defend it (sect. II. prop. IX.);

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in such a manner I mean, as does not interfere with truth, or his own design of being happy. He ought indeed not to act rashly, or do more than the end proposed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up, if be can, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that cannot be done, to use arguments and persuasives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take such other as he can, and confront force with force. Otherwise he will fail in his duty to himself, and

deny happiness to be happiness.

By the same means, that a man may defend what is his, he may certainly endeavour to recover what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been shewn already, that the power to take any thing from another gives no right to it. The right then to that, which has been taken from its owner against his will, remains still where it was: he may still truly call it his: and if it be his, he may use it as his: which if he who took it away, or any other, shall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggressor, and the owner does but defend himself and what is his. Besides, he, who uses any thing as his, when it is his, acts on the side of truth: but that man, who opposes him in this, and consequently asserts a right to that, which is not his, acts contrary to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiss: but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental proposition, sect. I. prop. IV.

Then further, if a man hath still a right to what is forceably or without his confent taken from him, he must have a right to the value of it. For the thing is to him what it is in value to him: and the right he has to it, may be confiderd as a right to a thing of such a value. So that if the very thing which was taken be destroyd, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of such a value to him; and something must be had in lieu of it: that is, he has a right to make reprifals. Since every thing is to every man what it is in value to him, things of the same value to any one may be reckond as to him the same, and to recover the equivalent the same as to recover the thing itself: for otherwise it is not an equivalent. If the thing taken by way of reprifal should be to the man, from whom it is taken, of greater value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he must charge himself with that loss. If injustice be done him, it is done by himself, the other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover what is his, or the equivalent, from an invader; so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the expense he is at in recovering his own, for the loss of time and quiet, and for the trouble, bazards, and dangers under-

[·] For ἐι ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς ἐδὲν ἦτθον ποιεῖ κακῶς, κὰν ἀμιύνηται. Μαχ. Τ.

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gone: because all these are the effects of the invasion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till be and all, that claim under him, are extinct. For, I. till then no other man can be the first possessor again: which is more than nothing; fince he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were donation. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to a, the finder may take without the violation of any truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth not begin to interrupt the happiness of any body, &c. Therefore to possess himfelf of it is not wrong. So far from it, that, fince every man is obliged to confult his own happiness (that is, his own interest and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to act confonantly to this obligation is an omiffion that would be wrong. What he does therefore is right. And then if he does right in taking possession of it, he must from thence be the rightful possession; or, it becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be possest without cultivation and the contrivance and labor of the first possessor. This has generally been the case of lands: and these are indeed more eminently meant by the word possession ons. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and sweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the intruder's pains and travel, is a most manifest violation of truth. It is afferting in fact that to be his, which cannot be 4. The contrary doctrine, viz. that prime occupancy gives his. See prop. II. no right, interferes with prop. III. for it must certainly be inconsistent with the peace and happiness of mankind in general to be left in endless wars and struggles for that, which no man can ever have any right to. And yet thus it must be, if that doctrine was true: because it has been demonstrated, that power confers no right; and therefore the first right to many things can only accrue from the first possession of them. 5. If B should endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the possession of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind without expelling or disturbing any body, he would certainly do that, which he himself would judge unreasonable, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reason with respect to C, which would be reason in respect of B; contrary to the nature of reason, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his possessions is the same as to command him to leave them, upon pain of fuffering for non-obedience. But this is usurping a dominion, which he has no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his

[·] Nam propria telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenquam statuit. Hor.

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possession without beginning to interrupt his happiness: nor can any one do this without contravening the truth containd in prop. VI. This therefore secures the possessor in his possession for ever: that is, it confirms his right to the thing possest. Lastly, the first possessor, of whom I have been speaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend his person, and such other things as can only be his, against the attempts of any aggressor (see prop. II.): therefore these no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably dispossest without violence offerd to these, no one has any right to disposses him. But this must be the case, where the possession does not quit his possession willingly. The right consequently must remain solely in him, unless he consents to quit it.

N. The successors of an invader, got into possession wrongfully, may acquire a right in time a, by the failure of such, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in possession, when all these are extinct, is

in the place of a prime occupant.

IX. A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation b. If B has the fole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the disposal of them besides B: and he has a right. For disposing of them is but using them as his. Therefore the act of B in exchanging them for some thing else, or bestowing them upon C, interferes not with truth: and fo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against truth, or that is wrong, in taking them: because he treats them as being what they are; as things, which come to him by the act of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of disposing of them. Thus C gets the title innocently.

But in the case of compact the reason, on which this transaction stands, is more evident still. For the contractors are supposed to receive each from other the equivalent of that which they part with, or at least what is equivalent to them respectively, or perhaps by each party preferable. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both advantaged. And so each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being what it is: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happiness. Indeed he, who receives the value of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it still. His property is not diminishd: the fituation and matter of it is only alterd.

Τας κίνσεις, Ε τας ίδιας κὰ τας κοινας, νν ἐπιγένηται πολύς χρόνΘ, κυρίας κὰ πατρῷας ἀπανίες είναι νοb To this may be reduced that title to things, which Tully mentions as con. wigsow. Ifocr. ferred by some law (lege); and even those, which accrue conditione, or sorte. For I suppose the government to have a right of giving them thus. S 2 Mankind

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Mankind could not well subsist without bartering one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse, is inconsistent with the general good of mankind, &c. If a man could find the necessaries of life without it, and by himself, he must at least want many of the comforts of it.

X. There is then such a thing as property, founded in nature and truth 2: or, there are things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his: by prop. II, VIII, IX. b.

XI. Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are u h, as he may part with) by compact or donation; or (which must be understood) till they fail, or death extinguishes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Because no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the depriver must use them as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth. For,

XII. To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing of it are the same thing: they are equipollent expressions. For when it is said, that P has the property, or that such a thing is proper to P, it is not said, that P and Q or P and others have the property (proprium limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is said to be his, it is not said that part of it only is his. P has therefore the all or all-hood of it, and consequently all the use of it. And then, since the all of it to him, or all that P can have of it, is but the use and disposal of it, he who has this has the thing itself, and it is his of

Laws

· Which must not give way to opinions of sitness, &c. The master was in the right, who corrected Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τέ αρμότουτ Φ κειτής, but of property. Omnium, que in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto prastabilius, quam plane intelligi vos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed natura constitutum esse jus. Cic. b There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulla natura: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, &c. Cic. And so in Xenophon it is said to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may possess them as their d Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα own, not amorpia. But fure this wants limitations. c Allodium. διαθήχας άναγινώσκων λεγέσας ο δείνα μέν έχετω την δεσποτέιαν τ άγεων, η της δικίας, την δε χεήσιν άλλ . Πάντες β την χρησιν έχομεν, δεσποτέιαν δε έδείς. — Ε έκοντες, Ε ακοντες ον τή τελευτή παςαχωρήσομεν έτέροις, την χίησιν καρπωσάμενοι μόνον. S. Chryf. Τέτων μέν Φύσει έδενός έσμεν κύριοι, νόμω δέ

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Laws indeed have introduced a way of speaking, by which the property and the usus are distinguished; but in truth the usus fructuary has a temporary, or limited property; and the proprietary has a perpetual usus fruct, either at present, or in reversion. Propriety without the use (if the use is never to come to the proprietary) is an empty sound.

I have before upon some occasions taken it as granted, that he, who uses any thing as his, when it is not his, acts against truth, &c. but now I say fur-

ther, that,

XIII. He, who uses or disposes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his. Because this is all, that he, whose it really is, can do. Borrowing and hiring afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uses the thing borrowd or hired, he uses what is his own for the time allowd: and his doing so is only one of those ways, in which the true proprietary disposes of it.

XIV. To usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice: or, more sully, to take, detain, use, destroy, burt, or meddle with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of these, or assist them, who do, are asts of injustice. The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is justice. Def.

XV. He that would not violate truth, must avoid all injustice: or, all injustice is wrong and evil. It interferes with the truths before laid down, and perhaps more. It denies men to be subjects capable of distinct properties: in some cases it denies them to have a property even in their own bodies, life, fame, and the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the peace and bappiness of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreasonable in his own case, when the injury is done to himself: to take any thing from another only because I think I want it, or because I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title

Furtum fit,—cum quis alienam reminvito domino contrectat. Just. inst. b On the contrary אמת העשה רין בעשה לעשה אמת. A saying of ריב"ל. And Cicero more than once uses verum for justum, and veritas for bonitas or probitas.

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to it, is the highest pretence to dominion, and denial of our natural equality: it is setting up a right to begin to disturb the happiness of others: and lastly, it is to deny there is any such thing as property, contrary to truth.

Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call bis, then, if T takes or uses it without the consent of P, he declares it to be his (for if it was his he could do no more) when it is not his, and so acts a lie a: in which consists the idea and formal ratio of moral evil.

The very attempting any instance of injustice, or assisting others in such an attempt, since it is attempting and promoting what is wrong, is being in the wrong as much as one is able to be; or doing what one can to achieve that which is evil: and to do this; by the terms, must be wrong and evil.

Even the defire of obtaining any thing unjustly is evil: because to defire to do evil, by the terms again, is an evil or criminal defire. If the act follows such a defire, it is the child and product of it: and the defire, if any thing renders the fulfilling of it impracticable, is the act obstructed in the beginning, and stifled in the womb.

Let it be observed here by way of scholion concerning the thing called cove-tousness, that there seem to be three sorts of it. One is this here mentiond: a desire of getting from others, tho it be unjustly. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense desire of heaping up what one can by just methods, but without any reasonable end proposed b, and only in order to keepc, and as it were bury it d: and the more he accumulates, the more he craves e. This also intrenches upon truth, and seems to be a vice. But to covet to obtain what is another man's by just means, and with his consent, when it may contribute to the happiness of our selves or families, and perhaps of the other person too, has nothing surely that looks unfriendly upon truth, or is blamcable, in it. This, if it may be called covetousness, is a virtuous covetousness.

Account το σον μόνον σον ἔιναι, το δε ἀπότειον, ώσπες ἐςίν, ἀπότειον. Ερίελ's words. Justita primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. Cic. This is to use things as being what they are.

Blepsias ὁ δανείτης, in Lucian, dies of hunger (λιμιῦ ἀθλιω ἐλέγετο ἀπεσπληκέναι). Ridiculous enough.

c Or only πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμιῶν, as Anacharsis said of some Greeks. Athen.

d As that man, in Athenaus, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he swallowd as much of it as he could (καταπίοντα ἐκ ὀλίγες χρυτῶς ἀποθανεῖι).

e Of such it is, that Diogenes used to say, Ὁμοίες τὰς Φιλαργύρες τοῖς ὑδρωπικοῦς, κλ. Stob. The Mamshilim, mentiond in Nahh. Ab. compare them πρωυ υτο τος νίσιος τος νίσιος ναι στος ναι στος ναι στος νίσιος ναι στος ναι στος ναι στος ναι στος νίσιος ναι στος ναι σ

XVI. When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other men's sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call cruelty. And not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes in which we are not concerned, is unmercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these.

XVII. He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel. Not to be affected with the afflictions of others, so far as we know them, and in proportion to the several degrees and circumstances of them, tho we are not the causes of them, is the same as to consider the afflicted as persons not in affliction; that is, as being not what they are, or (which is the same) as being what they are not: and this contradicts matter of fact.

One can scarce know the sufferings of another without having at least some image of them in his mind: nor can one have these images without being conscious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, so far as they fall within his knowledge, may be said to know and not to know; or at least to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conscience.

There is something in buman nature a resulting from our very make and constitution, while it retains its genuin form, and is not alterd by vitious habits; not perverted by transports of revenge or sury, by ambition, company, or salse philosophy b; nor opprest by stupidity and neglecting to observe what happens to others: I say, there is something, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case. It is grievous to see or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in torment. This compassion appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are justly reckond amongst the best of menc: in some degree it appears in almost all; nay,

Properly called humanity; because nothing of it appears in brutes. חששות מקפרת וחוששל. S. Hhas.

b When Seneca says, Clementiam—omnes boni prastabunt, misericordiam autem vitabunt, he seems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this subject. That, succurret [sapiens] alienis lachrymis, non accedet, owns one use of tears: they obtain succour even from a Stoic.

c 'Ayasoi à sudangues à robes. They, who of all writers undertake to imitate nature most, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer represents Ulysses Od. 2.

151,—2,—7,—8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejulations of children. They are silent streams, and flow from other causes; commonly some tender, or perhaps philosophical, restexion. It is easy to see how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fashionable. But for all that, it is certain the glandula lacrymales are not made for nothing.

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even sometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in those hardend and execrable monsters of cruelty themselves, who seem just to retain only the least tincture of humanity that can be. The Pherean tyrant, who had never wept over any of those murders he had caused among his own citizens, wept when he saw a tragedy but acted in the theatre: the reason was, his attention was caught here, and he more observed the sufferings of Hecuba and Andromache, than ever he had those of the Phereans; and more impartially, being no otherwise concerned in them but as a common spectator. Upon this occasion the principle of compassion, implanted in human nature, appeard, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrifaction, and would shew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to nature to be affected with the sufferings of other people; and the contrary is inhuman and unnatural.

Such are the circumstances of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering dangers and suffering many evils: and therefore since it is for the good of such, as are so exposed or actually smarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and affistance from others, without which they must commonly continue to be miserable, or perish, it is for the common good and welfare of the majority at least of mankind, that they should compassionate and help each other b. To do the contrary must therefore be contrary to nature and wrong by prop. III. And beside, it is by one's behaviour and actions to affirm, that the circumstances of men in this world are not what they are; or that peace, and health, and happiness, and the like, are not what they are.

Let a man fubstitute himself into the room of some poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, distracted with distinculties, or groaning under the pangs of some disease, or the anguish of some hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In this distress what reflexions can he imagine be should have, if he found that every body neglected him, no body so much as pitying him, or vouchsafing to take notice of his calamitous and sad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reasonable or unreasonable for others to do in respect of him, he must allow to be reasonable or unreasonable for him to do in respect of them, or deny a manifest truth in prop. IV.

If unmercifulness, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be spent in proving that eruelty is so. For all that is culpable in unmercifulness is contained in cruelty, with additions and aggravations. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the suffer-

^{*} Plut. b A generous nature pities even an enemy in distress. Έποικτέιρω δέ νιν Δύεννον έμνπης, κάιπερ δντα δισμενή. Soph.

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ings of others, but causes them; or perhaps delights in them, and (which is the most insolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a jest and subject of raillery. If the one be a defect of humanity, the other is diametrically opposite to it. If the one does no good, the other does much evil. And no man, how cruel soever in reality he was, has ever liked to be reckend a cruel man: such a confession of guilt does nature extort; so universally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injustice, unmercifulness, and cruelty are wrong. This follows from the nature of contraries. Beside, not to be just to a man is to be not just, or unjust to him: and so not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here I might end this section: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the beinousness of all such crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own necessary defence does not require it (it being not possible, that any thing should be more his, than his own person, life and limbs); robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cat. with all the approaches and tendencies to them. For these are not only comprised within the definition of injustice, and are therefore violations of those truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and some of them always, come within the description of cruelty too. All which is evident at first sight with respect to murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, &c. especially if a man brings himself into the case, and views himself in his own imagination as renderd scandalous by calumniators and liers; stript by thieves; ruind in his fortunes and undone by knaves; struggling to no purpose, convulsed and agonizing under the knife of some truculent russian; or the like.

The same is altogether as plain in the case of adultery b, when any one cinsnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithstanding the protection it gains from false notions, great examples d, and the commonness of the crime c. For (the nature of matrimony being for the present supposed to be such, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the property a husband has in his wife by compact, the most express and sacred that can possibly be made: he does that, which

T

² Est hominum natura, quam sequi debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. Cic.

b Δινον μεν
c κλέπτης, άλλ' έχ έτω ως ο μοιχος. Chrys.

c One of the Subsessors alienorum matrimoniorum, as they are called in Val. Max.

d Palam apparet, adhuc atate Divi Hieronymi adulterium capite solere puniri: nunc magnatum lusus est. Schol. in S. Hier.

e For hence follows
impunity, &c. משרבו מנאפים פסקו מים המרים. Mishm.

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tends to subvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconfistent with the order and tranquillity of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think reasonable, or even tolerable, were he the person wrongda: briefly, he impudently treats a woman as his own woman (or wife b), who is not his, but another's, contrary to justice, truth and fatt c. Nor is this simple injustice only, but injustice, for which no reparation can be made if the injured man thinks so; as he generally does (see sect. II. prop. I. obs. 4.) injustice accompanied with the greatest cruelty; so complicated, as scarce any other can be. The husband is for ever robbed of all that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from the wife's fidelity and affection to him d; presuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and sharer in all his fortunes e: and into the room of them succeed painful and destructive passions. The poor woman f herfelf, tho she may be deluded 8, and not see at present her guilt, or the confequences of it, usually pays dear for her security and want of guard, the husband becoming cold h and averse to her, and she full of apprehensions and fears i, with a particular dread of his further resentment. And their affairs, in this disjointed and distracted condition, are neglected; innocent children slighted, and left unprovided for, without so much as the comfort of any certain relations to pity themk, &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by such impertinent simile's and rakish talk, as are commonly used for that purpose 1. When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of what it is to him, the proprietor: and the value must be set according to what he esteems it to be, not what

² Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit, -- idem uxorem suam aspici non vult: & fidei acerrimus exactor, est persidus: & mendacia persequitur, ipse perjurus. Sen. ל וחשא, דאי במטדב שעימוגע. What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act against all these, (to use Seneca's words again) satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est [uxor]? τετ' ένες ιν έιπεῖν, ως το σωμα μονον διαφθείζεται της μοιχευομένης γιωαικός, άλλ' ιι δεῖ τάληθες ειπεῖν, ή ψυχή προ τε σώματο εἰς ἀλλοτείωσιν ἐβίζεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρόπον δλησερέφεος κ μισείν τ άνδρα, κ) ห็τ ον αν κον δεινον, ει το μισ Φ επεδείκνυτο έμφανες, κτλ. Ph. Jud. e Marriage is κοινωνία παντός & Bix, ___ oineiotega & weiZar T amar [noirariar]. Isocr. f 'Arador Zwor. S. Bas. έξεθωψας, says the penitent woman in Soph. ap. Plut. h Ψυχρον παραγκάλισμα —— Γυνή κακή i Quid enim salvi est mulieri, amissa pudicitia? Livy. κότες άθλιοι παιδες μηδ' έτέρω γένει προσνεμηθήναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τος τη γήμαντ Φ, μή τε τῷ τΗ 1 Such as Aristippus uses to Diogenes, ap. Athen. "Apa ye un Ti voi aroxor works. Ph. J. δοκεί είναι Διογενές δικίαν δικείν, ου ή πρότερον έκηταν άλλοι; έ ν έφη. τί ζ νάυν, ου ή πόλλοι πεπλέυκασιν; ร้อง รัฐ เลือง เลือง . Senseles stuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Prov. S. better: where בעלמה is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a serpent upon a rock, and ef a ship in the sea, שלא יעשה בה רושם יוכר אחר שעה and therefore she מקנחת פיה של מטה, and then thinks that מטה, and then thinks that אחר זה תוכל לומר לא פעלתי און See Qab venagi. the

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the injurer, who perhaps has no taste of virtuous pleasures, may think it to be. (See p. 33. obs. 3, 4.) Nor may these thests be excused from their secrecy. For 1. the injustice of the fact is the same in itself, whether known, or not. In either case truth is denied: and a lie is as much a lie, when it is whisperd, as when it is proclaimd at the market-cross. 2. It has been shewd (sect. II.) that the rectitude of our actions and way to happiness are coincident; and that such acts, as are disagreeable to truth, and wrong in themselves, tend to make men ultimately unhappy a. Things are so orderd and disposed by the Author of nature, or such a constitution of things flows from him, that it must be so. And since no retreat can be impervious to his eye, no corner so much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and vitious act a fuitable degree of unhappiness and punishment annext, which the criminal will be fure to meet with some time or other b. For his own fake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkness of the deed. But lastly, it can hardly be, but that it must be discoverde. People generally rife in vice, grow impudent and vain and careless, and discover themselves d: the opportunities contrived for it must be liable to observation: some confidents must be trusted, who may betray the secret, and upon any little distaste probably will do it: and beside, love is quick of apprehension e.

It will be easily perceived from what has been said, that if to murder, rob, &cc. are unjust and crimes of a heinous nature, all those things which have any tendency toward them, or affinity with them, or any way countenance them, must be in their degree criminal s: because they are of the same complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the same growth, nor matured into the gross act, or perhaps do not operate so presently, apparently, or certainly. Envy, malice, and the like, are conatus's toward the destruction or ruin of the person, who is the object of these unhappy passions. To throw dust s upon a man's reputation by innunendo's, ironies, &c. may not indeed sully it all at once, as when dirt is thrown, or gross calumnies; yet it insects the air, and may destroy it by a lingring poison. To expose another by the strength of a jesting talent, or harder temper of sace, is to wound him, though it be in an invisible

² Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, &c. Juy.

b 'Aναπόδεας δ ὁ θεῖ νόμο. Plot.

και δ ἀν παςαυτίκα κρύψες, ὑσερον ὀΦθήση. Ifocr. Μαςτυρήσεσιν — ἡ κλίνη κὸ ὁ λύχνο ὁ Μεγαπέν
θες. Luc.

d 'Ηδονή μεν δ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονέσατον. Plato.

ε Quid non fentit amor? Ον.

ε 'Αγαθὸν ἐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθελειν. Α gnome of Democrates.

ε Και δ το μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθελειν. Α gnome of Democrates.

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place a. Many freedoms and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and especially gallantries b, that proceed not to consummate wickedness, nor perhaps are intended to be carried so far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper object, and debauch the mind c. By stories or insinuations to sow the seeds of discord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples affairs, as busy bodies and intermeddle in other peoples affairs, as busy bodies and intermeddles with things, in which they are not concernd; to make that public, which in itself is private; and perhaps to rob the person, into whose business they intrude themselves, of his quiet, if of nothing else. For indeed this intermeddling looks like setting up a pretence to something further; like an unjust attack begun at a distance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to truth, this pragmatical humor is. And so on.

If these things are so, how guilty must they be, who are designedly the promoters or instruments of injustice and wickedness; such as mercenary swearers, and salfe witnesses; traders in scandal; solicitors in vice; they who intend by their conversation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it seems) prepare

them for knavery, lewdness, or any flagitious enterprize d.

There are other crimes, such as insidelity to friends or them who intrust us with any thing, ingratitude, all kinds of wilful perjury, and the like, which might have been mentiond in the proposition, being great instances of injustice: but because they are visibly such, and their nature cannot be mistaken, I comprise them in the et cet. there. Any one may see, that he, who acts unfaithfully, acts against his promises and ingagements, and therefore denies and sins against truth; does what it can never be for the good of the world should become an universal practice; does what he would not have done to himself; and wrongs the man, who depends upon him, of what he justly might expect. So the ungrateful man treats his benefactor as not being what he is, &c. And the false-swearer respects neither things, nor himself, nor the persons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God himself as being what they are. All this is obvious c.

Bewish doctors, he who does this breaks the fixth commandment. Abarb. See how chast the Romans were once. Quo matronale decus verecundia munimento tutius esset, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiserunt, ut inviolata manûs aliena tactu stolarelinqueretur. Val. M. And it is told of P. Manius, that tristi exemplo pracepit [filia sua], ut non solum virginitatem illibatam, sed etiam oscula ad virum sincera perferret. Id. Quanto autem prastantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratius corrumpitur. S. Aust. Quanto autem prastantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratius corrumpitur. S. Aust. ΔΟυτοι ἐιτιν δι λοιμοι δι τὸ ἔδιον κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας άγων φιλονεικῶντες, κλ. S. Bas. Commes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt. Cic. And the same may be said of the unsaithful, perjured, &c.

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SECT. VII. Truths respecting particular Societies of Men, or Governments.

I. M is a social creature: that is, a single man, or family, cannot subsisted or not well, alone out of all society. More things are necessary to sufficient life, or at least to make it in any degree pleasant and desirable, than it is possible for any one man to make and provide for himself merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and house, and that frugal furniture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary physic, suppose many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a shift in time of health to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon such spresent to him; yet what could he do in sickness, or old age, when he would not be able to stir out, or receive her beneficence.

If he should take from the other sex such a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to seek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet still if the hands are doubled, the wants are doubled too: nay more, additional wants,

and great ones, attending the bearing and education of children.

If we could suppose all these difficulties surmounted, and a samily grownup; and doing what a single samily is capable of doing by it self; supporting themselves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a sew cattle, which they have some how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things; no shops to repair to for tools; no servant, or laborer to assist; nor any public invention, of which they might serve themselves in the preparation of their grain, dressing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like); yet still it is only the cortex of the man, which is provided for: what must become of the interior part, the minds of these people? How would those be fed, and improved? Arts and sciences, so much of them as is necessary to teach men the use of their faculties, and unfold their reason, are not the growth of single samilies so imployd. And yet for men to lay out:

² Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus esca scientia nobis videtur? S. Aust.

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all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, without any further views, or any regard to the nobler part of themselves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for rational exercises.

If all the exceptions against this separate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increases, the little plots, which the several families possess, and cultivate, must be inlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themselves straitend: and there would soon be a collision of interests, from whence disputes and quarrels would ensue. Other things too might minister matter for these. And beside all this, some men are naturally troublesome, vitious, thievish, pugnacious, rabid; and these would always be disturbing and slying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or superiority in power, would not fail to make themselves yet greater or stronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be formidable.

Under so many wants, and such apprehensions, or present dangers, necessity would bring some samilies into terms of friendship with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reason of it increased, would become stronger, introduce stricter ingagements, and at last bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the several sorts would at length settle into their places, according to their several weights and capacities with respect to the common concern. And thus some form of a society must arise: men cannot subsist otherwise.

But if it was possible for a man to preserve life by bimself, or with his petit company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely better for him, and them, to live in a society, where men are serviceable to themselves and their neighbours at the same time, by exchanging their money, or goods, for such other things as they want more; where they are capable of doing good offices each for other in time of need; where they have the protestion of laws, and a public security against cheats, robbers, assaffines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or army is ready to interpose between them and foreign invaders; and where they may injoy those discoveries which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by conversation and innocent conflicts of reason, and (to speak out) may be made men.

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If, when we have the privilege of fociety and laws, we can scarce preserve our own, or be safe, what a woful condition should we be in without them; exposed to the insults, rapines, and violence of unjust and merciless men, not having any sanctuary, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithstanding the help of friends and those about us, and such conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how irksome would life be, if in sickness or other trouble there was no body to administer either remedy or consolation?

Lastly, society is what men generally desire. And tho much company may be attended with much vanity, and occasion many evils a yet it is certain, that absolute and perpetual solitude has something in it very irksome and hideous b. Thus the social life is natural to man; or, what his nature and circumstances require.

II. The end of society is the common welfare and good of the people associated. This is but the consequence of what has been just said. For because men cannot subsist well, or not so well, separately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the end of their uniting is their better subsistence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by so much the more effectually is this end answerd.

III. A society, into which men enter for this end, supposes some rules or laws, according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to them as occasion shall require. A number of men met together without any rules, by which they submit to be governed, can be nothing but an irregular multitude. Every one being still sui juris, and lest intirely to his own private choice, by whatever kind of judgment or passion or caprice that happens to be determind, they must needs intersere one with another: nor can such a concourse of people be any thing different from an indigested chaos of differing parts, which by their consused motions would damnify, and destroy each other. This must be true, if men differ in the size of their understandings, in their manner of thinking, and the several turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumstances; if the greatest part of them are under the direction of bodily affections; and if these differ as much as their shapes, their complexions, their constitutions do c. Here then we find nothing but consusting and unhappiness.

^{*} Aristotle says a good man would be neither ἄφιλΦ, nor πολύφιλΦ. This is just. Therefore Seneca seems to go a little too far, when he writes, Omnes amicos habere operosum esse, satis esse inimicos non habere.

b Zῶον σωναγελασικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπΦ. S. Bas.

c Man is, in Greg. Naz.'s words, τὸ πολυτεοπώτατον τ ζώων, κὸ ποικιλώτατον.

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Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common good and happiness, must be such a one as in the first place, may render them compatible one with another: which cannot be without rules, that may direct and adjust their several motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to some degree of uniformity, or at least restrain such excursions and enormities, as would

render their living together inconsistent.

Then, there must be some express declarations and scita to ascertain properties and titles to things by common consent: that so, when any altercations or disputes Thall happen concerning them (as be fure many must in a world so unreasonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their own settlements; and by the application of a general undisputed rule to the particular case before them it may appear, on which fide the obliquity lies, the controversy may be fairly decided, and all mouths eternally stopped. And then again, that they may be protected and persevere in this agreeable life, and the injoyment of their respective properties be fecured to them, feveral things must be forecasted by way of precaution against foreign invasions; punishments must be appointed for offences committed amongst themselves, which being known may deter men from committing them, &c. These rules, methods, and appointments of punishments, being intelligibly and honestly drawn up, agreed to, and published, are the mutual compacts a under which the society is confederated, and the laws of it.

If then to have the members of a society capable of sublisting together, if to have their respective properties ascertaind, if to be safe and quiet in the possession of them be for the general good of the society, and these things cannot be had without laws; then a fociety, whose foundation and cement is the public good,

must have such laws, or be supposed at least to design such.

As to the making of any further laws, when the public interest and welfare require them, that is but repeating the same power in other instances, which they made use of before in making their first laws: and as to altering or repealing, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are equal. Befide, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this end is to be confiderd at one time as much as at another; not only in their first constitution and settlement.

IV. These laws and determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural justice. For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the same as to ordain, that what is true shall be false; or v. vb. which is absurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be just, which before and in itself was unjust, is the fame as to ordain that which interferes with truth: because justice is founded in

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truth (as before), and every where the same a. Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing which is naturally unjust is to enact that which is absurd; that which by sect. I. is morally evil; and that which is opposite to those laws, by which it is manifestly the will of our Creator we should be governed. And to enact what is thus evil must be evil indeed. Lastly, to establish injustice must be utterly inconsistent with the general good and happiness of any society; unless to be unjustly treated, pilled, and abused can be happiness c. And if so, it is utterly inconsistent with the end of society; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. A society limited by laws supposes magistrates, and a subordination of powers: that is, it supposes a government of some form or other. Because, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, some must of necessity be appointed to judge, when those laws are transgrest, and how far; to decide doubtful cases, and the like: there must be some armed with authority to execute those judgments, and to punish offenders: there must be persons chosen not only to punish and prevent public evils, but also to do many other things, which will be required in advancement of the public good: and then the power of making new laws, and abrogating or mending old ones, as experience may direct or the case at any time require, as also of providing presently and legally for the safety of the public in time of sudden danger, must be lodged somewhere.

If there are no executors of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if so, they are but a dead letter, and equal to none: and if the society has none, it is indeed no society, or not such a one as is the subject of this proposition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the vitals of a society, without which there can be no circulation of justice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And since men can be but in one place at once, there must be numbers of these proportionable to the bigness and extent of it.

And

^{*} Δίκαιον Φύσει, ἀκίνητον, κỳ πανταχε την ἀυτην έχει δώναμων ὡσπερ τὸ πῦς κỳ ἐνθάδε κỳ ἐν Πέςσαις κάιει. Arift. b Even the Heathens believed, that above all human κηςύγματα there were άγραπτα κάισ ζαλή θεῶν νόμωμα, which mortals ought not to transgress: ἐ γάς τι νῦν γε κάχθες ἀκὶ πότε ζῆ τᾶυτα. Soph. Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Roma scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra—legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretia—attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, ἐψ ad rectè faciendum impellens, ἐψ à delicto avocans: qua non tum deniq; incipit lex esse, cùm scripta est, sed tum cùm orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. Cic. ε Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atq; jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciunt, ut, qua mala perniciosaq; sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cùr, cum jus ex injuria lex sacere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? Cic.

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And further, since the concerns of a whole society, and such things as may fall within the compass of a statute book, are various, requiring several sorts and sizes of abilities, and lying one above another in nature; since not only private men want to be inspected, but even magistrates and officers themselves, who (tho they off forget it) are still but men; and since the whole society is to be one, one compact body: I say, since the case is thus, there must be men to act in several elevations and qualities as well as places, of which the inserior sort in their several quarters must act immediately under their respective superiors; and so this class of superiors in their several provinces under others above them; till at last the ascent is terminated in some bead, where the legislative power is deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An army may as well be supposed to be well disciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either general or officers, as a society without governors and their subalterns, or (which is the same) without some form of government, to answer the end of its being.

VI. A man may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the government of laws, and those, who in their several stations are intrusted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of aregular society. Because by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons equivalent, or indeed preserable by much: and this he may do without acting against any truth. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are his own, and therefore no other man's property is denied by this: nor is the nature of happiness denied to be what it is, since it is happiness which he aims at in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend against truth, and deny happiness to be what it is, if he did not do it; especially seeing, that here his own happiness coincides with the general happiness and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his lot falls, or his choice determins him to live.

If the question should be asked, what natural rights a man may part with, or how far he may part with them; the general answer, I think, may be this. Some things are essential to our being, and some it is not in our power to part with. As to the rest, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the end, for which he does this: not further, because beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot give away the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to preserve or retain that property: but he may consent to contribute part of his estate, in order to preserve the rest, when otherwise it might all be lost; to take his share of danger in defence of his country, rather than certainly perish, be inslaved, or ruind by the conquest or oppression of it; and the like.

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VII. Men may become members of a society (i. e. do what is mentiond in the foregoing proposition) by giving their consent, either explicitly, or implicitly. That a man may subject himself to laws, we have seen. If he does this, he must do it either in his own person; or he must do it by some proxy, whom he substitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his confent must be collected only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the fociety, accepting the benefits of its constitution, and acquiescing in the established methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the two first ways he declares himself explicitly, and directly: nor can he after that behave himself as if he was no member of the fociety, without acting as if he had not done what he has done. And this is the case not only of them, who have been concerned in the first formation of any government, but also of them, who have in the said manners a given their consent to any subsequent acts, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came into what their ancestors had done, or who have by oaths put themselves under obligations to the public. By the last of the three ways mentiond a man's confent is given indeed implicitly, and less directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For suppose him to be born in some certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been party to any law, never to have taken any oath to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himself by any other act. In this case he cannot methinks but have some love and sympathy for that place, which afforded him the first air he drew; some gratitude towards that conflitution, which protected his parents, while they educated and provided for him; some regard to those obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.

If he inherits or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeafible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to get, or keep, without the aid of laws and advantage of fociety; then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, with it he takes and owns the laws which give it him.

Indeed fince the fecurity he has from the laws of the country in respect of his person, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereaster, is the general equivalent for his submission to them, he cannot accept that without being obliged in equity to pay this.

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Nay, lastly, his very continuing and settling in any place shews, that either he likes the constitution, or likes it better than any other, or at least thinks it better in his circumstances to conform to it than to seek any other: that is, he confents to be comprehended in it a.

VIII. When a man is become a member of a society, if he would behave himself according to truth, he ought to do these things: viz. to consider property as sounded not only in nature, but also in law; and men's titles to what they have, as strengthend by that, and even by his own concession and covenants; and therefore by so much the more inviolable and facred: instead of taking such measures to do himself right, when he is molested, or injured, as his own prudence might suggest in a state of nature, to confine himself to such ways as are with his own consent markt out for him: and, in a word, to behave himself according to his subordination or place in the community, and to observe the laws of it. For it is contained in the idea of a law, that it is intended to be observed: and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or professes himself member of a society formed upon laws, cannot willingly transgress those laws without denying laws to be what they are, or himself to be what he is supposed or professes himself to be: and indeed without contradicting all or most of those truths contained in the foregoing propositions.

IX. In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be had (for so it may sometimes happen. I say, in respect of such things), be who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is still as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and his best prudence. For in the former case there is nothing to limit him, by the supposition, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the same as if there was nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man should be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no opportunity or power to call the proper magistrate or officer to his assistance.

There is a third case, which perhaps may demand admission here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to truth and natural justice. For the they may pass the usual forms, and be styled laws; yet, since no such law can abrogate that law of nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make falshood to be truth; and two inconsistent laws cannot

Plato says, when any man has seen our form of government, & ε. and remains under it, κόλη φαμέν τέτον ὑμολογηκέναι ἔξηψήμῶν.

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both oblige, or subsist together; one of them must give way: and it is easy to discern, which ought to do it a.

There remains one truth more to be annexed here, which may be contradicted by the practices and pretences of Enthusiasts b.

X. The societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themselves against other nations: or, war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the security of a society, its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries. For if one man may in a state of nature have a right to defend himself, (see sect. VI. prop. VII.), two may, or three, and so on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At least, if the right be not greater, the concern is greater: and there will be more reason, that two, or three, or more should be saved, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more should defend themselves, than that one should. And if this may be done by men in a state of nature, it may be done by them when confederated among themselves: because with respect to other nations they are still in that state. I mean, so far as they have not limited themselves by leagues and alliances.

Beside, if a man may defend himself, he may defend himself by what methods he thinks most proper, provided he trespasses against no truth; and therefore, by getting the aid and assistance of others. Now when war is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be considered as if every particular man was defending himself with the assistance of all the rest, and so be turned into the same case with that of a single man.

In truth the condition of a nation seems to be much the same with that of a single person when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one man may do to another in that position, may be done by one nation or politic body with respect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deliverd in sect. VI. the justice of foreign wars may be not untruly estimated.

Mutual defence is one of the great ends of society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence against foreign enemies. And whoever signalizes himself, when there is occasion for his service, merits the grateful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men: so far at least as he acts generously and with a public spirit, and not in pursuance only of private views.

As

Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia justa esse, qua scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus.— Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum, jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari : jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hac suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Cic. Di Manicheans of old, and some moderns.

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As to those wars, which are undertaken by men out of ambition a, merely to inlarge empire, or to shew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to slay, how many flaves to make b, how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in short, how much mischief and misery they are able to bring upon mankind; these are founded upon false notions of glory: imbellished indeed by service wits and misplaced eloquence, but condemned by all true philosophy and religion.

SECT. VIII. Truths concerning Families and Relations.

HIS fection shall begin as relation itself does, with marriage.

I. The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself. The difference of the sexes, with the strong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the other, is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance of the species, which without that must be soon extinguished. And the people, when they marry, may have many times not so much the increase of their family in their design or wishes, as the gratification of an importunate appetite; yet since nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather its great Author) may be said to make this an end of the marriage, the the bridegroom and bride themselves do not.

Like those particularly of J. Casar: of whom it is reported, that, animadvers apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertasus ignariam suam, quod nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in atate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset. Suct.

b Some go to war ωσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν & κωνηγεσίαν ἀνθεωπων. Plut. Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war. Πολεμιθμέν, ινα εἰρήνην άγωμεν. Arist. Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quam pax quasita videatur. Cic.

c Oἱ ἀνθεωποι ἐ μόνον τ τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικέσιν, ἀκλα ε τ εἰς τὸν βίον, κλ. Arist.

d 'Ανδρί κ γυναικί φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἀνθεωπος φ τῆ φύσει συνδυας ικὸν μιακλον ἢ πολιτικόν. Id. 'Ως γ ἡ μαγνητις λίθωπερὸς ἐαυτην τ σίδηρον ἔλκει. ἐτα τὸ Ε θήλεων σῶμα — τὸ Ε ἀρρενων σῶμα πρὸς την μίξιν ἔλκει. S. Βας.

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforesaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the end itself a, the joint happiness of the conjuges, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself unhappy: no nor without a presumption of being more happy. For without an apprehension of some degree of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for fuch, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they think to better it. And indeed if their circumstances are such, as may inable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in good earnest resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and reciprocally to be helpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happiness b may justly be expected from this intimate union c, the interchange of affections, and a conspiration of all their counsels and measures d, the qualities and abilities of the one fex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pass over in silence those joys, which are truest when most conceald e, many things. there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the man, and yet require the delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the woman f: and fo, vicissim,

a That fure is a hard law in Plato, which injoins anexed agreas Indeias naons, cu i un Baudouro av ספו φύεως το σπαρέν. That mentiond in S. Hhared. fays otherwise: מ"ע לקוים ארם עונתו ואף כשאשתו מעוברת וכו. Many opinions are taken up upon flight reasons. When Ocellus Lucanus fays, 'Αυτάς τας δυνάμεις, & τα όργανα, η τας όρεξεις τας πρός την μίξιν ύπο θες δεδομένας άνθρώποις, έχ ήδονης ένεκα δεδοδ συμδέδηκεν, άκλα της είς τον αεί χρόνον διαμονής το γένος, how doth he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way? And so when Clemens Alex. shews his zeal against τας ακάςπες σποςας, τιν προς τας έγκύες ομιλίαν, &c. adding, ψιλη γ ήδονη, κάν ου γάμω παεαληφοή, παράνομος έτι, κλ. he does this because ο Μωτης απάγει των έγκυων της άνδρας; and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe any where to be found: Oun Ederas T hay av, Ede The valvar. (Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio. Gent. Herv.) Certainly the Jews understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that עונה mentiond in the law is explaind by Maim. in hilk. ish. Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting. Deus, cum cateras animantes, suscepto fœtu, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit; - ne feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, &c. that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. Latt. b Και το χρήσιμον είναι δοκεί, κ το κου ου τάυτη τη Φιλία. Arift כשאיש ואשה נוהגים כראוי שכינה ביניהם. Refh. hhokm. ε 'Εξως καθάπες ένδις ζών d True love is to be found in marriage, or no. διτία τμήματα-είς ταυτον άξμοτίεται. Ph. f. a homely, but true saying of a Jewish commentator. e Quod facere turpe non est modo occultà. f Έαν ηδ ή κοσμία κ έπιτικής, ε μόνον την δού της κοινωνίας παραμυid dicere obscanum est. Cic. Βίαν παρέξει τῷ ἀνδρί, ἀκλα κὸ ον τοῖς ἀκλοις ἀπασι ποκλήν τῆς ἐαυτῆς χρειαν ἐπιδείζεται, κλ. S. Chrys.

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the woman cannot but want many things, which require the more robust and active powers or greater capacity of the man². Thus, in lower life, whilst the wheel, the needle, $\mathcal{C}c$ imploy her, the plough or some trade perhaps demands the muscles and hardiness of him: and, more generally, if she inspects domestic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, spent frugally, and injoyd with neatness and advantage, he is busied in that profession, or the oversight and improvement of that estate, which must sustain the charge of all this; he presides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preserves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, $\mathcal{C}c$.

As then I founded the greater societies of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together; so may I found this less, but stricter alliance between the man and the woman in their joint-happiness. Nature

has a further aim, the preservation of the kind.

II. That marriages are made by some solemn contract, vow, or oath (and these perhaps attended with some pledge, or nuptial rites) d, by which the parties mutually ingage to live

 Διήρηται τὰ έργα, κλές τι έτεςα ἀνδρός, Ε γυναικός. ἐπαρκθσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ίδια. b See the conversation between Ischomachus and his wife in Xenophon. Arift. Plato (like most of the old Greeks and Romans) among many very fine things hath now and then some that are weak, and even abfurd; yet I cannot think, that by his community of women he meant any thing like that, which is faid, ap. Athen. to have been practifed παςα Τυρρίνοις έμτοπως τρυφήσασι ; or that his thought could be so gross, as Lactantius represents it : Sci icet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent. For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguished, and all industry and improvements are at an end. And beside that, many of the most substantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are destroyd at once. Siomnes omnium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, que ista confusio generis humani est? - Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nifi habitaverint semper unà? nisi devota mens, és servata invicem fides individuam fecerit caritatem, &c. Id. However it must be confest, that Plato has advanced more than was confistent with his own gravity, or with nature. The best excuse to be made for him, that I know of, is that in Athenaus, "Εοικεν ο Πλάτων μιλ τοῖς έσιν ἀνθεώπιις γεώψαι τές νόμες, ἀλλα τοις ὑπ' ἀυτε διαπλατομένοις: or perhaps to fay, that he was so intent upon Arengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men must live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear. d Every one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, confarreatione, coemptione, usu: of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the legitima tabella or at least consent of friends (which could not be given without some solemnity) preceded all, auspicia were usually taken, public notaries and witnesses assisted, &c. Among the Greeks men and women were espoused by mutual promises of fidelity: beside which there were witnesses, and dotal writings (Teoixão) ;

live together in love, and to be faithful, assisting, and the like, each to other, in all circumstances of health and fortune, till death parts them a. I take for granted. For all nations have some form or other upon these occasions: and even private contracts cannot be made without some words in which they are containd, nor perhaps without some kind of significant, tho private, ceremony between the lovers; which lose nothing of force with respect to them by their being both parties and witnesses themselves. Something must pass between them, that is declarative of their intentions, expresses their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and wife upon any other foot.

III. That intimate union, by which the conjuges become possess each of the other's person b, the mixture of their fortunes c, and the joint-relation they have to their children d, all strengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every att done in pursuance of a covenant, such as the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd, ratisfied, and as it were made de integro, and repeted.

Possession is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title must need be corroborated.

When two persons throw their all into one stock as joint-traders for life, neither of them can consistently with truth and honesty take his share out and be gone (i. e. dissolve the partnership) without the concurrence of the other; and sometimes it may not be easy, perhaps possible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the present case, if the marriage to be not altogether unfruitful, since both the parents are immediately related to the same child, that child is the medium of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the same blood with

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the child a, they themselves come to be of the same blood: and so that relation which at first was only moral and legal, becomes natural; a relation in nature, which can never cease, or be disannulled. It follows now that,

IV. Marrying, when there is little or no prospect of true happines from the match, and especially if there are plain presages of unhappines; after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preserve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friend-ship of a superior kind, and the like, are all wrong. Because the first of these is belying ones own sense of things, and has an air of distraction; or however it is to act as if that was the least and most trisling of all transactions in life, which is certainly one of the greatest and most delicate. And to offend in any of the other ways is to behave, as if the end of marriage was not what it is; as if no such league had been made between the persons married, as has been made, actually, and solemnly, and is still subsisting between them; as if they were not possest each of the other; their fortunes not interwoven; nor their children so equally related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to truth, is a sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the most express and solemn contracts, upon which persons, when they marry, do so far depend, as in confidence of their being religiously observed to alter quite their condition, begin a new thred of life, and risque all their fortune and happiness: I say, if such sacred compacts as these are allowed to be broken, there is an end of all faith; the obligation of oaths (not more binding than marriage vows) ceases; no justice can be administerd; and then what a diresul insluence must this have upon the affairs of mankind upon that, and other accounts e?

Allowance,

In respect of which that in Plutarch particularly is true, 'Η φύσις μίγνυσι Αμ΄ το σωμάτων ήμᾶςς

δ ἐξ ἐκατέρων μές Ακδεσα, κὰ τυικέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις λποδῶ τὸ γενόμθρον.

δ Socrates ab
adolescentulo quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum
eorum fecisset, acturum pænitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hichares alienus excipiet: illic perpetua solicitudo, contextus querelarum,—incertus liberorum eventus. Val.M.

κρόνω συνηθείας εντεκέσης πάθω ἀισθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φίλειν κὰ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμθρον. Plut.

d It is visible that polygamy, pellicate, &c. must be included here. They are not only inconsistent
with our forms and the very letter of the marriage-contract, but with the essence of marriage, which
lies in such a union and love as can only be between two. Aristotle doth not allow there can be
even perfect friendship between more than two: much less therefore, perfect love. Πολλος είναι φίλον, κατά την τελείαν φιλίαν, κῶν εὐδέχεθ, ὡσπερ ἐοθ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν άμα. Eth. Ἑςι ρὸ φίλω άλω άντός. Ibid.

ε Facunda culpa sacula nuptias Primùm inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hôc
fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit. Hor.

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Allowance, by fect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary failings. A person's age, health, estate, or other circumstances may be such, and without any fault, that he or she cannot do what they would; or persons instead of that one of them may come to want the pity and assistance of the other. In this case (which requires the philosophy and submission proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to bear with, but also to comfort, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happiness proposed, which consists not only in positive pleasures, but also in lessening pains and wants; whilst the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have defignedly forborn to mention that authority of a husband over his wife, which is usually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; because I think it has been carried much too high. I would have them live so far upon the level, as (according to my constant lesson) to be governd both by reason. If the man's reason be stronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly supposed to be), the woman will be obliged upon that score to pay a deference, and submit to him b.

Having now considered the man and woman between themselves, I proceed in the order of nature to consider them as parents; and to see (in a few propositions following) how things will be carried between them and their children, as also between other relations, coming at first from the same bed, if truth and matters of fast (to be named, where the argument shall call for them) are not denied.

V. Parents ought to educate their children, take the best care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to assist them. Because otherwise they do not carry themselves towards their children as being what they are, children and theirs: they do not do what they would desire to have done to themselves, were they again to pass through that seeble and tender state; or perhaps what has been done to them c: and beside, they transgress the law established by nature for the preservation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a law, which is in sorce among all the other tribes of animals, so far as there is occasion for it.

^{*} Κρατεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἀνδρα τὰ γωναικὸς ἐχ ὡς δεσπότων κτήματ, ἀκὰ ὡς ψυχὴν σώματ, συμπαθεντα ε συμπεφυκότα τῷ ἐυνόια. Plut. (A sentence, which deserves to be written in letters of gold.) 'Οπε συ Γάι. , ἐγὼ Γαία. — ὁπε συ κύξιος κὰ ὁικοδεσπότης, ε ἐγὼ κυρία ε ὁικοδεσποινα. Αρ. eund. Καία φύσιν οἱ ἀρρένες ἐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀκλα κὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀκλοις ζώοις ἀρχεσι. Plato ap. Diog. L. ο Πολυπλέθες δὲ σοι γυίας Λειψω. πατρὸς ἢ ταῦτ ἐδεξάμων πάρα. Eur. Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (si quis est pudor) alligaverunt. V. M.

Χ 2

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Not to do what is here required, is not barely to act against truth and nature, not only such an omission as is mentiond in sect. I. pr. V. but a heinous instance of cruelty. If any one can deny this, let him better consider the case of an infant, neglected, helpless, and having nothing so much as to solicite for him, but his cries and (that which will do but little in this world) his innocence: let him think what it would be to turn a child, tho a little grown up, out of doors, destitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly a, or what to do; and whether it is not the same thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body else hereafter, or (in general) to conflict with want and mifery: let him reflect a while upon the circumstances of poor orphans b left unprovided for, to be abused by every body c, &c. and then let him fay, whether it is possible for a parent to be so void of bowels, as not to be moved with these considerations; or what epithet he deserves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have done well, those instances ought to be placed among particular providences: as when a vessel at sea, without pilot or sailor, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the care, but the early care of parents is required, left death should prevent them; death, which skips none, and surprises many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the most eertain and obvious of all truths.

VI. In order to the good of children, their education, &cc. there must be some authority over them lodged by nature in the parents: I mean, the nature of the case is such, as necessarily requires there should be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good. At first if some body did not nurse, feed, clothe, and take care of children, the interval between their first and last breath would be very short. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their parents: to do this is their duty by the foregoing proposition. But then they must do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainty an act of authority, to order and dispose of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the best of one's judgment.

As the child grows up, the case is still the same in some degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond mature; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himself, but what path to choose he knows not; cannot

Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi sistere detur, in the poet's language.

Les Cription of the Hμας ὁς Φανικὸν in Homer.

Les Cription of the Hμας ὁς Φανικὸν in Homer.

Les Cription of the Hμας ὁς Φανικὸν in Homer.

Learns to shave upon the head of an orphan.

distinguish

distinguish his safety and his danger, his advantages and disadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he must be warned, and directed, and watched still by his parents, or some body intrusted by them, or else it might have been possibly much better for him to have expired under the midwise's hands, and pre-

vented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himself capable of governing himself, by how much the more he thinks himself capable, by so much the less capable may he be, and the more may he want to be governed. The avenues of sense are opend: but the judgment, and intellectual faculties are not ripend but with time and much practice. The world is not eafily known by perfons of adult abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it. yet they find things in it so intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for them to resolve, what measures are fittest to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, past their nuts, cannot be supposed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themselves, any thing else but a prey to the villain who first seizes upon them. Instead of judgment and experience we find commonly in youth such things as are remotest from them, childish appetites, irregular passions, peevish and obstinate humors; which require to be fubdued, and taught to give way to wholfom counsels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their own humors and follies, but also to those of their compa-They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers misconduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increases prodigiously. judgment therefore of the parents must still interpose, and preside, and guide through all these stages of infancy, childhood, and youth; according to their power improving the minds of their children, breaking the strength of their inordinate passions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and shewing them the way which they ought to be found in.

These things are so in fast, and a parent cannot acquit himself of the duty imposed upon him in the preceding proposition, if he acts so as to deny them: but then he cannot act so as not to deny them (that is, so as to subdue the passions of the child, break his stomach, and cause him to mind his instructions) with-

out some sort of discipline, and a proper severity; at least very rarely a.

To all this, and much more that might be urged, must be superadded, that the fortunes of children, and their manner of setting out in the world

For certainly, when it can be, Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium sun sponte reste facere, quam alieno metu. Ter.

depending

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depending (commonly) upon their parents, their parents must upon this account be their directors, and govern their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premisses, that even parents have not properly a dominion over their children, such as is intended sect. VI. prop. V. from which this parental authority is a very different thing. This only respects the good of the children, and reaches not beyond the means, which the parents, acting according to the best of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find most conducive to that end: but dominion only respects the will of the lord, and is of the same extent with his pleasure. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itself evil: and if they do, the children ought not to obey a. Nor may they do any thing, what they please, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expose them b: and when they come to be men or women, and are possest of estates, which either their parents (or any body else) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the same properties in these with respect to their parents, which they have with respect to other people: the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the rest of the world have. So that what occurs in the place abovementiond remains firm, notwithstanding any thing that may be objected from the case of parents and children. moreover,

N. 2. They, who found monarchy in paternal authority, gain little advantage with respect to despotic or absolute power. A power to be exercised for the good of subjects (like that of parents for the good of their children), and that principally, where they are incapable of helping themselves, can only be derived from hence. The father of his countrey cannot by this way of reasoning be demonstrated to be the absolute lord d of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to dispose of them as he pleases. The authority of parents goes not this length. Beside, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the eldest son should have the same authority, be it what it will, over his brothers

[•] Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπζθεντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ὰ κὰ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις ἐ πέιθονται. Hierocl.
• The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practifed by the Persians, Greeks, &c. Romulus's law only restraind it, but did not abolish it. For it injoind his citizens only, ἀπασαν ἀρρενα γενεὰν κλτεξοῦν, κὰ θυγατέρων τὰς πρωτογόνες: λόπελων τῶν μηθεν τῶν γενομθρων νεώτερον τριετές, πλην εἶτι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. Dion. Halicarn. And beside, ἀπασαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἔδωκεν ἔξεσίαν πατρὶ καθ΄ ὑιᾶ, κὰ παρὰ πάντα τὰ Ε΄ βίε κρόνον, κλ. Ide τ' Ρωμάιοις ἔθεν ἰδιον ἐςι κτῆμια ζώνταν ἔτι τὰ πατέρων, ἀλλα κὰ τὰ κρήματα κὰ τὰ σώματα τὰ πάιδων ὅ, τι βέλον) Διατιθέναι τοῖς πατράσιν λόποθέθολαι. Id. These are instances of such laws, as should not be, by prop. IV. sect. VII.

d Roma patrem patria Ciceronem libera dixit. Juv. ε΄ Ως λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἀιξον. Arr.

and

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and fifters: and much less, that the beir of the first parent should in succeeding generations have it over all the collaterals. The very relation between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in effect to nothing, and this notion with it.

VII. As parents are obliged to educate their children, &c. so children ought to consider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the first and great Cause²) of their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born. I know children are apt (not very respectfully, or prudently) to say; that their parents did not beget them for their sakes, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their own pleasure. But they, who make this a pretext for their disobedience, or disregard, have not sufficiently thought, what pain, what trouble, how many frights and cares b, what charges, and what self-denials parents undergo upon the score of their children: and that all these, if parents only rushed into pleasure, and consulted nothing else, might easily be avoided, by negleting them and their welfare c. For as to those parents, who do this, let them speak for themselves: I shall not be their advocate.

VIII. A great submission and many grateful acknowledgements, much respect and piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an authority in parents (as before) this must be answerd by a proportionable submission on the other side: since an authority, to which no obedience is due, is equal to no authority.

If the thought of annihilation be generally disagreeable, as it seems to be, then merely to be conscious of existence must have in it something desireable. And if so, our parents must be considered as the authors, or at least the instruments of that good to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unless they are treated with distinction and great regard, being to us what no other is, or ever can be.

God, as the first cause of all beings, is often styled metaphorically, or in a large sense of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our selves towards Him as being such, we cannot (according to sect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.) but adore Him. Something analogous, tho in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring there seems to be in the case between parents and their children. If that requires divine worship, this will demand a great respect and reverence e.

Nor

E Utinam oculos în pettora poffent Inserere, & patrias intus deprendere curas.

C I confess, in Seneca's words, minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nist accesserint alia, qua prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis officiis hoc ratum facerent.

d Tò αἰθάνεως ὅτι ζῆ τ ἀθέων καθ΄ ἀυτό φύσθ ρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωή. Arist. The sense of life (of being alive) seems to be something more than what Seneca calls muscarum ac vermium bonum.

e Οὶ πάλαιοι τ Ῥωμαίων νόμοι, κλ, — οἱ ρ ἔτι παλαιότεςοι τουῦτο τὰς γονέας ἐσέφθησαν, ὡς κὴ θεὰς αὐτὰς ὁςμῆσαι καλεῖν. Simpl.

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Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his parent, can have any difposition to worship his Creator. The precept of honoring parents, to be sound
in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiment:
for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that
of worshipping the Deity. In laying children under this obligation they have
all conspired, the scarce in anything else.

The admonitions of a parent must be of the greatest weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occasions to consider things, and observe events; hath cooler passions, as he advances in years, and sees things more truly as they are; is able in a manner to predict what they themselves will desire to have done, when they shall arrive at his age; may upon these accounts, ordinarily, be presumed to be a more competent judge than themselves, and lastly from his relation to them must be more sincerely inclined to tell them truth, than any other person in the world can be supposed to bee. I say, if young people resect well upon these things, they cannot in prudence, or even kindness to themselves, but pay the utmost deference to the advertisements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if parents want the affishance of their children, especially in the declension of their age, and when they verge towards a helpless condition again they cannot deny or withhold it, but they must at the same time deny to requite the care and tenderness shewd by their parents towards them in their helpless and dangerous years; that is, without being ungrateful; and that is, without being unjust, if there be injustice in ingratitude f. Nor (which is more still) can they do this with-

The fame author reckons among Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum. Cic. those things, that are laudable, parentem vereri ut deum (neq; enim multo secus parens liberis). Odd αυ πάλιν μείζων επίδειξις άθευ γέγους τ του γονείς ολιγωρίας κο πλημμελείας. Plut. τες - λέγκοι κὸ ἀδκοιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμών μετα θέκς πρώτην Ε μεγίτην ή τε Φύσις, ὁ, τε την Φύσιν σωζων νόμι άπεδωκε. Plut. Γονέων τιμιν μετά την προς Θεον δευτέραν έταξε [Μώυσης]. Fof. We indeed usually divide the two tables of Moses's law so, that the fifth commandment (Honor thy father and thy mother) falls in the second: but the Jews themselves divide them otherwise; as sivas of in wias yeaping the apport Θεὸν κὸ πατέρα. - Επαντός, τὸ ἡ τέλ Φ γονείς, κλ. Ph. Jud. Agreeably to this, Josephus says that οί δέκα λόγοι were written upon two tables, ἀνα πέντε μθρ ἐις ἐκατέραν [πλάκα]: Abarbanel reckons the fifth commandment the last of the first table; and says their Hhakamim do so: and in the offices of that nation these commandments are mentiond as written משה חמשה חמשה. ma igitur & optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra, &c. Val. Max. d'o xeno, rama e נואל אביך ויגרך: ask thy father, πάντ' άφωιζών, το γήςα προςίθησι την επιτήμου. Plut. f Δόξε δί αν προφης γονεύσι δεῖν μάλις ἐπαρκεῖν, ως ὀφειλεντας, and he will show thee. Deut. ε၌ τοις αίτίοις 🕏 είναι. — εξτιμήν ζ καθάπες θεοις.. Arist. Among the ancients θεεπίηςια and τροφεία were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to his parents שגמלוהו is called צמד is called HOXW YUT IN S. Hhar. out

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out denying what they may in their turn require of their children. In effect they do thus by their actions deny that to have been, which has been; and those things to be possible, which may be hereafter.

Not only bodily infirmities of parents, but such decays of their minds as may happen, ought to be pitied, their little hastinesses and mistakes dissembled, and

their defects supplied, decently b.

IX. That 'soer' or affection on both sides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and vicissim', ought to be observed and followd, when there is no reason to the contrary.

We have seen before, and it is evident from the terms, that sense ought to govern, when reason does not interpose; i. e. when there is no reason, why it should not. If then this soprin or mutual affection be an inward sense of the case between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is felt by them, and fits upon their natures d, it may be comprised in prop. XIV, and XV. of fect. III. But whether it is or not, the same may be said (which must be repeted in another place) of every affection, passion, inclination in general. For when there is no reason, why we should not comply with them, their own very follicitation, and the agreeableness we apprehend to be in complying, are preponderating arguments. This must be true, if something is more than nothing; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reason to deny. So that if this sopy be only taken as a kind of attraction, or tendence, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet still this physical motion or sympathy ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a good reason for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a suggestion of nature, which should always be regarded, when it is not superseded by something superior; that is, by reason. But further, here reason doth not only not gainfay, by its filence consent, and so barely leave its right of commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in strongly to abet and inforce it, as designd for a reasonable end: and therefore not to act according to it is not to act according to reason, and to deny that to be which is.

X. The same is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in some proportion or other, each for other. To this they ought to accommodate themselves

Y

Toist γίνε καὶ τὰς γονεῖς, οἶκς ἀν ἔυξαιο καὶ σεκυτὸν γενέος τὰς σεκυτᾶ παῖδας. Ifocr. b That epithet pius (pius Æneas) shines in Virgil. 'Posita est inter parentes ac libercs honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint. Sen. d That is, methinks, a moving description in S. Basil (Πεςὶ πλεονεξ.) of a conflict which a poor man had within himselt, when he had no other way left to preserve life but by selling one of his children.

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where reason does not prohibit. The proof of this affertion is much the same with that of the foregoing mut. mutand.

The foundation of all natural relation is laid in marriage 2. For the busband and wife having folemnly attachd themselves each to other, having the same children, interests, &c. become so intimately related as to be reckond united, one flesh, and in the laws of nations many times one person b. Certainly they are fuch with respect to the posterity, who proceed from them jointly c. The children of this couple are related between themselves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the same blood with their common parents, they are all of the same blood (truly consanguinei), the relations, which they respectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their center. This is the nearest relation that can bed, next to those of man and wife, parents and their children, who are immediately related by contact or rather continuity of blood, if one may speak so. The relation between the children of these children grows more remote and dilute, and in time wears out. For at every remove the natural tincture or sympathy may be supposed to be weakend; if for no other reason, yet for this. Every remove takes off half the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the fon of A and B, D the fon of C, E of D, F of E: and let the relation of C to A and B be as 1: then the relation of D to A and B will be but; because C is but one of the parents of D, and so the relation of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the same manner it will be found, that the relation of E to A and B is 4 (or half of the half), of F 1/8: and so on. So that the relation, which descendents in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, decreasing thus in geometrical proportion e, the relation between them of collateral lines, which passes and is made out through the grand parents, must foon be reduced to an inconsiderable matter f.

Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis, &c. Cic.

Mulier conjuncta viro concessit in unum. Lucr. ΤΕΝΠ ΧΕΙΧ ΠΠΟ. Αρ. R. Elaz. Αzq. & pass.

[Φιλία] Φάινεται πολυειδης είναι, κὰ ἡςτᾶοζ πᾶσα ἀπ τὰ πατςικῆς οἱ γονεῖς μὰ ἢ σέςγεσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἐαυτῶν τι ὀντα τὰ ἢ τέκνα τὰς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ ἀπέιναν τι ἀντα. — Αδελφοὶ ἢ ἀλήλες [Φιλεσι] τῷ ἀκ τὰ αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι.

Ανέψιοι ἢ ℰ οἱ λοιποὶ συγξενεῖς — τῷ λπὸ τὰ αὐτῶν είναι γίνονται δὶ οἱ μθρὶ ὀικειότεςςι, οἱ δὶ ἀλλοτριώτεςοι, κτλ. Ατίςτ.

In eodem domicilio, antequam nascerer, habitavi: in iisdem incunabulis infantia tempora peregi: eosdem appellavi parentes, &c. Val. Max.

There is no name for any descendent, who is more than trinepos.

It becomes ἀμυθεά. Andr. Rhod.

Truths concerning Families, &c. 167

If then we suppose this affection or sympathy, when it is permitted to act regularly and according to nature, no reason intervening to exalt or abate it, to operate with a strength nearly proportionable to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly discern the degrees of that obligation, which persons related lie under, to assist each other, from this motive.

But there are many circumstances and incidents in life capable of affecting this obligation, and altering the degrees of it. A man must weigh the wants of himself and his own family against those of his relations: he must consider their sex, their age, their abilities and opportunities, how capable they are of good offices, how they will take them, what use they will make of them, and the like. He, who designs to act agreeably to truth, may find many such things demanding his regard; some justly moving him to compassion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that next after our parents and own offspring a nature directs us to be helpful, in the first place to brothers and sisters, and then to other relations according to their respective distances in the genealogy of the family, preserably to all foreigners b. And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants should be but little; yet we ought to preserve our affection towards them, and a disposition to serve them, as far as we bonestly and prudently can, and whenever the proper opportunity shall present itself. This nature and truth require.

SECT. IX. Truths belonging to a Private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.

I. EVERY man knows (or may c know) best, what his own faculties, and perfonal circumstances are, and consequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himself. Because he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge of himself, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by restexion and experiments of himself to find, what his own abilities, passions, &c. truly are d.

II. He

and his felf. Otherwise considered distinctly, the one of them ought always to be the first care of the other.

b Mn δε κασιγνήτω ίσον ποιείοζ εταίζου. Hef.

c For many I acknowledge there are, who seem to be without reflexion, and almost thought. Τίς ἀγνοεῖ την οἰκείων φύσιν; πολλοι τάχα ζ πάντες πλην ολίγων. S. Chrys.

d Nec se quasiverit extra.

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II. He, that well examines himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true 2.

1. That there are fome things common to him not only with fensitive animals and vegetable, but also with inanimate matter: as, that his body is subject the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being separated, or dislocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impressions of violence.

2. That there are other things common to him with vegetables and fensitive animals: as, that he comes from a feed (such the original animalculum may be taken to be); grows, and is preserved by proper matter, taken in and distributed through a fet of vessels; ripens, flourishes, withers, decays, dies; is subject to diseases, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nourishment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has other properties common only to him and the fensitive tribe: as, that he receives by his senses the notice of many external objects, and things; perceives many affections of his body; finds pleasure from some, and pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himself, and acting: that is, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diseases, and the causes of death, but also feels them b; is not only capable of nourishment, and many other provisions made for him, but also injoys them; and, beside, may contribute much himself to either his injoyments, or his sufferings.

4. That beside these he has other faculties, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mass of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the sensitive kind, at least in any considerable degree; by the help of which he investigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner set down in sect. III. or, in a word, that he is animal rationale.

5. That he is conscious of a liberty in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is such a being as is described sect. I. prop. I. a being, whose acts may be morally good or evil. Further,

6. That there are in him many inclinations and aversions; from whence flow such affections, as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which prompt him to act this or that way.

7. That he is sensible of great defects and limitations in the use of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occasions: as also, that his passions

a nostra norimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr.

b Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: & non ferre non est viri. Sen. who condescends here to be something like other men. As also when he says, Alia sunt, qua sapientem feriunt, etiamsi non pervertunt; ut dolor capitis, &c. Hac non nego sentire sapientem, &c.

2 ui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, excessive. In other words, that he is in many respects fallible, and infirm b.

Lastly, that he desires to be happy: as every thing must, which understands

what is meant by that word.

III. If he doth find these things to be so, then if he will act as he ought to do (that

is, agreeably to truth and fact) he must do such things as these.

his members c to reason; and try every thing by it. For in the climax set down he cannot but observe, that as the principle of vegetation is something above the inertia of mere matter, and sense something above that again; so reason must be something above all these co, that his uppermost faculty is reason c. And from hence it follows, that he is one of those beings mentiond sect III. prop. XI. and that the great law imposed upon him is to be governed by reason.

Any man may prove this to himself by experiment, if he pleases. Because he cannot (at least without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reason against the doing of it than for it. When men do err against reason, it is either because they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and use their

reason, or not enough; or because their faculties are defective.

And further, by sect. III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right reafon, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the same thing. We cannot do the one, but we must do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or so as not to deny any truth, and that is we cannot act right, unless we endeavour to act according to right reason, and are led by it.

Therefore not to subject one's fensitive inclinations and passions to reason is to deny either that he is rational, or that reason is the supreme and ruling faculty in

Pρωπόν τινα ἀναμάςτηλον. Chrys. c The author of S. Hhared. reckons eight, the right use of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, nose, ear, hand, foot, and tria sint hac, esse, vivere, intelligere: & lapis est, & pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, autpecus intelligere: qui autem intelligit, eum & esse vivere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quàm id cui duo vel unum dest. S. Aug. Thus reason sets man above the other visible orders of beings, &c. e Prasto est domina omnium & regina ratio—. Hac ut imperet illi parti animi, qua obedire debet, id videndum est viro. Cic.

his nature: and that is to defert mankind, and to deny himself to be what he knows himself by experience and in his own conscience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body should say he was not.

If a beast could be supposed to give up his sense and activity; neglect the calls of hunger, and those appetites by which he (according to his nature) is to be guided; and refusing to use the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preserve his life, lie still in some place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a plant; this would be much the same case, only not so bad, as when a man cancels his reason, and as it were strives to metamorphize himself into a brute. And yet this he does, who pursues only sensual objects, and leaves himself to the impulses of appetite and passion. For as in that case the brute neglects the law of his nature, and affects that of the order below him: so doth the man disobey the law of his nature, and put himself under that of the lower animals; to whom he thus makes a defection b.

If this be so, how wretchedly do they violate the order of nature, and transgress against truth, who not only reject the conduct of reason to sollow sense and passion, but even make it subservient to them c; who use it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends d, but never apply it to the consideration of those ends, or the nature of those means, whether they are just or unjust, right or wrong? This is not only to deviate from the path of nature, but to invert it, and to become something more than brutish; brutes with reason, which must be the most enormous and worst of all brutes. When the brute is governed by sense and bodily appetites, he observes his proper rule; when a man is governed after that manner in defiance of reason, he violates his; but when he makes his rational powers to serve the brutish part, to assist and promote it, he heightens and increases the brutality, inlarges its field, makes it to act with greater force and effect c, and becomes a monster.

His duty then, who is conscious to himself of the truth of those things recounted under the foregoing proposition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to see

^{*} Abjecto homine in sylvestre animal transire. Έν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωςιζόμεθα; τῶν Ͽηρίων.——
Όςα ἐν μή τι πῶς ὡς Ͽηςίον ποιήσης. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem oficii quastionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque belluis antecedat. Cic. μος την τῶν Ͽηρίων ἀλογίων ἐνπεσών. Chrys. A thing too often done. ②ua enim libido, qua avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine—ratione perficitur? Cotta ap. Cic. Δ Something like him. who in Chrysosom's words, Δή τοιάκων καταθύει τὸ σκάφ. e This makes Cotta say, Satius suit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam: with other bitter things. Tho an answer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward: A deo tantùm rationem habemus, si modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis.

1 that

that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the expense of his reason; but that all his affections, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such objects, and in such measure, time, and place, as that allows. Every word and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by reason. This is the foundation and indeed the sum of all virtue.

2. He must take care not to bring upon himself c want, diseases, trouble; but, on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth d (that is, without denying matters of fact, and such propositions, as have been already or will in the sequel here be shewn to be true, conserning God, property, the superiority of reason, &c.) To explain this limination: if a man should consider himself as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diseases, and the rest; then, to supply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at last, in vindication of himself, say, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxious to hunger, &c. and to act otherwise would be incompliance with truth"; this would not be sufficient to justify him. The grand rule requires, that what he does, should interfere with no truth: but what he does interferes with several. For by taking that, which (by the supposition) is his neighbour's, he acts as if

* This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or a modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue, that Aristotle banishes it out of the commonwealth. Όλως μ αιχεολογίαν οπ τ πόλεως, ώσπερ άλλο τι, δες τ νομοθέτων έξοςίζον οπ Ε β έυχερως λέγειν ότιδο τ άιχρων κ το ποιείν σύνεγίυς. reason: which is a very different thing from that superstitious preciseness, which carries things too far. As v. g. when the Jews not contented to condemn זבלות הפה or דבור נבלות הפה, and every where to express גורל האסור, go fo far as to comprehend under it אפי שיחה קלה שארם משיח מוציא מלד. לבטלדה כמוציא זרע לבטלדה וכו' , and to add , מוציא מלד. ings of this kind to be feen, many of them, among those, which R. El. de Vidas has collected: as that particularly, כן ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציאו לבטלה וכו'. What Ælian reports of Anaxagoras and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed: with many other unnecessary austerities, which might be added. אין אני לי מי לי ם. P. Ab. d Προσδείται τέτων [των κπτος αγαθων] ο ανθεωπινο βίο πύριαι οξ εισίν αι κατ αξετην ενέργοαι τ ευδαιμονίας. Arift. They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely axorgia, distinguishing between τα ημέτεςα and τα δ σώμαι. making these latter to be έδεν προς ήμας, and leaving the body as it were to itself (ἀυτο [σωμάτιοι] μεςιμνάτω,—εί τι πάχι): they, I say, might injoy their own philofophy; but they would scarce gain many proselytes now a days, or ever persuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many stories that are told of some old philosophers: as that of Anaxarchus, when he was put to a most cruel death by Nicocreon; & Φροντίσαντα τ τιμωςίας, ειπείν-Πτίσε τ 'Αναξάεχε θύλακον, 'Ανάξαρχον ή & πλήτθεις. See Epict. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert. and others.

it was not his neighbour's, but his own, and therefore plainly contradicts fast, and those truths in sect. VI, VII. respecting property: when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny dimself to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furnishing himself with conveniences, or at least necessaries, which are consistent with property and all truth: and he can only be said to deny himself to be what he is by omitting to provide against his wants, when he omits to provide against them by some of those ways; and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 28. Ans. to Obj. 3.)

So again, when a man does any thing to avoid present suffering or dangers contrary to the express dictates of reason, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he acts as a sensitive being only, not as being what he really is, sensitive-rationalis. But when there is no good argument against his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himself only as a being, who needs that which is to be obtaind by doing it: and in that case, if he should not do it, he would be false to himself, and deny the circumstances of his own nature.

Certainly when a man may without transgressing the limits prescribed consult his own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not; and especially when he takes a counter-course, and exposes himself a, he forgets many of the foregoing truths, and treats himself as not being what he is. This is true with respect to futurity, as well as the present time: and indeed by how much suture time is more than the present, by so much the more perhaps ought that to be regarded. At least injoyments ought to be taken and adjusted in such a manner, that no one should preclude, or spoil more, or greater to come.

It may easily be understood here, that those evils, which it is not in a man's power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear patiently and decently, i. e. as such; and moreover, such as are made by this means lighter b: for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the effect must be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; especially the last, great one c.

3. He must consider even bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations as intimations, which many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to. What is said before of the subjection of passions and appetites to reason must always be rememberd. They are not to proceed from unjustifiable causes, or terminate in wrong objects;

Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa: quo nihil potest esse stultius.—In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est. Cic.

b Levius sit patientia, Quicquid corrigere est nefas. Hos.

c Μιλέτη θανάτε was a great man's definition of philosophy.

not be unseasonable or immoderate. Being thus regulated, set to a true biass, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become such as are here intended; gentle ferments working in our breasts, without which we should settle in inactivity and what I think may be taken for just motives and good arguments to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has not only a superior faculty of reason, but also an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are contained many propensions and aversions, these cannot be denied to be any more than that; tho they must be taken indeed for what they really are, and not more. When they are checked by reason and truth, or there lies a reason against them (as there always will, when they are not within the foresaid restrictions), they must be taken as closed with this circumstance, as things overruled and disabled: but when they are under no prohibition from the superior powers and truth, then they are to be considered as unsettered and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been observed upon a particular occasion before p. 165.) when there is no reason against the complying with our senses, there is always one for it by prop. XIV. sect. III. the inclination itself, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this case uppermost, and in course takes the commanding post: and then a man must act as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this section.

The springs of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of duty, or a prospect of some pleasure or prosit to be obtained, some evil or danger to be avoided; that is, either the reasonableness of what is done, or the manner, in which something doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are sounded either in reason, or passion and inclination. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being so, what should hinder, when reason does not work, but that the inserior springs should retain their nature, and act.

Bodily inclinations and passions, when they observe their due subordination to reason, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were assessor to it upon the throne, are of admirable use in life, and tend many times to noble ends. This is applicable to the irascible, as well as the concupiscible affections and the whole animal system. Love of that which is amiable, compassion b toward the miserable and helpless, a natural abborrence and resentment compassion between the concupation of the same and the miserable and helpless, a natural abborrence and resentment compassion between the same and the miserable and helpless, a natural abborrence and resentment compassion between the same and the same

Z

^{2 &#}x27;H οργή — ὑπνηλον ἡμῶν διεγέιζει. Chrys.

b When the Stoics say, that a wise man may relieve one, who wants his help, without pitying him; I own indeed he may, but I very much doubt whether he would. If he had not some compassion, and in some measure selt the ails or wants of the other, I scarce know how he should come to take him for an object of his charity.

c 'O μεν ἐρ' δις δεῖ ὀεριζόμεν , ἔτι ἡ ε ὡς δεῖ, ε ὁτε, ε ὁσον χεόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. Arist. Το be angry under these conditions is a different thing from rage, and those transports which perhaps scarce comply with any one of them: such as that of Alexander, who, because his ἐρώμεν died, commanded the Αταληπεῖα to be all burnt. Arr.

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of that which is villainous or vitious or base a, fear b of evils, are things, which duly tempered have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well subsist. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed these conatus's, these tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to dispose us for action, when there are no arguments of a higher nature to move us. So far are they, rightly managed, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the philosopher, who pretends to absolute apathy, maims nature, and sets up for a half-man, or I don't know what c.

I must confess however, that our passions are so very apt to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an exast discipline, that by way of prevention or caution it is advisable rather to affect a degree of apathy, or to recede more from the worse extreme d. This very proposition itself, which, when reason is absent, places sense and inclination in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our passions, or give them their full carreer; because if we do, they may (and will) carry us into such excesses, such dangers and mischiefs, as may sadly affect the sensitive part of us: that part itself, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examind; if reason is on their side, or stands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I say): in other cases we must be deaf to their applications, strongly guard against their emotions, and in due time prevent their rebelling against the sovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I shall tire you with repetitions, that from what is said here and just before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like best, among present injoyments, meats, drinks, &c. so far as they are *innocent*; but all those *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to secure to themselves a comfortable and pleasant being, may be justified, and that obs. under prop. XIII. in sect. II. strengthend.

If

There is, according to Tully, Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus.

Φοδέμεθα δηλονότι τὰ φοδερά. — φοδέμεθα διου πάντα τὰ κακά· διον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον. — ἐνια ρ ε δεῖ φοδεῖας, ε καλόν· τὸ δὲ μὰ, ἀισκρὸν, κλ. Arift. When one called Xenophanes coward, because he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολογεῖ πάνο δειλὸς ἔιναι πρὸς τὰ ἀισκρὰ κỳ ἀτολμω.

Plut.

A wise man is not ἀπαθὰς, but μετριοπαθής. Arift. ap. Diog. L.

Δεῖ τ΄ τον. Αγίβτ.— In the same chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but set down here. Σκοπεῖν δεῖ πρὸς ὰ ἀυτοὶ ἐυκατάφοροὶ ἐσμεν.— εἰς τὸμοαντίον δ΄ ἑαυτὰς ἀφέλκειν.— ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διετραμμένα τ΄ ξύλων ἀρθῶντες ποιᾶσιν. And after, Έν παντὶ ἡ μάλιςα φυλακτεον τὰ ἀδὸ, ε΄ την ήδονήν.
ἐ ρ ἀδέκας οι κρίνομεν ἀυτήν.

If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with reason and truth, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to deny it: but if it is not, to use it as it is, is to consider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this must be to comply with it. The humoring of such appetites, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reason, seems to be the very means, by which the Author of nature intended to sweeten the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well mustle himself up against sun-shine and blue sky, and expose himself bare to rains and storms and cold, as debar himself of the innocent delights of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

4. He must use what means he can to cure his own defects, or at least to prevent the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper distance is even mortify, where mortification is necessary is, and always carry about him the sense of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform himself to the seventh particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be true, which he is supposed to have found true in himself); denies a defect to be what it is, to be something which requires to be supplied, or amended; and is guilty of an omission, that will fall under sect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention some precautions, with some kinds and degrees of mortification or self-denial, which men will commonly find to be necessary. But I shall not prescribe; leaving them, who best know their own weak places and

diseases, to select for themselves the proper remedies.

I shall only take notice, that since the self-denial here recommended can only respect things in themselves lawful and not unreasonable, and in favor of such our bare inclinations have been allowed to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to deny ones self or inclinations inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow those inclinations might otherwise be right; yet in these circumstances and under this view there arises a good reason against it, and they, according to the established rule, must therefore give way: which is all that is intended c.

[&]quot;Aγεσιλάφ μέχει τ ὀφθαλμῶν πεοσελθών ὁ ἔςως, ἐντᾶνθα ἔςη ἐπὶ θύεαις τ ψυχῆς. Max. Tyr.—

To appoint things, as the fewish Doctors have done, to be סייג לתורד, or סייג לתורד, or כרי להרחיק אר שוות, would be right, if they were judiciously chosen, and not so very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly just: as that איסחכל ארם באשת איש ובשאר some of their cautions are certainly just: as that אריות פן ינקש בם what should a man do to live? אריות פן ינקש בו monkery, no superstitious or phantastical mortifications are here recommended.

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The last clause of the proposition takes in a great compass. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what they are, and consequently what others of the same kind with themselves also are, not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather dissident of themselves: not to censure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-severe in punishing or exacting justice a, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, mansuete: and so forth.

7. He ought to examine b his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has transgressed, to repent. That is, if the transgression be against his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make reparation, or at least as far as he can: in other cases, when that which is done cannot be recalled, or repaird, or terminates in himself only, to live however under a sense of his fault, and to prove by such acts as are proper, that he desires forgiveness, and heartily wishes it undone; which is as it were an essay towards the undoing of it d, and all that now can be e: and lastly, to use all possible care not to relapse. All this is involved in the idea of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it presents itself to a rational mind. For such a mind cannot approve what is unreasonable, and repugnant to truth; that is, what is wrong, or a fault: nay more, it cannot but disapprove it, detest it. No rational animal therefore can act according to truth, the true nature of himself and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at least shew himself to be penitent f.

If when a man is criminal, he doth not behave himself as such; or, which is the same, behaves himself as being not such, he opposes truth considently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is supposed to find himself to be, is to act as one who is in danger of relapsing: which is to be upon his guard for the suture.

6. He must labor to improve his rational faculties by such means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and consistent with his circumstances. If it be a disadvantage to be obnoxious to error, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know such truths as may prevent this: if so, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing, more such truths? and then again, not to endeavour to improve

^{* (}which words I understand in the sense, that Rashi seems to put upon them, Gen. xliv. 10.)

* Πῆ παρέβην; τι δ΄ ἔξεξα; τί μοι δεον ἐκ ἐτελέωη;

* Αμτ. carm.

* τις ης εἰς τὰ ἀγῶνα Ε΄ βίε παρελθων ἀπτωτ Ε΄ ἔμεινε; τίς δ΄ ἐχ ὑποσκελιθείς;

ἐυδάιμων ὁ μὰ πολλάκις. Ph. Jud.

* Quem panitet peccasse, penè est innocens. Sen.

* Ενεπα a Jew says, τησας; ἐυλόγησως

ἐπλεονέκτησας; ἀπόδ Ε΄ ἐμεθύθης; νησευσον. S. Bas.

* Έρει ης τῷ ἀντι φιλοσοφία μέγισον

* πτημα. Just. Μ.

* those

those faculties, by which these truths are apprehended, is to shut them out, as being not what they are a.

And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become more rational; that is, we advance our natures b, and become more attentive to rational injoyments.

The ordinary means indeed of improving our minds are the instruction of ablemen, reading, observation, meditation: but every man has not proper opportunities, or capacity for these, or but in some low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by sect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that mollished in added, by such means, &c.

Beside health, a comfortable and suitable provision of externals is so necessary to the well-being of the whole man, that without it the rational part cannot dwell easy, all pursuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) impersect. And so reason itself (which cannot betray its own interest) must for its own sake concurr in seeking and promoting that, which tends to the preservation and happiness of the whole. But the doing of this ingrosses time and industry; and before that which is sought can be obtaind (if it is ever obtaind), probably the use of it is lost: except where men live by the profession of some part of learning.

And as to them who are more free from worldly cares, or whose business and imployment brings them into a stricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (such is the great variety of human circumstances in other respects) they must be contented with several degrees and portions of knowledge. Some are blest with clean and strong constitutions, early instructions and other helps, succeeding incouragements, useful acquaintance, and freedom from disturbance: whilst others, under an ill state of body, or other disadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can:

But notwithstanding all this, every man may in some degree or other endeavour to cultivate his nature, and possess himself of useful truths. And not to do this is (again) to cast off reason (which never can be reasonable), apostatize from humanity, and recoil into the bestial life d.

And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες άνθεωποι Ε είδεναι ὀείε γονται φόσει. Arist.

b Aristotle being asked, what he got by philosophy, answerd, Τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιξιν ά τινες Δεί τ λπὸ τ νόμων φόδον πειξουν. And another time, how the learned differd from the unlearned, said, Όσω οι ζωντες τ τηθνηκότων την παιδείαν έλειγεν εν μθρ ἐυτυχίαις ἔιναι κόσμου, εν ἢ ταις ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν. D. Laert.

c 'Αδύνατον β, η ἐ ράδιον, τὰ καλὰ περάτειν ἀχοερίγητον ἔντα πολλὰ μθρ β περάτεται καθάπερ δι ὀεγάνων, κτλ. Arist.

d Nam suit quoddam tempus, the in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, &c. Cic.

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7. He must attend to instruction a, and even ask advice; especially in matters of consequence. Not to do this is to deny, that his faculties are limited and desective, or that he is fallible (which is contrary to that, which he is presumed to be conscious of); and perhaps, that it is possible for another to know what he doth not.

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the more doth truth press him to submit to the counsel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only capable, but every one wants upon some occasions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs must the scholar take the rustic for his master? In how many other men of business, traders and mechanics? And on the other side, in respect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are learned and honest?

There is or should be a commerce or interchange of counsel and knowledge, as well as of other things: and where men have not these of their own growth, they should thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.

I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and blindly to follow the opinion of another b (this other being fallible too, as well as himself), unless he has in himself a good reason so to do, which many times happens; but by the affistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to find out more certainly on which side reason, truth, and happiness (which always keep close together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's own reason at last, which governs.

He, who is governed by what another fays (or does) without understanding it and making the reason of it his own, is not governed by his own reason, and that is, by no reason that he has. To say one is led by the nose (as we commonly speak c) gives immediately the idea of a brute d.

* The effect, which Xenocrates's lecture had upon Polemo, is remarkable: unius orationis saluberrima medicina sanatus, ex infami ganeone maximus philosophus evasit. Val. M.

**The infamition of their Hhakamim, Infamicial United Unit

Lastly, He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reasoning freely, and judging impartially. We set out in life from such poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under such remains of superstition and ignorance, such influences of company and fashion, such infinuations of pleasure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in one way; that these habits in time grow confirmed and obstinate; and so their minds come to be overcast with thick prejudices, scarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reason. He therefore, who would use his rational faculties, must in the first place disentangle them, and render them sit to be used: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not intend to use them; that is, he proclaims himself irrational, contrary to truth, if supposition the fourth be true.

The sum of all is this: it is the duty of every man, if that word expresses such as being as is before described, to behave himself in all respects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reason. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piously. Because to practice reason, and truth is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the foregoing sections it is apparent, that one cannot practice reason (or act according to truth) without behaving himself reverently and dutifully toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without justice and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unless his injoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harmless. And as to those virtues, which respect a mans self, the same thing will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by some of the principal ones.

Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choosing (after things d have been duly weighd) and using the most reasonable means to obtain some end, that is reasonable. This is therefore directly the exercise of reason.

Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as physic for hunger and thirst, but also as an innocent cordial and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes, reason not refusing that liberty, merely as matter of pleasure. It only confines us to such kinds, quantities, and seasons, as may best consist with our health.

Ipsa virtus brevissimè recta ratio dici potest. Cic. Qua non aliud est quam recta ratio. Sens b Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem. Id. c Viz. That a man cannot practise reason without practising them. d Τά τ' ἐόντα, τά τ' ἐονόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα. c That saying of Timotheus to Plato, with whom he had supped the night before in the Academy, should be rememberd. Υμεῖς ἔυ δειπνειτε—εἰς των ὑς ερᾶιαν—μμέραν. Αρ. Athen.

the use of our faculties a, our fortune, &c. and shew, that we do not think our selves made only to eat and drink here b; that is, such as speak us to be what we are.

Chastity does not pretend to extinguish our tender passions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them against reason and truth c; not give up the man to humor the brute d; nor hurt others to please our selves; to divert our inclinations by business, or some honest amusement, till we can gratify them lawfully, conveniently, regularly e; and even then to participate of the mysteries of love with modesty, as within a veil or sacred inclosure, not with

a canine impudence f.

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only confiders the man bimself, but compassionates his family; knows, that, when the exactest computation is made that can be beforehand, there will still be found many unforeseen desiderata in the calendar of his expences; is apprehensive of the world, and accidents, and new occasions, that may arise, tho they are not yet in being g; and therefore endeavours wifely to lay in as much, as may give him some kind of fecurity against future wants and casualties, without which provision no man, whose sense is not quite lost, or circumscribed within the present minute, can be very easy h. To this end it not only cuts off all profusion and extravagance, but even deducts fomething from that, which according to the present appearance might be afforded i; and chooses rather that he should live upon half allowance now, than be exposed (or expose any body else) to the danger of starving hereafter k, when full meals and former plenty shall make poverty and fasting more insupportable. But still it forbids no instance of generosity, or even magnificence, which is agreeable to the man's station and circumstances, or (which is tantamount) to the truth of his case 1.

b Quibus 2 Corpus onustum Hesternis vitiis animum quoq; pragravat una, &c. Hor. in solo vivendi causa palato est. Juv. Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos canaturi (Leonid. ap. Val M.) may be turned to a general memento, no man knowing, how near his death may be. c Τί είδες; -- καλήν; "Επαγε Τ κανόνα. Arr. d Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum e In which words are comprehended naturally (Το μη τας παρά φύσιν ήδονας δίωf Not as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom see Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.), and indeed xsiv). the Cynics in general are said to have done: quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit. Lactant. Of whom therefore Cicero says with good reason, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota est ejicienda. Est enim inimica verecundia, sine qua nibil restum esse potest, nibil honestum. אר אשתו יבא ΜΥΣΙΣ [W'N]. S. Hhas. That in Herodotus, 'Αμα κιθωνι εκδυομένω συνεκδύεται & την άιδω γυνής ought not to be true. Verecund'à naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum. Aug. Eis h Simonides was wont to fay, Bedoipen an donτο της τύχης ατικμαςτιν αφορώσα. Ph. 7. Βανών τοῖς έχθροῖς μιακλον λοπλιπείν, η ζάν δείας τ φίλων. Stob. i Non intelligunt homines quam magnum vestigal sit parsimonia. Cic. Like them, who en Ty reother Ta & Thews i pool a mpo-1 Ea liberalitate utamur, que prosit amicis, noceat nemini. καταναλίσκεσιν, as in Athen. Cic. After

After the same manner I might proceed upon other particular virtues. But my notion of them must by this time be sufficiently understood: and therefore I shall only give this general advice. That you may take the truer prospect of any act, place your self in your imagination beyond it (beyond it in time), and suppose it already done, and then see how it looks; always remembring, that a long repentance is a disproportionate price for a short injoyment. Or, fancy it done by some other man, and then view it in that speculum: we are commonly sharper-sighted in discerning the faults of others, than of our selves a. And further, as to those virtues, which are said to consist in the mean, it may be sometimes safer to incline a little more to one of the extremes, than to the other: as, rather to stinginess, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a degree of ill nature, than to dangerous complaisance, or easiness in respect of vice, and such things as may be hurtful; and so on b.

Since then to live virtuously is to practise reason and act conformably to truth, he, who lives so, must be ultimately happy, by sect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reason, but even the desire of happiness (a motive, that cannot but work strongly upon all who think) will oblige a man to live so.

It may be collected even from experience, that the virtuous life compared with the contrary, if one looks no further than the present state, is the happier life; or, that the virtuous pleasures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer d. Who sees not, that the vitious life is full of dangers and solicitudes, and usually ends ill; perhaps in rottenness and rags, or at least in a peevish and despicable discontent?

I am not of opinion, that virtue can make a man happy upon a rack funder a violent fit of the stone, or the like g; or that virtue and prudence can always exempt him from wants and sufferings, mend a strait fortune, or rectify an ill constitu-

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tion:

^{*}Non est incommodum, quale quodq; —— sit, ex aliis judicare: ut si quid dedeceat in aliis, vitemus & ipsi. Fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Cic. Το Olov, ci δέιπνω προπίνει τις άδην έχοντι; μιη δυσωπηθής, μιηδε προσβιάση σεαυτόν, άπλα κατάθε το ποτήριον, κλ. Plut. Even Epicurus himself ἀχώρισον Φησί τ΄ ήδοιης την άρετην μόνην and Δρά την ήδουην τας άρετας δεῦν άιρεῖοζ. Diog. L. Τις σερον εντάθη προστον ήθουν τες, ὑσερον ελυπήθημεν ἐντάνθα η μξ τας λύπας τας ήδουας έχομεν. Εναί μβο πρώτον ήθεντες, ὑσερον ελυπήθημεν ἐντάνθα η μξ τας λύπας τας ήδουας έχομεν. "Whereas virtue is ἐφόδιον πρὸς γῆρας. Bias ap. S. Bas. from who can bear such rants as that, Epicurus ait, sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce est, & ad me nihil pertinet? Sen. Tully reports the same.

§ It isin the power of very tew to act like him, qui dum varices exsecandas praberet, legere librum perseveravit: or him, qui non desit ridere, cum ob hoc ipsum irati tortores omnia instrumenta crudelitatis experirentur. Sen.

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tion: amidst so many enemies to virtue, so many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be fometimes affected. But I have said, and say again, that the natural and usual effect of virtue is happiness; and if a virtuous man should in some respects be unhappy, yet still his virtue will make him less unhappy: for at least he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breast conscious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which naturally tends to happiness, tho it may be disturbed; or that, which naturally tends to unhappiness? In brief, virtue will make a man here, in any given circumstances, as happy as a man can be in those circumstances: or however it will make him happy hereaster in some other state: for ultimately, all taken together, happy he must be.

Some may possibly wonder, why among virtues I have not so much as once named one of the cardinal, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to: I mean fortitude. That that, by which so many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greatest, death itself; that, which distinguishes nations, raises empires, has been the grand theme of almost all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and assumes the name of virtue by way of excellence; that this should be forgot!

To attone for this omission I will make this appendix to the foregoing brief account. If fortitude be taken for natural courage (i. e. strength, activity, plenty of spirits, and a contempt of dangers resulting from these), this is constitution and the gift of God², not any virtue in us: because if it be our virtue, it must consist in something, which we produce, or do our selves b. The case is the same with that of sine seatures and complexion, a large inheritance, or strong walls, which may indeed be great advantages, but were never called virtues c. To have these is not virtue; but to use them rightly, or according to reason, if we have them.

That this is justly said, may perhaps appear from what is to be said on the other side. It may be a man's misfortune, that he has not more courage, a greater stock of spirits, sirmer health, and stronger limbs, if he has a just occasion to use them; but it never can be reckond a vice or fault not to use what he has not: for otherwise it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thousand pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.

^{*} Εἰ μάλα καρτιρός ἐωτι, θεός πε σοὶ τόγ' ἔδωκεν. Hom.

b Propter virtutem jure laudamur, & in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id donum à deo, non a nobis haberemus. Cicca As that word is used here. For when it is used as in that ap. Luc. Αρετή μβι σώματω ἰχὺς, and the like passages, it has another meaning.

Fortitude

Fortitude confiderd as a virtue confifts in standing and endeavouring to overcome dangers and oppositions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of reafon and truth. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural bravery, a healthful constitution, good bones and muscles, ought to use them, and be thankful to the Doner: and he who is not so favord, must yet do what he can: if he cannot conquer, he must endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwise infirm, may have as much, or more of the virtue of fortitude, than the hero himself; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or possibly may find pleasure in a scene of dangerous action.

If a man can prevent, or escape any peril or trouble, salvå veritate, he ought to do it: otherwise he neither considers himself, nor them as being what they are; them not as unnecessary, himself not as capable of being burt by them; and so dashes against truth on the worse side a. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his abilities, whether great or little, and refer the success to the Divine providence. This is the true virtue of fortitude, which is nothing but endeavouring firmly and honestly to act as truth requires; and therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its object not only adversaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the evils of life b; which a man must labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with resignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjustment of all events in a future state: the belief of which I am now going to prove, in my manner, to be no vain nor groundless conceit.

V. Every one, that finds himself as before in prop. I. finds in himself at the same time a consciousness of his own existence and acts (which is life), with a power of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, willing, beginning and stopping many kinds and degrees of motion in his own members, &c. c. He, who has not these powers, has no power to dispute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any dispute here, unless it be concerning the power of beginning motion. For they, who say there is always the same quantity of motion in the world, must not allow the production of any new; and therefore must suppose the animal spirits not to

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^{*} Καπνε κὸ κύματ εκτὸς ἔκεγε Νῆα. Hom.

* Εἰσὶ δ' ὁι κὸ κὸ ὁικία διατείδοντες, το σωμάτων κυτοῖς ἡ μακρᾶις νόσοις, ἡ ἐπιπόνω γήρα κατεσκελετευμένων,—τω ἀλκ. ϶ῆ διαπονεσιν ἀνδείαν, ἀσκηταί σοφίας δυτες. Ph. J. Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis in virtute animi.— fure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, iram continet, mullis illecebris emolli ur acque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, &c. S. Ambr.

2 Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive from it their directions into these or those canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be answerd, that, if the mind can give these new directions and turns to the spirits, this serves my purpose as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And besides, it could not do this, if it could not excite those spirits being at rest.

It is plain I can move my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, just as I will. Now if my hand and those parts and spirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already imprest upon them, the effects would be determind by rules of mechanism, and be necessary: the motion or rest of my hand would not attend upon my will, and be alterable upon a thought at my pleasure. If then I have (as I am sensible I have) a power of moving my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by those laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends solely upon my will, and begins there 2.

VI. That, which in man is the subject or suppositum of self-consciousness, thinks, and has the foresaid faculties, must be something different from his body or earcass.

For, first, he doth not I suppose find himself to think, see, hear, &c. all over, in any part of his body: but the seat of cogitation and reflexion he finds in his head b: and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are conveyed to him, all tend to the same place. It is plainly something, which resides there c, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of these nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by so many reins, or wires) d, seels what is done to it, sees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c.c.

^{*} Εἰ μήτε ἔξωθεν κινεῖται [τὸ σῶρα] ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦς, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινεῖται, κλ. Greg. Thaum. b Which, ὡς ἐιπεῖν, δικός ἐςι τ΄ ἀισθήσεων. Artem. c Όπε ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ κὰ ὁι δορυφόροι δορυφόροι δὲ ἀισθήσεις Ε΄ νᾶ, τε κεφαλήν ἔσαι. Ph. f. d Τὰ μέςη Ε΄ σώματ ὁν ἀλογά ἐςιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁςμὴ γένηται, σείσαντ ὁν ἀσπες ἡνίας Ε΄ λογισμᾶ, πάντα τέτακται κὰ συῆκται ε΄ ὑπακόυει. Plut. e Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, qua videmus : neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed—via quasi quadam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi persorata. Itaque sape aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris ఈ oculis ఈ auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facilè intelligi possit, animum ఈ videre, ఈ audire, non eas partes, qua quasi fenestra sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, ఈ adsit. Cic.

Upon amputation of a limb a this thing (whatever it is) is not found to be diminished b, nor any of its faculties lost. Its sphere of acting, while it is confined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its instrument lost. It cannot make use of that which is not, or which it has not.

If the eyes be shut, or the ears stopt, it cannot then see, or hear: but remove the obstruction, and it instantly appears that the faculty, by which it apprehends the impressions made upon the organs of sensation, remaind all that while intire; and that so it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had never been opend again; or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite disabled. This shews in general, that, when any sense or faculty seems to be impaired or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pass, because it is the body that perceives and has these faculties in itself; but because the body loses its instrumentality, and gives that which is the true subject of these faculties no opportunity of exerting them, or of exerting them well: tho it retains them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut. Thus distinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the soul.

Again, as a man peruses and considers his own body, doth it not undeniably appear to be something different from the considerer? And when he uses this expression my body, or the body of me, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by me, or what my relates to? It cannot be the body itself: that cannot say of itself, it is my body, or the body of me. And yet this way of speaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual sense of our selves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A man being supposed a person consisting of two parts, soul and body, the whole person may say of this or that part of him, the soul of me, or the body of me: but if he was either all soul, or all body, and nothing else, he could not then speak in this manner: because it would be the same as to say the soul of the soul, or the body of the body, or the I of me. The pronoun therefore (in that saying my body, or the body of me) must stand for something else, to which the body belongs d; or at least for something, of which it is only a part, viz. the person of the whole man e. And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not body.

² Or even detracto corpore multo, as Lucretius speaks. b Πολλάκις ἢ τ χειρῶν & τ ποδῶν ἐκλεκομμένων, ὁλόκληρΘ ἐκείνη [ἡ ψυχη] μένει. Chrys. c Therefore Aristotle says, if an old man had
a young man's eye, βλέποι ἀν ἀσπες & ὁ νέΘ·. "Ως ε τὸ γῆςας, ἐ τῷ τἰω' ψυχην πεπουθέναι τι, ἀλλ' ἀν
ῷ καθάπες ἀν μέθαις ἢ νόσοις, κτλ. d Hierocles (with others) accounts the soul to be the true
man. Σὸ ἢ ἔι ἡ ψυχή τὸ δὲ σῶμια σόν. e So Plato uses 'Αυτὸς for the whole of the man; by
which the soul, as one part of it, is called κτημα.

It is plain there are two different interests in men a, on the one side reason, on the other passion: which, being many times directly opposite, must belong to different subjects. There are upon many occasions contests, and as it were wars between the mind and the body: so far are they from being the same thing.

Lastly, there is we may perceive something within us, which supports the body (keeps it up), directs its motion for the better preservation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The body therefore must be considered as being under the direction and tuition of some other thing, which is (or should be) the governor of it, and consequently upon this account must be concluded to be different from it.

VII. The foul cannot be mere matter. For if it is, then either all matter must think; or the difference must arise from the different modification, magnitude, figure, or motion b of some parcels of matter in respect of others; or a faculty of thinking must be superadded to some systems of it, which is not superadded to others. But,

In the first place, that position, which makes all matter to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehensions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can it be true, unless our senses and faculties be contrived only to deceive us. We perceive not the least symptom of cogitation, or sense in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the scene of thinking lie in our heads, and all the ministers of sensation make their reports to something there, if all matter be apprehensive, and cogitative? For in that case there would be as much thought and understanding in our heels, and every were else, as in our heads.

If all matter be cogitative, then it must be so quaterus matter, and thinking must be of the essence and definition of it: whereas by matter no more is meant but a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And since, for this reason, it cannot be necessary for matter to think (because it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as matter only.

If it did, we should not only continue to think always, till the matter of which we consist is annihilated, and so the affertor of this doctrine would stumble upon

² Φάινεται εν ἀυτοῖς κὰ ἀκό τι παρὰ τὰ λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὁ μάχετάι τε ε ἀντιτεινει τος λόγο. Arist.

b Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human soul, seems to be much such another question as that in one of Seneca's epistles, An justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraque virtutes, animalia sint.

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immortality unawares; but we must also have thought always in time past, ever since that matter was in being; nor could there be any the least intermission of actual thinking: which does not appear to be our case.

If thinking, self-consciousness, &c. were essential to matter, every part of it must have them: and then no system could have them. For a system of material parts would be a system of things conscious every one by itself of its own existence and individuality, and consequently thinking by itself: but there could be no one ast of self-consciousness or thought common to the whole. Juxtaposition in this case could signify nothing: the distinction and individuation of the several particles would be as much retaind in their vicinity, as if they were separated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot arise from the size, figure, texture, or motion of it: because bodies by the alteration of these only become greater or less; round or square, &c. rare, or dense; translated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which ideas are quite different from that of thinking; there can be no relation between them². These modifications and affections of matter are so far from being principles or causes of thinking and acting, that they are themselves but effects, proceeding from the action of some other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its passivity, deadness, and utter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to sense.

They, who place the effence of the foul in a certain motion given to some matter (if any such men there really be) should consider, among many other things, that to move the body spontaneously is one of the faculties of the soul b; and that this, which is the same with the power of beginning motion, cannot come from motion already begun, and imprest ab extra.

Let the materialist examine well, whether he does not feel something within himself, that acts from an internal principle: whether he doth not experience some liberty some power of governing himself, and choosing: whether he does not injoy a kind of invisible empire, in which he commands his own thoughts, sends them to this or that place, imploys them about this or that business c, forms such and such

² Νουω ἐδεν σῶμα γενες πῶς ἡ ἀν τὰ ἀνόητα νουω γεννήσοι. Sallust.

b That the foul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no testimony) often said by the ancients. Φασὶ ἡ ἔνιοι, κὰ μάλισα, Ͼ πεώτως ψυχὴν είναι τὸ κινουν. Arist. Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἔνδοθε, κινουν τὰ σώματα, κὰ ἀυτοκίνητον. Simpl. ᾿Αςχὴ κινήσεως. Plotin.

c Ἡ ψυχὴ περίεισι πᾶσαν γῆν, κὰ γῆς ἐπ΄ ἔςανον, κλ. Μαχ. Τ:

designs and schemes: and whether there is any thing like this in bare matter a, however fashiond, or proportiond; which, if nothing should protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can such an active being as the soul is b, the subject of so many powers, be itself nothing but an accident?

When I begin to move my felf, I do it for some reason, and with respect to some end, the means to effect which I have, if there be occasion for it, concerted within my self: and this doth not at all look like motion merely material (or, in which matter is only concernd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine matter to be moved by arguments, or ever placed syllogisms and demonstrations among levers and pullies?

We not only move our selves upon reasons, which we find in our selves, but upon reasons imparted by words or writing from others, or perhaps merely at their desire or bare suggestion. In which case, again, no body sure can imagine, that the words spoken or written (the sound in the air, or the strokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical efficience cause the reader or hearer to move in any determinate manner (or at all). The reason, request, or friendly admonition, which is the true motive, can make no impression upon matter. It must be some other kind of being, that apprehends the force and sense of them.

Do not we see in conversation, how a pleasant thing said makes people break out into laughter, a rude thing into passion, and so on? These affections cannot be the physical effects of the words spoken: because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood, or not. And this is further demonstrable from hence, that tho the words do really contain nothing, which is either pleasant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be spoken, which are not spoken; yet if they are apprehended to do that, or the sound to be otherwise than it was, the effect will be the same. It is therefore the sense of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the understanding and causing that, which is the subject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces these motions in the spirits, blood, muscles.

What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in Lucretius? Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil sieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeà naturà animum constare, animamq; ? If nothing can move the body, but another body, what moves this? The body might as well move itself, as be moved by one that does.

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\text{Taxisor v\vec{v}s} & \text{Ag\vec{v}} \taxisor v\vec{v}s & \text{Texisor v\vec{v}s} & \text{Texisor v\vec{v}s} & \text{Texisor v\vec{v}s} & \text{Toxisor v\vec{v}s} & \text{Tox

They, who can fancy, that matter may come to live, think, and alt spontaneously, by being reduced to a certain magnitude, or having its parts placed after a
certain manner, or being invested with such a figure, or excited by such a particular
motion: they, I say, would do well to discover to us that degree of sineness, that
alteration in the situation of its parts, &c. at which matter may begin to find itself
alive and cogitative; and which is the critical minute, that introduces these important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any particular crisis, it is a sign they have no good reason for what they say. For if they have no reason to charge this change upon any particular degree or difference, one more than another, they have no reason to charge it upon any degree or difference at all; and
then they have no reason, by which they can prove that such a change is made
at all. Besides all which, since magnitude, sigure, motion are but accidents of
matter, not matter, and only the substance is truly matter; and since the substance of
any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if any matter can be by
nature cogitative, all must be so. But this we have seen cannot be.

So then in conclusion, if there is any such thing as matter that thinks, &c. this must be a particular privilege granted to it: that is, a faculty of thinking must be superadded to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, must infer the existence of some Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the ineptness of matter has been well considered, cannot appear to be less than omnipotent, or God. But the truth is, matter seems not to be capable of such improvement, of being made to think. For since it is not of the essence of matter, it cannot be made to be so without making matter another kind of substance from what it is. Nor can it be made to arise from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in respect of what else can any matter be made to differ from other matter.

The accidents of matter are so far from being made by any power to produce cogitation, that some even of them shew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking superadded. The very divisibility of it does this. For that which is made to think must either be one part, or more parts joind together. But we know no such thing as a part of matter purely one (or indivisible). It may indeed have pleased the Author of nature, that there should be atoms, whose parts are actually indiscerpible, and which may be the principles of other bodies: but still they consist of parts, tho sirmly adhering together. And if the seat of cogitation be in more parts than one (whether they lie close together, or are loose, or in a state of sluidity, it is the same thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there must be so many several minds, or thinking substances, as there are parts (and then the consequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again);

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or else, that there must be something else superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be one? And then what can this be, but some other substance, which is purely one?

Matter by itself can never intertain abstracted and general ideas, such as many in our minds are 2. For could it reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but material and particular impressions; abstractions and metaphysical ideas could not be printed upon it b. How could one abstract from matter who is himself nothing but matter? And then as to material images themselves, which are usually supposed to be imprest upon the brain (or some part of it), and stock the phantasy and memory, that which peruses the impressions and traces there (or any where) must be something distinct from the brain, or that upon which these impressions are made: otherwise it must contemplate itself, and be both reader and book. And this other distinct contemplating being cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a soul. For such a corporeal being must require sense, and suitable organs, to perceive and read these characters and vestigia of things; and so another organized body would be introduced, and the same questions and difficulties redoubled, concerning the soul of that body and its faculties c.

If my foul was mere matter, external visible objects could only be perceived within me according to the impressions they make upon matter, and not otherwise. Ex.gr. the image of a cube in my mind (or my idea of a cube) must be always under some particular prospect, and conform to the rules of perspective; nor could I otherwise represent it to my self: whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is in itself, and almost view all its bedree at once, as it were incompassing it with my mind.

I can within myself correct the external appearances and impressions of objects; and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my senses, to form ideas of things that are not extant in matter. By seeing a material circle I may learn to form the idea of a circle, or sigure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occasions, I can conclude there is no exact material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raised from the hints I received from without, but is not truly to be found there. If I see a tower at a great distance, which according to the impressions made upon my

^{*} Diogenes, the he could fee the table, and the pot, could not by his eyes fee Plato's τομπεζότης, & πυαθότης. Diog. L. β Plato, & δι σοφδι (more generally) fay, that the foul indeed perceives objects of fenfe by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητὰ, which it doth καθ' ἀντὰν ἀνθυμεῖῶζ. Id. c Such a foul must be indeed as Greg. Thaum. has it, σῶμα μμψυχον. "Ατοπον ἢ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν.

material organs feems little and round, I do not therefore conclude it to be either: there is something within, that reasons upon the circumstances of the appearance, and as it were commands my sense, and corrects the impression: and this must be something superior to matter, since a material soul is no otherwise impressible itself, but as material organs are. Instances of this kind are endless. (v. p. 53, 54.)

If we know any thing of matter, we know, that by itself it is a lifeless thing, inert, and passive only; and acts necessarily (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This passiveness seems to be essential to it. And if we know any thing of our selves, we know, that we are conscious of our own existence and acts (i.e. that we live); that we have a degree of freedom; that we can move our selves spontaneously; and in short, that we can, in many instances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impress new motions upon our spirits (or give them new directions), only by a thought. Therefore to make mere matter do all this is to change the nature of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, necessity into liberty. And to say, that God may superadd a faculty of thinking, moving itself, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the suppositum of these faculties (that substance, in which they inhere), is the same in effect as to say, that God may superadd a faculty of thinking to incogitativity, of acting freely to necessity, and so on. What sense is there in this? And yet so it must be, while matter continues to be matter.

That faculty of thinking, so much talked of by some as superadded to certain fystems of matter, fitly disposed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be so called, must in reality amount to the same thing as another substance with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking alone will not make up the idea of a human soul, which is indued with many faculties; apprehending, reslecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reasoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its presence, and giving life; and therefore, whatever it is that is superadded, it must be something which is indued with all those other faculties. And whether that can be a faculty of thinking, and so these other faculties be only faculties of a faculty of whether they must not all be rather the faculties of some substantial superadded.

[•] This is worse than $\psi v \chi \dot{\eta}$ $\psi v \chi \dot{\eta} \dot{\eta}$ in Max. Tyr. and the place just before cited. The author of the Essay conc. Hum. Underst. has himself exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, says he, whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossy absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves? There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another passage some where in the same book as much (or more) to my purpose: but at present I cannot find it.

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flance 3, which, being (by their own concession) superadded to matter, must be different from it, I do leave the unprejudiced to determin.

If men would but seriously look into themselves, I am persuaded the soul would not appear to them as a faculty of the body, or kind of appurtenance to it; but rather as some substance, properly placed in it, not only to use it as an instrument, and act by it, but also to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.) according to its own reason. For I think it is plain enough, that the mind, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many instances govern the body arbitrarily: and it is monstrous to suppose this governor to be nothing but some fit disposition or accident (superadded) of that matter which is governed. A ship it is true would not be fit for navigation, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a system of materials fitly disposed, it is not this disposition that governs it. It is the man, that other substance, who sits at the helm, and they, who manage the sails and tackle, that do this. So our vessels without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted as they are; but still it is not the shape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The capacity of being governed or used can never be the governor, applying and using b that capacity. No there must be at the helm fomething distinct, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather fink.

For the foregoing reasons it seems to me, that matter cannot think, cannot be made to think. But if a faculty of thinking can be superadded to a system of matter, without uniting an immaterial substance to it; I say, if this can be, yet a human body is not such a system, being plainly void of thought, and organized in such a manner as to transmit the impressions of sensible objects up to the brain, where the percipient, and that which reflects upon them, certainly resides: and therefore that, which there apprehends, thinks, and wills, must be that system of matter to which a faculty of thinking is superadded. All the premisses then well considered, judge I beseech you, whether instead of saying, that this inhabitant of our heads (the soul) is a system of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is superadded, it might not be more reasonable to say, it is a thinking substance intimately united to some fine material vehicle, which has its residence in the brain.

Tho I understand not perfectly the manner, how a cogitative and spiritual substance can be thus closely united to such a material vehicle; yet I can understand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itself cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be superadded to matter: and beside, several phenomena may more easily be solved by this hypothesis; which (tho I shall not pertinaciously maintain it) in short is this. Viz. that the human foul is a cogitative substance, clothed in a material vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were inseparably mixt (I had almost said incorporated) with it 2: that these act in conjunction, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the foul is detaind in the body (the head or brain) by some sympathy or attraction between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is spoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an aversion, that makes it fly off), by some hurt, or disease, or by the decays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the interim by means of this vehicle motions and impressions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps fomething more by and by.

VIII. The soul of man subsists after the dissolution of his body: or, is immortal. For, I. If it is immaterial, it is indiscerpible, and therefore incapable of being dissolved or demolished, as bodies are b. Such a being can only perish by annihilation: that is, it will continue to subsist and live, if some other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular act annihilate it. And if there is any reason to believe, that at the death of every man there is always such a particular annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any substance into nothing requires just the same power as to convert nothing into something: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the soul, will be cautious how they admit any such power.

2. If the foul could be material; that is, if there could be any matter, that might be the subject of those faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet still, since we cannot but be sensible, that all these are faculties of the self-same thing; and that all the several acts of the mind are acts of the same thing, each of them individual and truly one: I say, since it is so, this matter must be so perfettly united in itself, so absorbed

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It is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those Beings, that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underst.

b This is Socrates's argument in Plato. The soul is altogether adadour, and therefore avades of which Cicero interprets thus: nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; nec interire igitur.

lutely one, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the least that can be allowed is that it should be truly solid, and not actually divisible; that is, such as no natural cause could destroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a thinking matter, is to introduce matter with a new and opposite property; and that is to introduce a new species of matter a, which will differ as essentially from the other common unthinking kind, as any species whatsoever doth from its opposite in scala pradicamentali, even as body doth from spirit. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if so, this thinking matter must always continue to think, till either it is annihilated, or there is a transmutation of one species into another: and to take refuge in either of these expectations is at least to expect omnipotence should interpose to help out a bad cause.

If any one should say, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence superadd to certain parcels of matter a fourth dimension, I should not perhaps dispute the Divine power: but I might say, that such matter, existing under four dimensions, would essentially differ from that, which cannot exist under four, or which can exist but only under three; and that this sour-dimensiond matter must always remain such, because no substance can be changed into or become another, essentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the course of nature ceases

totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument shall proceed by way of objection and answer. Because a removal of the principal objection against any thing is a good argument for it. Obj. It seems as if thinking was not essential to the soul, but rather a capacity of thinking under certain circumstances. For it doth not think, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infancy, in sleep, in a swoon: and the reason of this seems to lie in the circumstances of the body, which either is not sufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while imploys the spirits wholly in the digestion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal ceconomy; or by some external attack, or the working of some enemy got into it, hath its parts disorderd, and the passages so possess, that the blood and other sluids can scarce break through; or after some such manner is preternaturally affected. And therefore the question to be resolved is not, whether the soul is material or immaterial; and much less, whether it will be annihilated at death; but, whether that soul (be it what it will), which ceases to think, when the body is not fitly disposed,

^{*} Lucretius seems to be aware of this. Jam triplex animi e? natura reperta: Nec tamen hac sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum &c. Quarta quoq; his igitur quædam natura necesse est Attribuatur: ea est omnino nominis expers.

can think at all, when the body is quite dissolved, and leaves the soul no opportunity of actuating it any more, or operating by it a. Ans. If this objection cannot be sully answerd, till we know more of the nature of spiritual beings, and of that vinculum, by which the soul and body are connected, than we do at present, it must not therefore be looked upon as certainly unanswerable in it self; and much less, if only it cannot be answerd by me. It may perhaps be possible to turn it even into an argument for the immortality of the soul.

The foul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts under limitations: these limitations at different times are different, its activity and faculties being more obstructed or clogd at one time than another, and most of all in sleep, or a deliquium: as these obstructions are removed, it acts more clearly and freely: and therefore if the state of the soul in the body (its confinement there) may be confiderd as one general and great limitation, why, when this limitation shall be taken off (this great obstruction removed), may it b not be allowed to act with still greater freedom and clearness; the greatest it is capable of? Whilst it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a few apertures; that is, receive the notices of many things by those nerves and organs, which are the instruments of sensation: but if any of those avenues to it be stopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If those tracks in the brain, or those marks, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our memory and images of things feem to depend, are filled up or overcast by any vapor, or otherwise darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is dispersed. (For it cannot read what is not legible, and indeed for the present not there.) And since even in abstracted reflexions the mind is obliged to make use of words c, or some kind of figns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and stable enough to be perufed, compared, &c. and this kind of language depends upon memory; whilst this is intermitted, the use of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the present state of the soul: and from hence the reason appears in some measure, why we do not think in found sleep, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the foul cannot subsist and act under more inlarged circumstances. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op-

If Lucan by fensus means all manner of apprehension and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: Aut nihil est sensus animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipsa nihil. For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

b Velut è diutino carcere emissus [animus]. Sen. animus Those kinds of animals, which do not speak, do not reason: but those, which do the one, do the other. Therefore הוות מדבר (or Arab. הוות מדבר) is a rational animal: and λόγ fignisses both speech and reason, as going together.

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portunities this affords, can now perceive visible objects only with two eyes (at two windows a), because there are no more, might doubtless see with four, if there were so many properly placed and disposed; or if its habitation were all eye (window all round), might see all round. And so, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impressions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our present organs, and in this situation and inclosure can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be loofed out of that prison b, know them immediately, or by some other medium. That, which is now forced to make shift with words and figns of things in its reasonings, may, when it shall be set at liberty and can come at them, reason upon the intuition of things themselves, or use a language more spiritual or ideal. I say, it is not impossible, that this should be the case; and therefore no one can say, with reason, that it is not: especially, since we find by experience, that the soul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of spirit to determin, how these limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This suffices to remove the force of the objection. But further,

A man, when he wakes, or comes to himself (which phrase implies what I am going to say), immediately knows this, and knows himself to be the same soul that he was before his sleep, or fainting away. I will suppose, that he is also conscious to himself, that in those intervals he thought not at all (which is the same the objector must suppose): that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or moulderd to dust, he could not have thought less: for there is no thinking less than thinking not at all. From hence then I gather, that the soul preserves a capacity of thinking, &c. under those circumstances and indispositions of the body, in which it thinks no more, than if the body was destroyd; and that therefore it may, and will preserve it, when the body is destroyd. And if so, what can this capacity be preserved for? Certainly not, that it may never be exerted. The Author of nature doth not use to act after that manner. So that here is this dilemma to be opposed to the objection. In sleep and swoonings the soul doth either think, or not. If it does, the objection has no foundation: and if it doth not, then all that will follow, which I have just now said.

If we should suppose the foul to be a being by nature made to inform some body, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of total separation from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, must therefore reduce it

[•] Θυρίδες ϕ όντως τ΄ ψυχῆς αι αιθήσεις. Βας. ϕ 'Ασαρκ ϕ ϕ ασώματ ϕ εν τῷ ϕ παντὸς ϕ εκτρ ϕ -διημεριύεσα. Ph. ϕ .

to a state of absolute insensibility and inactivity, which to it would be equal to non-existence. For that body, which is so necessary to it, may be some fine vehicle, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that hypothesis p. 193.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the answers to the objection, nor the case after death will be much alterd by fuch a supposition. And fince I confess I see no absurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are sensible of many material impressions (impressions made upon us by material causes, or bodies): that there are such we are sure. Therefore there must be some matter within us, which being moved or pressed upon, the soul apprehends it immediately. And therefore, again, there must be some matter to which it is immediately and intimately united, and related in such a manner, as it is not related to any other. Let us now suppose this said matter to be some refined and spirituous vehicle a, which the foul doth immediately inform; with which it sympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is vitally and inseparably united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the brain, among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppose we also, that when any impressions are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the nerves up to their fountain, and the place, where the foul in its vehicle is; and there they communicate their feveral motions or tremors to this material vebicle (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, press upon it); so that the soul, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly possest of it, shall be apprehensive of these motions or pressures: and moreover, that this vehicle so guarded and incompassed by the body as it is, can be come at or moved by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the foul, by consequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correspondence with them, any other way. And as we suppose the foul to receive notices of things from without in this manner, so let us suppose, on the other side, that by moving its own vehicle it may produce motion in the contiguous spirits and nerves,

Cc

יש גוף רק ער מאר בו מתלבש הנשמות לא יש ביאה לא ליים וגם בריאתם הוא יש אונה והנשמות לא יום בריים מושגים לחוש הראונה נקשרות עם גשמים באונה בל יום בריים באונה בל יום באונה באו

and so move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us suppose further, that the foul by means of this vehicle feels or finds those prints and portraits, or those effects and remains left by objects on the mind in fome manner or other, which cause the remembrance of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obscured by anything; or, when there are any fuch to be felt. And lastly, let us suppose, that if the soul in its more abstracted and purer reasonings, or more spiritual acts, has any occasion for matter, to serve it, the matter of this vehicle is that which is always with it, and ferves it. All which it is easy to understand, and perhaps not very difficult to suppose. On the contrary, by many symptoms it appears most probable, that that matter, to which the mind is immediately present, and in which is its true shekinah, is not the whole gross body, but some subtile body, placed (as I have said) in the region of the brain. For there all the conveyances of sensible species conspire to meet, and there in reflexion we find our selves: when a limb is lost, the soul, 'tis true, loses an opportunity of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of using it, but perceives no loss in itself: and tho the body, many parts of it at least, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the substance, which thinks within me now (or rather, which is I), is, notwithstanding all the changes my body has undergone, the very same which thought above fifty years ago, and ever fince; when I playd in such a field, went to such a school, was of such a university, performed such and such exercises, &ca. If you would permit me to use a school term, I would say the egoity b remains. Now to answer the objection, and apply all this to our purpose. Why do we not perceive external objects in our sleep, or a swoon? Because the passages are become impracticable, the windows thut, and the nerves, being obstructed, or some how renderd for the time useless, can transmit no information to it. Why however does it not reason and think about something or other? Because, all the marks by which things are rememberd being for the present choked up or disorderd, the remembrance of those objeEts, about which it is wont to imploy itself, and even of the words (or other figns), in which it uses to reason, and to preserve the deductions and conclusions it makes, is all fuspended and lost for the time; and so its tables being coverd, its books closed, and its tools locked up, the requisites for reasoning are wanting, and no subject offers itself, to exercise its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to

take

² Cùm corpora quotidie nostra fluant, & aut crescant aut decrescant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutamur? aut alius suin decem annorum essem; alius, cùm triginta; alius cùm quinquaginta, alius, cùm jam toto cano capite sum? S. Hier. So it must be, if our souls are nothing different from our bodies.

^b Tully has Lentulitas and Appictas; in the same form, tho not just the like sense.

take in higher objects and more refined matter for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one should imagin, that the foul may think, perceive, act after death, when it doth not do this in fleep, &c. the answer is; because those inclosures and impediments, which occasiond the formentiond intermissions, and those great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be removed with its inlargement out of the body. When it shall in its proper vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the immediate impressions of objects: and why should not those impressions, which affected the nerves that moved and affected the vehicle and foul in it, affect the vehicle immediately, when they are immediately made upon it, without the interposition of the nerves? The hand, which feels an object at the end of a flaff, may certainly be allowed to feel the fame much better by immediate contact, without the staff. Nay, why should we not think, that it may admit of more objects and the knowledge of more things, than it can now; fince being exposed all round to the influences of them, it may be moved not only by visible objects just at the extremities of the optic nerves, by sounds at the ends of the auditory, &c. but become as it were all eye to visible objects, all ear to audible, and so on? And why should we not think this the rather, because then the foul may be also perceptive of finer impressions and ethereal contacts, and confequently of more kinds of objects, fuch as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being so, why should we not presage, that other indowments, as faculties of reasoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be proportionable to such noble opportunities of knowledge? There seems to be nothing in this account impossible; and therefore nothing, but what may be.

If we do but attend, we must see every where, that many things are by ways, which we do not, nor can understand; and therefore we must be convinced, even from hence, that more may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not salve the difficulties in it, and what is supposed here should be all rejected as chimerical, yet ought to be no prejudice against the belief of the immortality of

the foul, if there is any (but one) good reason for it.

But if we can in any tolerable manner (which in our present circumstances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and those the greatest belonging to this matter, and shew how it is possible that they may consist with immortality, this will greatly corroborate the arguments for it, if not be one itself. This I hope is done: or if I have not spoke directly to every part of the objection, from what has been done that defect may easily be supplied.

4. We may conclude the fouls of men to be immortal from the nature of God. For if he is (which fure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as such, can do nothing

thing inconsistent with perfect or right reason. And then no being, nor circumstance of any being, can come from Him as its cause, which it is not agreeable to
such reason should be: or (which is the same), He cannot but deal reasonably with
all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of these, and
the mortality of the human soul does not consist with reason, we may be sure it
is immortal: as sure as we can be of any thing by the use of our faculties; and
that is, as sure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth consist
with reason, or not, is to be inquired.

To produce a being into a state of clear happines, in any degree, can be no injury to it; or into a state of mixt happines, provided the happiness certainly overbalances the contrary, and the unhappy or suffering part be not greater than what that being would choose in order to obtain the happiness, or rather than lose it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being subject to more misery than happiness, if that being hath it in his own power to avoid the misery, or so much of it, as may leave the remainder of misery not greater, than what he would rather sustain than miss the proportion of happiness. The only case then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is necessarily and irremediably to be miserable, without any recompense, or balance of that misery a: and this indeed is a case so grievous, so utterly irreconcilable to all reason, that the heart of a reasoning and considering man can scarce bear the thought of it. So much every one must understand of the nature of reason and justice as to allow these things for truths incontestable.

Now then he, who says the foul of man is mortal, must say one of these two things: either that God is an unreasonable, unjust, cruel Being; or that no man in respect of this life (which according to him is all), has a greater share of misery, unavoidable, than of happiness. To say the former is to contradict that, which I presume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow such an unworthy, impious notion of the Supreme being, as one would not entertain without caution even of the worst of men; such a one, as even the person himself, who says this, must know to be false. For he cannot but see, and must own many instances of the reasonableness and beneficence of the Deity: not one of which could be, if cruelty and unreasonableness were His inclination; since He has power to execute His own inclinations thoroughly, and is a Being uniform in his nature. Then to say the latter is to contradict the whole story of mankind, and even ones own senses.

That passage in S. Iqqar. imports much the same thing, that has been said here: מבואר שהרבר שמציאותו טוב ראוי שימצא והרבר שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצא ומדן מבואר שהרבר שמציאותו מעורב מן הטוב והרע אם הטוב הוא הגובר ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא הגובר אין ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא ראוי שימצא ושימצא ואם הרע הוא הנובר אין שימצא ואם הרע הוא הנובר אין שימצא ושימצא ואם הרע הוא שימצא ושימצא ושימ

Confider well the dreadful effects of many wars, and all those barbarous desolations, which we read of: what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the world, who (at least in their fits) divert themselves with the pangs and convulsions of their fellow-creatures a: what flavery is b, and how men have been brought into that lamentable state: how many have been ruind by accidents unforeseen: how many have fufferd or been undone by unjust laws, judges, witnesses, &c c. how many have brought incurable diseases, or the causes of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, such bodily infirmities and disadvantages, as have renderd their whole lives uneasy: how many are born to no other inheritance but invincible poverty and trouble? Instances are endless: but, for a little taste of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that story related by Strabo (from Polybius) and Plutarch, where, even by order of the Roman senate, P. Emylius, one of the best of them too, at one prefixt hour facked and destroyd feventy cities, unawares, and drove fifteen myriads of innocent persons into captivity; to be sold, only to raise pay for the merciles foldiers and their own executioners. Peruse that account of the goldworks in the confines of Egypt given by Diodorus: and think over the circumstances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even such as calumny, or unjust power had doomd (perhaps for being too good) to that place of torment; many times with all their relations

² C. Casar - Senatores & Equites - cecidit, torsit, non quastionis, sed animi causa. Deinde quosdam ex illis - ad lucernam decollabat. - Torserat per omnia, qua in rerum natura tristissima sunt, fidiculis, &c. Sen. Homo, sacra res, jam per lusum & jocum occiditur. Id. kondamong beafts of old. Οὐτε ηδ γυνη πέφυκας, ἐυτ' ἐν ἀνδεκσι σύγ' ἔι. Eurip. And sometimes as mere instruments and tools. 'Ο β δελος εμψυχον όργανον τὸ δ' όργανον άψυχος δελος. Arift. Their fad condition I will fet down in Plato's words. Οὐκ ἀνδρος τῶτο γ' ἐςὶ το πάθημα, το ἀδικείος ἀκλα ἀνδεαπόδε τινός, ῷ κεεῖτῖον τεθνάναι ἐσιν ἢ ζῆν. ὅσις ἀδικέμενος κὰ πεοπηλακιζόμενος, μιὰ ὅιόςτε ἐσίν ἀυτὸς αυτῶ βοηθεῖν, μηθε ἀλλω ε αν κήθηται. · Those άρρητοι & άπισοι δυσυχίαι, which the τελώναι had brought upon the cities of Asia, are too many to be transcribed: but some account of them is to be seen in Plut. v. Luc. which may serve for one instance out of thousands. It may be reckond madness indeed, maximas virtutes, quasi gravissima delicta, punire; as Val. M. says, speaking of Phocion's case: but fuch madness has been very common, and men have suffered even for their virtue. Ochus cruelly put to death, Ocham sororem -, & patruum cum centum amplius filiis ac nepotibus -, nulla injuria lacessitus, sed quod in his maximam apud Persas probitatis & fortitudinis laudem consistere videbat. Id. And Seneca having recommended the example of Gracinus Julius (Julius Gracinus, ap. Tacit. the father of Julius Agricola), adds, quem C. Casar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat; quam effe quemquam tyranno expediret.

and poor children 2. Or, once for all, take a view of servitude, as it is described by Pignorius. To pass over the Sicilian tyrants, him of Pheræ, Apollodorus b, and the like, of which history supplies plenty; consider those terrible proscriptions among the Remans c, with the reigns of most of their emperors, more bloody than Lybic lion, or Hyrcanian tiger, even some of the Christian emperors not excepted. Read the direful and unjust executions reported by Amm. Marcellinus: among hundreds of others that of Eusebius d. Every whisper in those times or light suspicion brought upon men the question and tortures inconceivable. Men's very dreams were once interpreted to be treason; and they durst scarce own, that they had ever flept e. What inhuman punishments were used among the Persians f, in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned g? But instead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, orac Φισμώς, &c. I choose to refer you to those authors, who have designedly treated of the torments and questions of the ancients. Look into the history of the Christian Church, and her martyrologies: examin the prisons of the inquisition, the groans of which those walls are conscious, and upon what slight occasions men are racked and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finish this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as fast as I can, consider the many massacres, persecutions, and miseries consequent upon them, which false religion has caused, authorized, sanctified. Indeed the bistory of mankind is little else but the history of uncomfortable, dreadful passages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is scarcely to be red by a good natured man without amazement, horror, tears. One can scarce look into a news-paper, or out at his window, but hardships and sufferings present themselves, in one shape or other. Now among all those millions, who have sufferd eminently, can it be imagind, that there have not been multitudes, whose griefs and pangs have far outweighd all their injoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their

^{*} Οἱ ἀδικοις διαδολᾶις περιπεσόντες, κὰ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς Φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτε μθρ ἀυτοὶ, ποτε ἡ κὰ μετὰ πάσης συγ∫ενέιας.

b Mentiond by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of Cassandria, and is represented (out of Polyanus) as Φονικάταθ & ἀμότατ πάντων, ὅσοι πας Ἑκλησινη παρά Βαρδάτοις ἐτυράννησαν. Yet Ælian says, Ἐκ Ε δίνε ὑπαναΦλεγόμεν & ὁπεξαπθόμεν, ἐγίνετο Φονικάτερος, κλ.

c It is said of Sylla's peace, after Marius's party were broken, Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, Εννίοιτ. S. Aust.

d Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans calo justitiam, torvùm renidens fundato pestore mansit immobilis, &c. In the reign of Constantius.

c Marebantque dosti quidam, quòd apud Atlanteos nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri.

d Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit. Amm. Marc.

prudence,

prudence, or any power in them, to escape that bitter draught, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the justice and reasonableness of that Being, upon whom these poor creatures depend, and who leaves them such great losers by their existence, if there be no future state, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable issue; if the soul of man is not immortal, either there is no God, upon whom we depend; or He is an unreasonable Being; or there never has been any man, whose sufferings in this world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being the cause of it himself.

But furely no one of these three things can be said. Ergo ---.

That, which aggravates the hard case of the poor sufferers mentioned above, if there be no future state, in which their past sufferings may be brought into the account, and recompensed, is, that many times their persecutors and tormenters pass their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the innocent have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreasonable part of mankind, but the guilty have that, which belongs rather to the innocent a. Such a transposition of rewards and punishments, ending in itself, without any respect to something which is to follow hereafter, can never consist with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much below rational: a thought, which God forbid any one should dare to admit of Him. To suppose the virtuous and wise lest ultimately but in the same state with the unjust and profligate is to suppose such a constitution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reason, a God of truth and equity: and therefore such a constitution, as leaves the former in a worse condition than the other, can much less be supposed.

and how then can the virtue tends to make men's lives happy even here, &c. and how then can the virtuous be supposed ever to be so very miserable? Ans. In ordinary cases virtue doth produce happiness: at least it has indeed a natural tendency to it; is the mean, by which it is most likely to be attaind; and is therefore the way, which a wise man would choose for his own sake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no perturbations in human affairs; no cases, in which the usual effect of virtue may be overpowerd by diseases, violence, dysasters. It doth not render men invulnerable; cannot command the seasons; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice must fall undistinguishd. (There may be a direct road to a place, and such a one, as he, who sets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is possible he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other side, vice and wickedness may be so

Dies deficiet, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenerit: nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime. Cic. This is justly said; the I account his instances not the most apposite.

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circumstantiated as to be attended with much greater pleasure than pain, contrary to the tendency of its nature: that is, a wicked man may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a strong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive pleasures, which shall exceed the present inconveniences and sufferings

naturally following from his vices a.

Men's circumstances have a natural influence with respect to the present pleasures or sufferings, as well as their virtue or vice. No body sure ever said, that all depends only upon these: nor, when the natural tendence of them is afferted, is the natural tendence or effect of the other denied. Therefore indeed, when it is faid that virtue naturally tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in proportion to their circumstances; and vice does the contrary. It is naturally productive of that part of happiness, which is in our own power, and depends upon our felves; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumstances are, than they could be without it, and commonly tends to mend their worldly circumstances too: but it is not afferted, that virtue can always intirely correct them, or make men so completely happy in this life, as that their injoyments shall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of some particular men, tho they bereave them of many solid pleasures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from being greater than their present sufferings. Not only our being, but our place, with the time, and manner of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the scheme the manner of behaving our selves in our station (according to our indowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has so orderd things on purpose, that from the various compositions of men's circumstances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many inequalities arising thence, they might see the necessity and certainty of another state: and that for this reason there should always be some remarkable instances of opprest innocence and flourishing wickedness.

The upshot is, that upon comparing those pleasures, which are the natural effects of virtue with those sufferings, which are the natural effects of ill constitution or other calamity, these are many, very many times found to exceed: and è contrario, upon balancing those evils, which are the genuin effects of vice, against the

Yet according to Aristotle he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion Diog. L. represents thus: των ἀρετην μη ξιναι ἀυτάςκη πρὸς ἐυδαιμονίαν προδείος ρ τ τε των σῶμα ε τ ἐκτὸς ἀγαπην μήν τοι κακίαν ἀυτάςκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, κὰν ὅτι μάλισα παρῆ ἀυτῆ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ κὰ τὰ τὰ δῶν σῶμα.

advantages resulting from a fortunate estate, these may often be found to outdo the other. Both contrary to reason, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only some few, nay but one instance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and prosperous wickedness), it would be to me a sufficient argument for a future state: because God cannot be unjust or unreasonable in any one instance. It must not be forgot here, that many times men of great vices have also great virtues, and the natural effect of these may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumstances may help to turn the scale.

If there is no other beside the present being, the general and usual state of mankind is scarce consistent with the idea of a reasonable Cause. Let us consider it a little a. Not to mention what we must suffer from the very settlement and condition of this world by hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and indispositions; like leaves one generation drops, and another springs up, to fall again, and be forgotten b. As we come into the world with the labor of our mothers, we soon go out of it with our own. Childhood and youth are much of them lost in insensibility or trifling, vanity and rudeness; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are spent in the best manner, are attended with labor and discipline. When we reach that flage of life, which usually takes us from our nearest relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper imployments and stations found for us? When we are got out, and left to scramble for ourselves, how many bardships and tricks are put upon us, before we get the fagacity and dexterity to fave ourselves? How many chances do we stand? How troublesome is business made by unreasonableness, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the perfons with whom we deal? How do we find ourselves instantly surrounded with snares from defigning men, knaves, enemies (of which the best men have some), opposite interests, factions, and many times from a mischievous breed, whose childish or diabolical humor seeks pleasure in the uneasiness of other people? Even in many of those injoyments, which men principally propose to themselves, they are greatly disappointed, and experience shews, how unlike they are to the antecedent images of them. They are commonly mixtc: the apparatus to most of them is too operose: the completion of them seldom depends upon ourselves

² Et valet annales nostrorum audire laborum. For, as Seneca says, Nulli contigit impune nasci.

b''Οιηπερ φύλλων γενεί, τοιήδε & ἀνδεων. — ἡ μβο φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. Hom. This is true not only of single men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may say the same concerning many of them, that Florus says of Veii: Laborat annalium sides, ut Veios suisse credamus.

c Labor voluptasa; dissimillima natura, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta. Liv.

D d

alone,

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alone, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit all right a: they are generally not only less in practice, than in theory, but die almost as soon as they are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the history of human life: tho affairs go prosperously, yet still perhaps a family is increasing, and with it new occasions of solicitude are introduced, accompanied with many fears and tender apprehensions. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at old age, then he feels most commonly his pressures rather increased, than diminished, and himself less able to support them b. The business he has to do grows urgent upon him, and calls for dispatch: most of his faculties and active powers begin now to fail him apace: relations and friends, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Confort of all his joys, and all his cares c) leave him, never to return more: wants and pains all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this additional load he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either stumbles upon something which throws him into the grave d, or fainting falls of himself. And must be end bere? Is this the period of his being? Is this all? Did he come into the world only to make his way through the press, amidst many justlings and hard struggles, with at best only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleasures interspersed, and so go out of it again? Can this be an end worthy a first Cause perfectly reasonable? Would even any man, of common sense and good nature, send another upon a difficult journey, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little smooth way, get an interval for rest and contemplation, or be flatterd with some verdures and the smiles of a few daisies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he must travel through much dirt, take many wearisom steps, be continually inquiring after some clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent viaticum and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being lost in deep waters, and beside forced all the while to fence against weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I fay, would any one fend a man upon such a journey as this, only that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts perish; that is, either for no end at all, or for the punishment of one, whom I suppose never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable

² Sensible of this, Socrates used to say, δεῖν τὰς ἡδονὰς, μὰ πας ἀκλων, ἀκλὰ παρ ἡμῶν Αηρᾶοζ. Stob. 6 Senex, & levissimis quoq; curis impar: as Seneca, of himself, in Tac. 5 Rogus aspiciendus amata Conjugis, &c. Juv. Δ Σμίκεα παλαιὰ σώματ ἐυνάζει ροπή. Soph.

of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common fize of men 2?

I am apt to think, that even among those, whose state is beheld with envy, there are many, who, if at the end of their course they were put to their option, whether, without any respect to a future state, they would repeat all the pleasures they have had in life, upon condition to go over again also all the same disappointments, the same vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the same secret pangs and tedious hours, the same labors of body and mind, the same pains and ficknesses, would be far from accepting them at that price b.

But here the case, as I have put it, only respects them, who may be reckond among the more fortunate passengers: and for one, that makes his voyage so well, thousands are tost in tempests, and lost c. How many never attain any comfortable settlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various misfortunes? What melancholy, what distractions are caused in families by inhumane or vitious husbands, false or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy children; and, if they are otherwise, if they are good, what forrow by the loss of them? How many are forced by necessity upon drudging and very shocking imployments for a poor livelihood? How many subsist upon begging, borrowing, and other shifts, nor can do otherwise? How many meet with sad accidents, or fall into deplorable diseases? Are not all companies, and the very streets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful ftories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may ascribe their deaths to want and dejection. Seriously, the prefent state of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not some connexion with another, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it d.

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruses the story and face of the world, what appears to prevail in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at least? Are not debauching e, getting per fas aut nefas, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other,

pro-

[·] Πάντες έτμεν ον όδω.— ίδες έπι τ΄ όδο φυτον η πόαν η ύδως η ό, τι άν τύχη τ άξίων θεάματ. μικρον ετές 4 2 15; ειτα παρεδραμες πάλιν ενέτυχες λίθοις κο Φάραγξιν Ε κρήμνοις Ε σκοπέλοις, ή που Ε b Non mehercule quisquam accepisset [vitam], nisi da-Inciois, xx. Toisto o Bio. Baf. e Paulisper te crede subduci in montis ardui verticem celsiorem; specuretur insciis. Sen. lare inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in deversa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines in-העולם הזדה רומדה לפרוזרור בפני ש tuere. Jam seculi & ipse miseraberis, &c. Cypr. e O si possis in illa sublimi specula constitutus oculos tuos inse-רבא. P. Aboth. rere secretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad conscientiam luminum penetralia occulta reserare, ec. Cypr. Dd 2

propagating empty and senseless opinions with bawling and sury the great business of this world? And are not all these contrary to reason? Can any one then with reason imagine, that reason should be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then extinguishd? May we not rather conclude, that there must be some world, where reason will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of reason to come?

In the last place, that great expectation, which men have, of continuing to live in another state, beyond the grave, has I suppose been commonly admitted as one proof, that they shall live; and does seem indeed to me to add some weight to what has been said. That they generally have had such an expectation, can scarce be denied. The histories of mankind, their deissications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a hades, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c. all testify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the souls of men survived their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the seats and circumstances of the departed has begot many errors and superstitions; and these have been multiplied by licentious poets and idle visionairs: but this, being no more than what is usual in the like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the fundamental opinion itself.

Cicero b, tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philosophers about this matter; that, quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum effe sempiternos; that Pythagoras and his school confirmed this opinion; that Plato was the man, who brought a reason for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare; that nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium; that permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium; and more to this purpose. Now if this consent was only the effect of some tradition, handed from parents to their children; yet fince we meet with it in all the quarters of the world (where there is any civility or fense), and in all ages, it seems to be ceeval to mankind itself, and born with it. And this is sufficient to give a great authority to this opinion of the foul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is supported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reasonings and symptoms which we may find within ourselves. All which, put together, may at least justify an expectation of a future state: that is, render it a just or reasonable expectation: and then this reasonable expectation grows, by being such, into a further argument, that there will be fuch a state.

^{*} Beside, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for suture opportunities, when our faculties shall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας & θέας Ε΄ ὅντῷν ἐδεῖς ἐντᾶνθα τ΄ ἐράνταν ἐκαλησεν ἐκυτὸν ἰκανῶς. κτλ. Plut.

Lin Tusc. disp.

Fancy

Fancy a man walking in some retired field, far from noise, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himself: and then judge, whether such meditations as these would not be just. "I think I may be sure, that neither lifeless matter, nor the vegetative tribe, that stone, that flower, that tree have any " reflex thoughts: nor do the sensitive animals, that sheep, that ox, seem to have " any fuch thing, or but in the lowest degree, and in respect of present objects " only. They do not reason, nor discourse. I may therefore certainly pretend to " be fomething much above all these things a. I not only apprehend and consi-" der these external objects acting at present upon my nerves, but have ideas " raised within my self of a higher order, and many: I can, not only represent " to my felf things, that are, or have been, but deduce many other from them, " make excursions into futurity, and foresee much of what will be, or at least " may be; by strict thinking I had almost said, get into another world before-"hand: and, whether I shall live in some other state after death, or not, I am " certainly a being capable of fuch an expectation, and cannot but be folicitous a-"bout it: none of which things can be faid of these clods, or those brutes b. Can "I then be designd for nothing further, than just to eat, drink, sleep, walk about, " and act upon this earth; that is, to have no further being, than what these brutes have, so far beneath me? Can I be made capable of such great expectati-" ons, which those animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I " am, if we must die alike), only to be disappointed at last? Thus placed, just upon "the confines of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, " and injoying it, only to make a short appearance hered, and then to be shut out and totally sunk? Must I then, when I bid my last farewell to these walks, when " I close these lids, and yonder blue regions and all this scene darken upon me and " go out, must I then only serve to furnish dust to be mingled with the ashes of " these berds and plants, or with this dirt under my feet? Have I been set so far above them in life, only to be leveld with them at death?

This argument grows ftronger in the apprehension of one, who is conscious of abilities and intellectual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of shewing and using, through want of health, want of considence e, want of pro-

^{*} Methinks those philosophers make but an odd appearance in story, who looking big and fastuous, at the same time professed, that their own souls were not superior to those of gnats, &c. is τας όφεῦς ἀνεσπακότες μηθεν κατὰ των ἐσίαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφήναντο ἐμπίδων τε κὰ ἐυλῆς, ε μυίας,—
κὰ συὸς ψυχῆς——των σφῶν ἀυτῶν Φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχὴν, as Euseb.

b Alexander after:
death might be in the same state with his muletier (M. Anton.), but sure not with his mule.

s Brevis est hic fructus homullis, may be justly said for all Lucretius.

d Ὁ κόσμω σκηνή,
è βιος πάροδος ἡλθες, ἰδες, ἀπῆλθες. Democrat.

c ΠΟΟΠ ΣΥΙΟΥ ΓΝ. Prav.

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per place, want of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge consequent upon them, cannot ultimately respect this state: they can be only an inlargement, and preparation for another. That is all they can be: and if they are not that, they are nothing. And therefore he may be supposed thus, surther, to argue within himself. "Can the Author of my reasoning faculties be Himself so unreasonable" as to give me them, either not to imploy them, or only to weary my self with "useless pursuits, and then drop me? Can He, who is privy to all my circumstances, and to these very thoughts of mine, be so insensible of my case, as to have no regard to it, and not provide for it?

It grows ftronger still upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cause he has given for it, the pains and secret uneasiness he has felt upon that score, together with many other sufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a silent, humble appeal to that Being, who is his last and true refuge, and who he must believe will not desert him thus.

Lastly, it is strongest of all to one, who, besides all this, endeavours in the conduct of his life to observe the laws of reason (that is, of his nature; and that is, of the Author of nature, upon whom he depends); laments, and labors against his own instrmities; implores the Divine mercy; prays for some better state hereaster; acts and lives in the hopes of one; and denies himself many things upon that view: one, who by the exaltation of his reason and upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effect of real and useful philosophy, the practice of virtue, is still approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taste something spiritual and above this world. To such a one there must be a strong expectation indeed, and the argument built upon it must be proportionable. For can he be indowd with such capacities, and have as it were overtures of immortality made him, if after all there is no such thing? Must his private acts and conceald exercises of religion be all lost ? Can a perfect Being have so little regard to one, who however inferior and nothing to Him, yet regards Him according to his best abilities in the government of himself?

Are such meditations and reflexions as these well founded, or not? If they are, it must be reasonable to think, that God will satisfy a reasonable expectation.

There are other arguments for the immortality of the foul, two of which I will leave with you, to be at your leifure ponderd well. The one is, that, if the fouls of men are mortal (extinguished at death), the case of brutes is by much prescrable to that of men. The pleasures of brutes, tho but sensual, are more sincere, being

palled or diminished by no diverting consideration: they go wholly into them; and when they have them not, they seem less to want them, not thinking of them. Their sufferings are attended with no reflexion, but are such as they are said to be p. 34. obs. They are void of cares; are under no apprehension for families and posterity; never fatigue themselves with vain inquiries, hunting after know-ledge which must perish with them; are not anxious about their future state, nor can be disappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at last some sudden blow (or a few minutes of unforeseen pain) finishes them, having never so much as known that they were mortal.

The other is, that the foul is a principle of life: that, which brings vitality to the body. For how should that, which has been proved to be a substance, and at the same time is also a principle of life, and as such (as being what it is) is alive; I say, how can that die c, unless it is annihilated?

Here I begin to be very fensible how much I want a guide. But as the religion of nature is my theme, I must at present content my self with that light which nature affords; my business being, as it seems, only to shew, what a Heathen philosopher, without any other help, and almost aurodidate, may be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else containd in this Delineation, can be the least prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is immediately reveald from God, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being what it is: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, believed and obeyd. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my song, is so far from undermining true reveald religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And so returning to my philosopher, I cannot imagin but that even he would have at least some such sast these, which make up almost the remainder of this last section.

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IX. The foul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat, or state, agreeable to the nature of it. Every species of beings must belong to some region, or state. Because nothing can be, but it must be some where, and some how: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of substituting in the universe, and the natures of the things, that are to exist in them, being also different, there will be a greater congruity between these several natures respectively and some particular places, or states, than there is between them and others; and indeed such a one, that out of those perhaps they cannot substit, or not naturally. To those therefore must be their respective tendences: to those they are adjudged by the course of nature, and constitution of things, or rather by the Author of them b.

While the foul is in the body, it has fome powers and opportunities of moving it spontaneously, or otherwise than it would be moved by the meer laws of gravitation and mechanism. This is evident. But yet, notwithstanding this, the weight of that body, to which at present it is limited (among other causes) constrains it to act for a while upon this stage. That general law, to which bodies are subjected, makes it fink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself; keeps it down; and so determines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, to be upon the furface of this earth, where, or in whose neighbourhood it was first produced. But then, when the foul shall be disengaged from the gross matter. which now incloses and incumbers it, and either become naked spirit, or be only veild in its own fine and obsequious vehicle, it must at the same time be either freed from the laws of bodies, and fall under some other, which will carry it to some proper mansion, or state; or at least by the old ones be capable of mounting upwards d, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of these regions into some medium more suitable, and (if the philosopher may say so) equilibrious. Thus much as to the general state of souls after death. But then,

The transmigration of souls has been much talked of: but ea sententia,—quoniam ridicula, & mimo dignior quàm scholâ, ne refelli quidem seriò debet; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat. So Lactantius. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucian of Homer's having been a camel in Bactria, &c.

b Χωρεῖν δ ἀνάξκη τὸ ὁμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοιον. Hierocl.

c Ex humili atque depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu. Sen. Ἡ τ θνητῆς προσπαθείας δίπιολη, ⓒ ἡ τ ἀρετῶν, ὁιον πτερῶν τινων, ἔκφυσις πρὸς τ τ καλῶν καθαςὸν τόπον, ἐις τὸν θείαν ἐυζωίαν ἡμῶς ἀνάξει. Hierocl.

d Depositâ sarcinâ, levior volabit ad cœlum. S. Hicr.

X. In this new state, or place of abode, there may be different stations besitting the differences of particular souls among themselves, as they are more or less perfect in their kind. We see even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, sigures, impulses, &c. settle into some order among themselves, agreeable to these differences. And so by the same universal rule in nature (viz. that differences in things are attended with answerable relations and effects) souls must also take their situation in some kind of order according to their differences.

XI. The great difference of human souls, with respect to perfection and impersection, lies in their different degrees and habits of reasonableness or unreasonableness. That is to say, not only in men's different improvements, or neglects and abuse of their rational faculties; but also in the greater or less influence of these upon their actions, and by consequence in their different degrees of virtue, or vice. For a man is accounted a reasonable man, when he reasons rightly, and follows his reason: in which expression virtue must be included, being (as p. 179, & al.) nothing but the practice of reason and truth.

That men are reasonable, or the contrary, in different degrees is plain. Some reason well upon some subjects, but in respect of others, to which they have not been accustomed, are dim and confused: or they are partial to their vices and passions, their old impressions and parties; and so their reason is not general, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whose reason is uncultivated and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into superstition and absurdities; missed by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes of speaking, and grave non-sense. Many, if not the most, seem to have scarce any notion of reason or virtue at all, but act fortuitously, or as they see other solks act; moved either by bodily propensions, or by example. Some few there are, who endeavour to improve their understandings, to discover what is agreeable to reason, and to fix their opinions; and conduct their lives accordingly. And in all these several kinds there are various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immersion in vice and ignorance, and new differences arising endlessy. All this is visible.

The Jews, who generally fay, that by the practice of religion the foul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay fuch a stress upon habits of piety, that R. Albo makes the effect of giving 1000 zuzin in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one zuz and repeating it 1000 times החמת בעם אחת בעל אחר בעצמו יקנה מררגה יותר גרולה מעשיית הפעל ההוא פעם אחת בל שוביים מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב---והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל הפועל והיותו קים לעד עושר: מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב---והגמול הגוף והרבקו בשכל הפועל והיותו קים לעד E e

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Now the foul, reflecting, finds in itself two general faculties, one, by which it understands, and judges, and reasons (all which I comprehend under the term rational faculties, or reason); and another, by which it wills, or determins to act, according to the judgments and conclusions made in the upper part of it. And the more perfectly it performs these operations (i.e. the more truly it reasons, and the more readily it wills and executes the decisions of reason), the more perfect certainly it must be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accomplishments therefore and perfections of human souls, and the contraty, must be in proportion to the forementiond differences.

XII. According to these differences then it is reasonable to think the souls of men will find their stations in the suture world. This is but a corollary from what goes before.

Obj. Why should we think, that God causes things to be in such a manner, as that in the future state men shall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progress they have made in reason and virtue, when we see the case to be widely different in this? Ans. It must be rememberd, that this is one of those very reasons on which the belief of the soul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reasonable to believe there is a future state, because things are dealt unequally now, upon that very score it will be reasonable to think, that they are dealt equally b in that other state.

Here bodily wants and affections, and such things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound merit with demerit, knowledge with ignorance: and hence it comes to pass many times, that bad men injoy much, and good men suffer, and both are, if there is no other state, in their wrong places. But, when the corporeal causes of misplacing shall be removed, spirits (or spirits and their objects their objects) may be supposed more regularly to take their due posts and privileges: the impudent and vitious will have no such opportunities of getting into circumstances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find such obstructions to keep them down in circumstances unworthy of them. Be sure the more advanced and pure any state is, the more properly will the inhabitants be ranked, and the juster and more natural will the subordination of its members be.

Even here we commonly find men in that kind of business, for which they are educated and prepared; men of the same professions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reasonable desiring to be (tho they not always can be) with their like;

^{*} Τόπες προσήκεντας τῆ ἀρετῆ. Plato.

b With an equal or impartial regard to every man's deserts: equitably.

c 'Αγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἔασιν 'Αντόματοι ἀγαθὸι. Ε. Plat.

and

and the vitious (as they scarcely cannot be) with theirs. And why should we not think, that an association and communion of souls with those of their own size, disposition, and habits may be more universal and compleat, when those things, which in great measure hinder it here, shall be no more? If we may think this, certainly those fields or states, in which the virtuous and wise a shall meet, must be different from those in which the foolish and wicked shall herd together b. The very difference of the company will itself create a vast difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. The mansions, and conditions of the virtuous and reasoning part must be proportionably better than those of the foolish and vitious. The proposition cannot be inverted, or the case be otherwise, if the constitution of things depends upon a reasonable cause: as I have endeavourd to shew it does.

Cor. Hence it follows, that the practice of reason (in its just extent) is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happiness through all our subsequent duration. But moreover,

XIV. In the future state respect will be had not only to men's reasoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but also to their injoyments and sufferings here. Because the forementiond inequalities of this world can by no means be redrest, unless men's injoyments and sufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I say, taken together: because no reason can be assigned, why a vitious man should be recompensed for the pains and mischiefs and troubles, which he brings upon himself by his vices, as the natural consequences of them; nor, on the other side, why any deductions should be made from the future happiness of a good man upon the score of those innocent injoyments, which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and sound reasoning.

Cor. Wicked men will not only be less happy than the wise and virtuous, but be really unbappy in that state to come. For when all the happiness, that answers to those degrees of virtue, which they had, and those sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedness; I say, when

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that is subtracted, what remains upon the account will be something below no-happiness: which must be some quantity of positive unhappiness, or misery.

Thus there will be rewards, and funishments hereafter: and men will be happy, or unhappy, according to their behaviour, injoyments, and sufferings in this present life. But,

XV. If the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot. To say, when a house is ruinous and falm, that it once had an inhabitant, and that he is escaped out of it, and lives in some other place, can involve no contradiction, or absurdity. And,

XVI. If the immortality of the foul should be considered only as a probability, or even as a chance possible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contraty. For if the foul be mortal, and all perception perishes for ever at our death, what in this case does a good man lose by his virtue? Very rarely more than some acts of devotion, and instances of mortification, which too by custom grow habitual and easy c, and it may be pleasant by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man gain? Only such injoyments, as a virtuous man leaves: and those are such, as most commonly owe their being to a vitiated taste; grow insipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off disagreeably;

sure those arguments in Lucretius can convince no body. Nunc quoniam, quassatis undique vasis, Diffluere humorem, & laticem discedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi, &c. And Preterem gigni pariter cum corpore & unà Crescere sentimus, pariter que senescere mentem, &c. Quare animum quoque dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi. Nor those in Pliny (N.H. 7.55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the antegenitale experimentum is to beg the question; which may be put thus, Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence, than we were before we were born. And if Dicaarchus's Lesbiaci were extant, I believe we should find nothing stronger in them. The truth seems to be, O' βάλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον κίνωι τίω αυτά ψυχών: but he comforts himself with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον ἐδένεια ἐαυτά will prevent future sufferings. This is τὸ μὴ είναι καταφυγή. Hierocl.

b Nor that the soul still exists ἔξημου καταλιπάσα ζωῆς τὰ μμέτεςον δίκου. Ph J. Domus ab habitatere deserta dilabitur:

- Ε΄ corpus, relictum ab anima, dessuit. Lact.

c Μακερος ζ ε΄ δεθιος δίμος ἐπ΄ ἀυτὴν [ἀρετην].

και τρηχὸς τὸ πρῶτον. ἐπλην δ΄ εἰς ἀκερον καται, Υπίδη δ΄ ἡπειτα πέλει. Hes.

are followd many times by sharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and at best after a short time end in nothing, as if they had never been. This is all a. But then if the soul prove to be immortal (as we have all the reason in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous man gain? His present pleasures (if not so many) are more sincere b and natural c; and the effect of his self-denials and submission to reason, in order to prepare himself for a future state, is the happiness of that state: which, without pretending to describe it, may be presumed to be immortal, because the soul is so; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (i. e. truer, and greater) than any of these low injoyments here, because that state is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man lose? That happiness, which the virtuous gain as such; and he sinks, bestide, into some degree of the unbappiness of that suture state: of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappiness or sufferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above those of this.

In a flate that is *spiritual* and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and strongly, and (if the expression may be tolerated) with more spirit: there will be fewer obstructions to either happiness or unhappiness: the soul will lie more open, and have more immediate and acute perceptions of either: so that each of them in their kind will be more intense, the one nearer to pure or mere happiness, the other to the contrary d. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my philosopher.

I shall only add, that the reasoning and virtuous man has at least this advantage over the foolish and profligate, that, tho his wisdom and virtue cannot always rectify that which is amiss in himself or his circumstances, they will find means to alleviate his pressures and disadvantages, and support him under all the anomalies of life, with comforts of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of felicity bereafter, sincere and durable e.

^{*} Calo prafertur Adonis.

b 'O ἀρετῆ διαπρέπων & ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτες καρπέται. Hierocla

c If the foul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τω ἱαυτε τελειότητα ἀπλαμδάνων, τὸ ὀικεῖον καρπέμενος ἀγαθον, ἐυδάιμων ὀντως ἐςὶ & μακάριος. & β & τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. Simpl.

α 'Ωςε μὴ μόνον τῷ καλῷ περιεῖναι τ σπεδαῖον Ε φάυλε, ἀκὰ & ἀυτῆ τῷ ἡδονῷ νικᾶν, δὶ ἡν μόνην δοκεῖ εἰς κακίαν ὁ φᾶυλος ὑπάγεοζ. Hier.

c Οἱ β δίκαιοι τ ἀδίκων, εἰ μηδεν ἀκλο πλεονεκτεσιν, ἀκὰ ὁων ἐλπίσι γε σπεδαίαις ὑπερέχεσιν. Ι/οςτ.

ΧΥΙΙ. Ηε

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XVII. He therefore, who would all according to truth, must, in the last place, not only consider what he is, and how circumstantiated in this present state, and provide accordingly; but, further, must consider himself also as one whose existence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.

For a conclusion of the whole matter; let our conversation in this world, so far as we are concernd, and able, be such as acknowledges every thing to be what it is (what it is in itself, and what with regard to us, to other beings, to causes, circumstances, consequences): that is, let us by no act deny any thing to be true, which is true: that is, let us act according to reason: and that is, let us act according to the law of our nature. By honestly endeavouring to do this we shall express our duty a to Him, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the same time prosecute our own proper happiness (the happiness of rational beings): we shall do what tends to make us easy here, and be qualifying our selves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great revolution, which, at the farthest, cannot be very far off.

And now, Sir, the trouble is almost over for the present, not properly which I give you, but which you have brought upon yourself, these being the Thoughts, which you desired: unless I have any where misrepresented myself through inadvertence; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in some places subjoined a few little strictures principally of antiquity, after the manner of annotations: such as, when I came to revise these sheets, I could recollect upon the sudden b; having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any such thing before that time. They may serve perhaps sometimes a little to explain the text; and sometimes to add weight; but chiefly to divert you, who know very well how to improve any the least bint out of the Ancients, and I fear will want to be diverted. I have also printed a sew copies of this Sketch, not with any design to make it public, but merely to save the trouble of transcribing; being minded, since I have made it, to leave it not only with you, but perhaps also with two or three other friends:

a Τρόπ Φ η Θι δ θις απείας ετος εσιάτατος [ἀσκεῖν ἀςετήν]. fof.

b Some more were added in the fecond impression.


c Nothing more was intended at first. See the advertise-ment.

or however, with my Family, as a private monument of one that meant well. Tho, as to the disposal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment and manner of acceptance.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

מכיא ות"ל.







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